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Given the the low levels of educational standards in the developing world, the World Edu-
cation Forum adopted the Dakar Framework for Action (DFA) in 2000, calling for quality
‘Education for All’ children of school-going age. Heeding to this call, many sub-Saharan
African countries instituted Free Primary Education (FPE) policies. Lesotho instituted the
FPE programme in 2000 on a grade-by-grade basis; first abolishing school fees in grade one,
and then in successive higher grades each following year.
This thesis consists of a short introductory chapter, three self-contained analytical chap-
ters which empirically evaluate the importance of the FPE policy and family factors on
education in Lesotho, and the summary chapter. It first examines the effect of the FPE
policy on primary school enrolment in Chapter 2 using household level data for before and
after the policy. A difference-in-differences strategy is employed to tease out the FPE ef-
fect. This exploits the variations in enrolment rates over time and across grade-groups (i.e.
grades covered versus those not-yet covered) created by the implementation strategy of the
programme. The findings demonstrate that the policy significantly increased enrolment of
primary school-age children by at least 9.3 percentage points (or 13.2 percent). There is also
evidence that this policy disproportionately raised enrolment levels of children from poor
households and that of boys (the historically disadvantaged group), thereby bridging the
gender- and wealth-related educational (enrolment) inequalities.
In Chapter 3, the thesis draws on grade six pupils’ standardised maths and (English)
reading test scores from 2000 and 2007 to analyse changes in educational achievement and
educational inequality, and the determinants of such changes. The analysis of the data shows
that educational achievement increased significantly for both low- and high-ability pupils
over the period of analysis. Nonetheless, this increase in achievement was accompanied by
a significant rise in educational inequality, especially in reading test scores. The analysis
further shows that these changes are statistically related to policy measures taken under
the FPE programme. In particular, the results show that pupil-teacher ratio is negatively
correlated with changes in reading performance of low-ability pupils, while teacher effort (i.e.
subject-testing frequency and teaching hours per week) and grade repetition have a positive
influence on changes in educational achievement. These results suggest that the fall in pupil
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teacher ratio between 2000 and 2007 has helped increase educational achievement.
The analysis, however, reveals that much of the increase in educational achievement
and educational inequality is unexplained by both school and pupils’ family characteristics,
which suggests that there could be other unobserved family and school factors that influence
achievement and inequality. Therefore, in Chapter 4 of the thesis I shift focus from FPE
policy effects and look at the impact of family factors on human capital accumulation. Specif-
ically, Chapter 4 examines the effect of a child’s order of birth on human capital development
(i.e. enrolment, educational attainment, and schooling progression) using family-fixed effects
models. Birth order has received much attention in the economics and psychology litera-
ture. Contrary to much of the evidence from developing countries, I find that birth order
has a strong negative effect on human capital development. These birth order effects are
pronounced in large families, and families with first-born girls, thereby revealing the strong
girls’ education preferences in Lesotho. Turning to potential pathways of these effects, I find
that birth order effects are not propagated through family wealth, but mainly though birth-
(or child-) spacing. These results suggest that there are some intra-household inefficiencies
that could explain the changes in educational achievement and inequality.
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Economic theory predicts and many empirical studies confirm that quality education is
important for individuals’ health and lifetime earnings as well as economic growth (Becker,
1964; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012). Thus, the poor education in much of the developing
world will likely retard growth and development in these countries.
In 2000, the World Education Forum adopted the Dakar Framework for Action (DFA),
which called for complete, free and compulsory quality education, and redress of educational
inequalities (UNESCO, 2000, p.8). This was the world’s response to addressing the problem
of what Pritchett (2004) calls ‘lack of education’ (that is, low levels of school enrolment,
educational attainment, and educational achievement) in the developing world. For example,
at the time, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was trailing all other regions in all education indicators
with a net enrolment rate of 56 percent, a 13 percent repetition rate, and high delayed school
entry estimated at 70 percent (see Pritchett, 2004).
It is often said that education is like a three-legged pot; it requires equal contribution
from parents, teachers, and the community. This implies that a child’s development outcomes
are influenced by her family, community, and school experiences. Thus, public policies that
increase the supply of schooling, and aim to change a community’s and family’s preferences
towards education might help to improve education.
Since the adoption of the DFA, several sub-Saharan African countries1 have instituted
free primary education (FPE) programmes, which involve the abolition of all user fees in
public schools to encourage school enrolment as a first step towards addressing the ‘lack of
education’ problem.
Lesotho implemented the FPE policy sequentially from grade one up to grade seven
between 2000 and 2006. Today, primary schooling is free of user-fees. Under the FPE
programme, other private schooling costs such as stationery and textbooks’ costs have largely
1These include Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland,
Tanzania, and Zambia.
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been eliminated. Moreover, since the government’s primary objective was to put all children
of primary school-going age in school, the abolishment of user-fees was accompanied by an
aggressive school building programme and school feeding programme. For example, between
2002 and 2011, the number of schools in Lesotho increased by 10 percent, from 1333 schools
in 2002 to 1468 schools in 2011 (MOET, 2011). Much of the increase in the number of
schools during this period occurred between 2002 and 2006. The number of schools in this
period, 2002 to 2006, increased by 9 percent.
As of 2011, 40 percent of primary schools were in the mountains region (which is a largely
rural region), versus 36 percent in the lowlands ( a largely urban) region. The remaining 24
percent of schools were also in the mainly rural regions; the Senqu River Vally region with
4 percent, and the Foothills region with 36 percent. Data from the Southern and Eastern
African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) shows that the share
of urban schools dropped by 1.5 percentage points from 35.1 percent to 33.6 between 2000
and 2007. This was a statistically significant drop (increase) in the number of urban (rural)
schools over this period. This indicates that, there were more schools built in rural areas
than in urban areas where relatively more schools existed before the programme.
The school building programme is aimed at increasing the schools’ capacity to handle the
influx of students attracted by the abolishment of user-fees. The school feeding programme on
the other hand is aimed at retaining children within the schooling system, especially children
from poor families who are at higher risk of dropping out of school because of hunger. In
order to mitigate against the potential decline in educational quality, the government also
increased the number of teachers in primary schools. Between 2002 to 2011, the number
of teachers increased by 28 percent, from 8908 teachers in 2002 to 11378 teachers in 2011
(MOET, 2011). Similar to the increase in the number of schools, the biggest increase in the
number of teachers hired happened between 2002 and 2006. During this time, the number
of teachers increased by 21 percent, which accounts for about 75 percent of the increase
between 2002 and 2011. This shows that, at the time the FPE was being rolled out to higher
grades, the number of schools and teachers were also increasing.
To my knowledge, no other sub-Saharan African country followed the same strategy as
Lesotho in implementing the FPE programme. For example, in Malawi, school fees were
first abolished on a grade-by-grade basis for the first three grades, starting with grade one
from 1991 to 1993, and then simultaneously eliminated for all remaining grades in 1994. In
Uganda and Kenya, user fees were simultaneously eliminated for all primary school grades
in 1997 and 2003, respectively. The effects of this policy on education in Lesotho have not
been studied before, and may differ from those found in other countries.
As mentioned earlier, taking children to school is just one way of addressing the lack
of education in the developing world. Improving education does not only require chang-
2
ing demand and supply constraints, but also requires deep understanding of other family,
community, and school environment factors that impact on a child’s development. Knowing
which family factors affect child outcomes, and how they do so, is equally important for
addressing the lack of education problem. There are a plethora of important family factors
that have an influence on education, but the child’s order of birth has been a recurring
theme in both the economics of education and psychology literatures. That birth order has
an influence on human capital accumulation is undisputed in both literatures (Black et al.,
2005; De Haan, 2010; De Haan et al., 2014; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; Sulloway, 2007),
but the important question of how it impacts a child’s outcomes remains open.
Therefore, the big question that forms the basis of this thesis is, what is the effect of
public policies and the family environment on human capital development? Specifically, the
thesis addresses the following questions:
1. What is the effect of the FPE programme on school enrolment?
2. What are the implications of FPE policy on educational quality?
3. What is the effect of birth order on education?
Looking at the effects of both government policy (i.e. the FPE) and family environment (i.e.
birth order) on education acknowledges the fact that both family and school factors, and
government policy are essential in human capital accumulation.
This thesis is related to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to the literature
that analyses changes in schooling and educational achievement in developing countries over
time, sometimes following the introduction of large public policy reforms (Jopo et al., 2011b;
Carnoy and Rothstein, 2013; Lekhetho, 2013; Rodrigues et al., 2013; Taylor and Spaull,
2013). Most of this literature, however, largely use measures of location (that is, mean, me-
dian, and variance) to analyse changes in educational quality (or achievement) and schooling
enrolment (see Jopo et al., 2011b; Carnoy and Rothstein, 2013; Taylor and Spaull, 2013).
For example, Carnoy and Rothstein (2013) use changes in PISA (Program for International
Student Assessment) test scores since 2000 to assess changes in the U.S.’s educational qual-
ity, while Jopo et al. (2011b) look at changes in SACMEQ average test scores for Lesotho to
infer changes in education quality since the introduction of FPE.
However, the use of this traditional summary statistic (i.e. the mean) leaves much of the
information inherent in a test scores’ distribution untapped and thus fails to reveal much of
education quality dynamics. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the increase in average
achievement in some countries, for example, is due to improved student performance levels
at the upper and/or lower tails of the distribution. On the one hand, if the increase in
average achievement is due to an increase in the performance of high-ability students, then
we are faced with a scenario of improved average education quality and a rise in education
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inequality. If, on the other hand, the increase in average scores is a consequence of increased
performance of low-ability students, then we have a case of a reduction in education inequality
and improved education quality. Knowing which scenario prevails is essential for education
policy in order to ensure that no child is left behind, not only outside the schooling system
but also within the schooling system.
Furthermore, studies that go beyond averages in analysing changes in education (for
example, Rodrigues et al., 2013) fall short of analysing the determinants of such changes.
In this thesis, I examine the distributional changes in educational quality (or achievement),
and the determinants of such changes, following the introduction of the FPE programme.
Second, this thesis speaks to the literature on the effects of large public policy reforms
on school enrolment and educational achievement. For example, Schultz (2004) evaluates
the effect of the PROGRESA programme in Mexico, which provides rural mothers with
education grants, on school enrolment. In China, Chyi and Zhou (2014) examine the impact
of public policy reforms targeting the rural poor (that is, tuition waivers, free textbooks, and
living stipends for children). Both in China and Mexico, public policy reforms implemented
in the respective countries had a significant positive effect on school enrolment.
I mentioned earlier that a number of sub-Saharan African countries have implemented
FPE programmes. But there are few studies, concentrated on a few countries, that attempt to
tease out the effect of these programmes on education in sub-Saharan Africa (see Deininger,
2003; Grogan, 2009; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). For example, Deininger (2003), Nishimura et al.
(2008), and Grogan (2009) assess the effects of the Ugandan FPE programme on schooling.
Al-Samarrai and Zaman (2007), Lucas and Mbiti (2012), and Hoogeveen and Rossi (2013)
evaluate the effects of FPE on education in Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania, respectively. These
papers find positive effects of the FPE policy on schooling.
However, the results of some papers are potentially biased because of the methods they
used. For instance, Deininger (2003) examines the impact of FPE on enrolment in Uganda by
estimating Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of primary and secondary enrolment,
respectively, on a vector of controls plus a dummy for post-FPE period which is meant to
pick the effect. The results indicate that after the programme, primary school enrolment
increased more than secondary school enrolment, and this is attributed to the FPE policy.
But we know that primary school enrolment rates are higher than secondary school
enrolment rates in many developing countries, and that drop-out rates are differentially high
among girls (Pritchett, 2004). This suggests that secondary school enrolment is potentially
a bad counterfactual for primary school enrolment. Thus, it is hard to infer and/or quantify
the impact of FPE from the analysis. Therefore, Lucas and Mbiti (2012) lament that, in
spite of the widespread implementation of FPE programmes in SSA, there is a dearth of
credible research evaluating their casual effect on child schooling. Furthermore, there is
4
little knowledge on the implications of this policy for changes in educational achievement
over time. This thesis adds to this growing literature while addressing some identification
issues that have plagued earlier studies as highlighted by Lucas and Mbiti (2012). Given
that resources are limited, it is always important to know whether any given public policy
achieves the desired outcomes.
Third, this thesis relates to the literature that examines the influence of the family envi-
ronment on human capital development (Leibowitz, 1974; Cunha et al., 2006). Specifically,
it contributes to the literature that evaluates the effect of a child’s unique characteristic,
the order of birth, on human capital accumulation (Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010; Jay-
achandran and Kuziemko, 2011; De Haan et al., 2014). Even though a child’s order of birth
is biologically determined, parents can actively or passively choose to create different home
environments for children of different birth orders, which will then affect their cognitive and
non-cognitive skills’ development. On the one hand, parents may enforce stricter disciplinary
rules on the first-borns than later-borns, and thus lead to different educational outcomes be-
tween siblings. This constitutes passive differential investments on children. On the other
hand, parents may purposefully invest relatively more on later-borns and/or boys because
of cultural and/or economic pressures.
The available evidence on birth order effects on educational attainment shows a consistent
divide between the developing world and the developed world: there tend to be negative birth
order effects in developed countries, while there is evidence of positive birth order effects from
developing countries (De Haan et al., 2014). Therefore, birth order effects on child outcomes
appear to be context-specific, as it relates to countries’ levels of development. The literature
on birth order effects in the sub-Saharan African context is very sparse (see Tenikue and
Verheyden, 2010) and the available evidence may not be generalised to other countries in
the region. This points to the value of this thesis, which aims to provide new evidence on
this subject from another sub-Saharan African country.
Lastly, the thesis contributes to the literature on child gender and parental investments.
According to this literature, parents discriminate against girls in terms of investments in
human capital development. For example, in India, parents invest more on boys than girls in
terms of breastfeeding and provision of medical care, and this preferential treatment increases
with birth order (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). These early better investments in the
health of boys relative to girls, and younger children relative to earlier borns may translate
into better human capital accumulation capabilities for boys and young children relative
to their female and older siblings, respectively, (Cunha and Heckman, 2009). Furthermore,
parents in most developing countries are more likely send boys to schools than girls (Morduch,
2000).
The fundamental question that guides this thesis is, what is the effect of public policy
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reforms and the family environment on human capital accumulation? With the following
three self-contained analytical chapters, I attempt to answer this fundamental question, and
also contribute the literature by filling in the research gaps highlighted above.
Lesotho presents an interesting case study for addressing this important question for the
following reasons. Firstly, because of the unique way in which the FPE policy was introduced
in Lesotho, one is able to analyse the causal effect of the policy on education using a relatively
clean identification strategy. In countries where the FPE policy was introduced at once for
all primary school grades, it have been difficult to tease out the potential effects of the policy
on school enrolment and educational achievement (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). This has been a
significant impediment to our understanding of the effectiveness of the FPE programmes in
different contexts.
Secondly, the availability of educational achievement data for before and after the FPE
policy implementation makes it possible to analyse the dynamics of educational achievement
since the introduction of the policy. Thirdly, being a less developed country with a relatively
low fertility rate, Lesotho presents a perfect testing ground for the hypothesis that birth
order effects on human capital development depend on a country’s level of development.
That is, given that Lesotho is a developing country, are birth order effects on educational
attainment positive? This will not only tell us how birth order as a family environment
factor affects child development, but also whether context other than a country’s level of
development determines such an influence. Lastly, I am not aware of any other study in
Lesotho that engages the questions raised and/or address them in the way I do in this thesis.
This makes this thesis unique both in the questions addressed and the approaches taken to
address them.
To offer a preview, in Chapter 2, I examine the effect of the FPE policy on child school-
ing in Lesotho, thereby contributing to the scant literature evaluating the impact of this
policy on education in sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis uses data from two cross-sectional
household surveys, the 1994/5 Household Budget Survey data collected before the policy was
introduced, and the Lesotho Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey data col-
lected in 2002 after the introduction of the policy. To identify the causal impact of FPE on
school enrolment, I use the difference-in-differences method. I estimate the lower- and upper-
bound effects of the policy. The results show that FPE has significantly raised enrolment of
primary school-age children, and more so that of boys (the historically disadvantaged group)
and children from poor backgrounds. The most important implication of these results is that
it is possible that, if the FPE policy can be instituted in those sub-Saharan African countries
still lagging behind in education indicators, the ‘Education for All’ goal can be achieved.
While getting children to school is important in and of itself, schooling is not education,
but rather an essential input in the production of education (Behrman, 2010). The next
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challenge is to make sure that children learn while in school. Indeed the ultimate goal of
FPE policies, as contained in the DFA call, is to improve education quality (or achievement)2,
which is a much bigger problem in SSA. For example, Beatty and Pritchett (2012) estimate
that it will take 150 years (134 years) for a median Southern and Eastern African country
(in terms of SACMEQ3 tests performance) to reach OECD reading (maths) levels.
There are arguably several factors contributing to this dire state of educational quality
in SSA, but a common presumption in the current literature is that it has been exacerbated
by the recent push to meet the universal primary education Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) by 2015 (see for example, Colclough et al., 2008; Zuze and Leibbrandt, 2011). Al-
though there is some evidence showing negative effects of FPE on achievement immediately
after the introduction of the policy (see Lucas and Mbiti, 2012; Hoogeveen and Rossi, 2013),
we have very little knowledge of how educational achievement and educational inequality
have evolved since the policy was introduced. In particular, the questions of whether ed-
ucational achievement falls (or increases) for all students (both low- and high-ability), and
whether such a change in achievement comes with an increase (or decrease) in educational
inequality have not been answered. Not only does educational inequality explain income
inequality, it also correlates with health inequality (Deaton, 2003; Alves, 2012; Ferreira and
Gignoux, 2014).
Chapter 3 of the thesis tries to answer these questions in the case of Lesotho. Using
data on grade six pupils’ standardised maths and reading test scores from SACMEQ, I first
employ the relative distribution method of Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) to analyse
the distributional changes in achievement between 2000 and 2007, following Rodrigues et al.
(2013). While the relative distribution method is good in both quantifying the changes
in achievement and showing them graphically without any distributional assumptions, it
has a limitation of not being able to apportion these changes to individual characteristics.
Therefore, I apply the Recentered Influence Function regression decomposition by Firpo et al.
(2007, 2009) and Fortin et al. (2011) to analyse the determinants of such changes. The results
from this analysis reveal that the increase in educational achievement in Lesotho, between
2000 and 2007, was driven by the rise in the performance of both low-ability and high-
ability students. I also find that educational inequality increased during this period. The
results show that pupil-teacher ratio, grade repetition, “teacher effort” (that is, the number
of teaching hours per week and frequency of testing students), and students’ socioeconomic
status explain some of the changes in educational quality and inequality. However, much
of these changes in educational quality and inequality are not explained by observed school
and child characteristics, suggesting that there could be some intangible school and family
factors influencing these changes.
2I use educational achievement and education quality interchangeably throughout this thesis.
3Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ).
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Even though changes in educational achievement and educational inequality in many
sub-Saharan African countries have been linked to the changes in schools’ resources and
characteristics due to the FPE policy, the result that these school characteristics explain
very little of the changes in achievement is not surprising in the literature. For example,
Glewwe et al. (2011) review the literature that estimates the effects of school resources on
students’ achievement. From a list of studies they review, they find that there is little
evidence that school resources have a positive impact on students’ achievement.
There are at least three important implications of the results from chapter 3 of the
thesis. First, Lesotho is one of the first countries to have sequentially implemented the FPE
programme in sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that educational achievement increased since
the policy was introduced, and that this increase is positively associated with educational
policy variables (for instance, PTR and instructional time) suggests that the sequential
implementation strategy potentially helps to minimise the disruptions in the system and
reduce potential negative quality effects of the programme on quality. This is possibly a
good policy lesson to those countries that are yet to institute FPE programmes.
Second, the increase in educational achievement inequality will have negative implica-
tions on health and earnings inequalities (Becker and Tomes, 1986a; Alves, 2012; Ferreira
and Gignoux, 2014). The Lesotho government thus should implement policies to address
educational inequality in order to reduce the high level of income inequality. More generally,
the evidence suggests that for countries to effectively address the income inequality problem,
distributional changes in educational quality have to be closely monitored, such that any
emerging inequalities can be bridged in time.
Third, the result that grade repetition has a significant influence on achievement seems to
support the evidence found by Foureaux Koppensteiner (2014) in Brazil (see also Rodrigues
et al., 2013) which indicates that relaxing the retention policy reduces students’ performance.
Therefore, the finding suggests that the automatic grade promotion policy that is now being
implemented in Lesotho could hurt educational quality.
In Chapter 4, I shift focus and evaluate the effect of family factors on the household
distribution of education. Specifically, I examine the effect of birth order on children’s
educational attainment in Lesotho. “Childhood is the province of the family” (Heckman and
Mosso, 2014, p.3). Therefore, much of schooling decisions and education happen within the
household. In as much as taking children to school can help increase education attainment
and reduce educational inequality, there are childhood factors that influence intra-household
distribution of education among siblings, and ultimately the level of educational achievement
and inequality within a country. I use the 2006 census data for children aged six to twelve
years to estimate birth order effects on educational attainment. To deal with potential
endogeneity of birth order resulting from its correlation with family size and other unobserved
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family factors, I use family fixed effects models.
Apart from this thesis being the first to estimate birth order effects on human capital
development in Lesotho, it adds to the literature in three other ways. First, I use different
measures of educational attainment, instead of one as is common in the literature. I estimate
birth order effects on a short-run measure of education (that is, enrolment), and two long-run
measures of education (that is, completed years of education, and schooling progression or
age-adjusted schooling). Second, I examine two possible sources of heterogeneity in birth
order effects: differences due to families of different sizes, and gender bias (that is, gender
of the first-born). Lastly, I investigate whether family wealth and child-spacing can explain
the observed birth order effects.
Different from the available evidence based on many developing countries data, I find
large and significant negative birth order effect on child educational attainment. The birth
order effects differ by family size and gender. Specifically, the negative birth order effects
are more pronounced in large families, and in families of first-born girls. I also find strong
evidence that this negative birth order effect is transmitted through birth-spacing, and not
family wealth, contrary to earlier evidence from other developing countries (for example,
Ecuador and some sub-Saharan countries) which shows that wealth is the underlying causal
mechanism behind the positive, not negative, birth order effect on attainment (Tenikue and
Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al., 2014).
Surprisingly, the results affirm the negative birth order effects found in developed coun-
tries (for example, Norway and the United States) (Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010).
The difference with the latter evidence is that, in the United States, for example, De Haan
(2010) finds that family wealth, and not birth-spacing, explains the negative birth order ef-
fect. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that these findings are consistent with the confluence
model’s predictions, even though the hypothesis that first-borns do better because of being
brought up under tougher parental disciplinary rules than their younger siblings cannot be
ruled out.
The implications of the negative birth order results are twofold. One is that, the theories
that try to explain birth order effects in developing country contexts cannot be generalised
as yet. We still have to identify those conditions or contexts that fit the negative birth order
effects and those that fit the positive birth order effects because it is evident that the level
of development cannot be the only factor. Second, for policy direction, the results suggest
that, in order to attenuate these birth order effects and increase educational attainment
of later-borns, it is essential that the government designs policies that will improve school
participation of later-borns, especially for boys and those from larger families. Without
speculating on the general equilibrium effects, one such policy intervention could be the
introduction of conditional cash transfers to larger families, particularly those with first-
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born boys.




The Effect of Free Primary Education
on Enrolment in Lesotho
2.1 Introduction
Since the adoption of the DFA by the World Education Forum in 2000, a number of sub-
Saharan African countries have implemented free primary education (FPE) programmes,
aiming to boost enrolment levels by abolishing all user-fees. Malawi and Uganda were among
the first countries to introduce this policy in the mid-1990s. The policy, however, has been
implemented differently in different countries. For example, in Malawi, school fees were
first abolished on a grade-by-grade basis for the first three grades, starting with grade one
from 1991 to 1993, and then simultaneously eliminated for all remaining grades in 1994. In
Uganda and Kenya, user fees were simultaneously eliminated for all primary school grades in
1997 and 2003, respectively. In this thesis, I will refer to the FPE policy in these countries as
the ‘big bang’ FPE because user-fees were eliminated for all grades in one year. In Lesotho,
however, fee-elimination was phased-in grade-by-grade, starting with grade one in 2000, until
it covered the entire primary schooling system in 2006.
To date, there is only a handful of studies that attempt to quantify the causal effects
of FPE programmes, and almost all of them have concentrated on a few countries where
the policy was implemented in a big bang fashion. Deininger (2003), for example, examines
the impact of FPE on enrolment in Uganda by estimating Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions of primary and secondary enrolment, respectively, on a vector of controls plus a
dummy for post-FPE period which is meant to pick the effect. The results indicate that after
the programme, primary-school children were 89 percent more likely to be enrolled, while
secondary school enrolment increased by 62 percent during the same period (see Table 3 of
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Deininger, 2003, p.299)1. The author then interprets the large increase in primary school
enrolment as the impact of the FPE policy.
However, we know that primary school enrolment rates are higher than secondary school
enrolment rates in many developing countries, and that drop-out rates are differentially high
among girls (Pritchett, 2004). The fact that secondary school enrolment, which is used as
a control, also increased significantly after the policy, could be attributed to part of the
FPE policy in Uganda which specifically targeted girls’ education by campaigning against
early marriages (see Deininger, 2003 p.294). This suggests secondary school enrolment is
potentially a bad counterfactual for primary school enrolment. Thus, it is hard to infer
and/or quantify the impact of FPE from the analysis.
Grogan (2009) also assesses the Ugandan FPE programme, but instead of looking at its
enrolment effects, she examines its effect on the age at which a child enters school. She
specifically examines the FPE effect on the probability that a child begins school before
age nine, which is the age associated with a lower probability of completing at least seven
years of schooling. Exploiting the discontinuity created by the policy in the relation between
child age and the probability of enrolment, she applies a regression discontinuity strategy,
and discovers that FPE increased the probability of on time enrolment by 3 percent with a
much higher effect (5 percent) for girls (see also Nishimura et al., 2008). This evidence is
suggestive of sustained enrolment benefits of FPE for those who enrol on time. But given
large fractions of overage children attracted by fee waivers, and their high drop out rates, it
is hard to infer the longer term overall enrolment effects of FPE from the results.
In the case of Malawi, Al-Samarrai and Zaman (2007) document increases in primary and
secondary school enrolment between 1990 and 1997, and also present suggestive evidence that
girls and children from poor backgrounds benefited the most from FPE. They, however, do
not identify the causal effect of FPE on enrolment. Lucas and Mbiti (2012) apply a difference-
in-differences strategy, exploiting differences in pre-programme primary school drop out rates
(and post-programme completion rates) across districts in Kenya, to tease out the FPE effect
on access. They find a positive effect of FPE on the primary school completion rate, and a
much higher effect on that of children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Indeed the 2013/4 Education for All Global Monitoring report attributes the fall by half
in the global number of out-of-school children between 1999 and 2011 to FPE programmes
(UNESCO, 2014). But the question of how much of this drop is due to the causal effect of
FPE, unconfounded with improving educational tastes over time, still begs for an answer.
Moreover, the Global Monitoring report also reveals that universal primary education is
unlikely to be met by 2015, and that sub-Saharan Africa still lags far behind all other
1Note, however, that Deininger (2003, p. 298), reports different figures that cannot be read from Table 3
in page 299. For instance, the author reports that primary school enrolment increased by 60 percent, while
the time dummy coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant for secondary school enrolment.
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regions with an estimated 22 percent of primary school-age children still out of school in
2011. Progress is even more abysmal for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. This
further points to the value of learning more about FPE effects on enrolment from different
contexts.
This chapter contributes to this growing literature, taking the FPE programme in Lesotho
as a case study. I specifically examine the causal effect of FPE on overall enrolment, and
whether the policy has bridged gender- and wealth-related educational inequalities. Lesotho
presents an appropriate setting for evaluating FPE effect on enrolment while, at the same
time, credibly addressing identification concerns. I take advantage of the unique phasing-in
approach to school-fees elimination to identify the FPE effect on primary school enrolment,
three years after its implementation. Looking at the FPE effect on primary school enrolment
after three years gives an indication of whether the short-term (or immediate) effects on
enrolment of the policy reported in other countries will likely be sustained or whether such
gains might be reversed as a result of school drop out of primary school, for example.
The main outcome variable is net enrolment rate (NER), defined as the proportion of
official primary school-age children who are currently in school. In this study, official primary
school-age children consist of all those aged 6 to 12 years old. By comparing changes in
enrolment in grades covered by FPE to changes in enrolment in grades not-yet-covered, I
am able to wipe out the common trends in education demand over time and hence credibly
identify the FPE effects. In line with previous studies elsewhere, I show that the removal
of school fees significantly increased net enrolment of the primary school-age population by
at least 9.3 percentage points (or 13.2 percent). More importantly, the results reveal that
FPE led to a significant increase in enrolment of boys (the historically disadvantaged group
in Lesotho)2 relative to that of girls, and of children from poor backgrounds.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present Lesotho’s institutional context
and the FPE policy background. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework, while Section
4 discusses the data used. Section 5 presents the descriptive evidence of FPE effects. Section
6 explains the identification strategy and Section 7 discusses the main results. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2.2 The institutional context and policy background
2.2.1 The institutional context
Lesotho education follows a 7-3-2-4 system with seven years of primary education, three
years of junior secondary education, two years of senior secondary education, and four years
2In Lesotho, boys look after their families’ livestock, while girls do household chores. This, therefore,
disadvantages boys relative to girls when it comes to schooling.
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of university education. The official age of entry into primary schooling is six years (or five
years for children born on or before the 30th of June) such that by age twelve, children should
be in grade seven completing their primary school. This implies that the official primary
school-age is 6 to 12 years.
Unlike many other countries, most primary schools in Lesotho (about 80%) are owned
and controlled by various churches (see Table A.1), and these churches are represented in
the national education advisory board by their appointed education secretaries (Ambrose,
2007). Non-religious private schools constitute only one percent, and are not covered by FPE.
Notwithstanding this co-ownership structure, all schools follow the same national curriculum
provided by the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). Additionally, the government
has an overall authority in pronouncing education policies, management and regulation of
education, training of teachers, and teachers’ appointments, dismissals, and deployments.
With regard to students’ progression within the system, the de jure government policy
since 1967 is that of automatic grade promotion (see Ambrose, 2007), but de facto, schools
still practice grade retention. This, coupled with delayed school enrolment, implies that, in
any given grade, one is most likely to find students of different cohorts. Beyond physical and
monetary costs, there are no regulatory restrictions with regard to school choice in Lesotho.
Parents are thus free to choose schools to which they prefer to take their children.
Primary schools’ funding mainly comes from the government through payment of teacher
salaries. At least until the year 2000, primary education was not free in Lesotho. Thus,
another way that schools used to raise funds was through charging school fees. The situa-
tion changed in 2000 when the government introduced the FPE programme, starting with
standard 1 (or grade 1). I now turn to the background of this policy.
2.2.2 Policy background
As a signatory to the World Declaration on ‘Education for All’, and the United Nations’ Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs), Lesotho has pledged to ensure that primary education
is free and available to all (UNESCO, 2000). Therefore, in 2000, the country instituted the
FPE programme. However, as mentioned earlier, Lesotho’s implementation strategy was
different from that followed by other African countries. School fees were eliminated sequen-
tially on a grade-by-grade basis starting with grade one in 2000; such that by 2002, the first
three grades were covered, and all seven primary school grades were under FPE by 20063.
The main reason for this implementation strategy was to cushion FPE’s financial impact on
the public budget (Urwick, 2011).
The FPE policy addresses both the demand and supply side constraints to schooling.
On the demand side, the policy involves elimination of some private schooling costs, such
3Figure A.1 shows the phasing-in of the FPE programme.
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as school fees, stationery and textbooks’ costs. On the supply side, the government builds
additional classrooms in existing schools, and new government schools where none existed
before. The latter helps to reduce the distance to schools, and hence transportation costs.
In addition, the government provides annual capitation grants, furniture and teaching
materials to all schools, including church/private schools (Jopo et al., 2011a; Lekhetho,
2013). As of 2000, these capitation grants were calculated as follows. The book rental and
maintenance fees were set at 15 maloti (M15)4 and M5 per pupil per year, respectively;
pupils’ stationery per class per year was M11.51, while the annual teaching materials fee per
teacher was set at M37 (Jopo et al., 2011a). These fees have been increasing but not on an
annual basis. The school feeding programme has been integrated into the FPE programme
to further encourage school attendance. It is necessary to mention, though, that prior to
the implementation of FPE, schools were already providing lunch meals to pupils. These
costs, however, were included in the school fees. Under FPE, all pupils in covered grades are
provided with free meals.
In the first year of the policy, there was a 75 percent surge in the number of new school
entrants in grade one (MOET, 2011), and a 33 percent increase in primary school net en-
rolment rate5. Urwick (2011) also reports that gross enrolment rate (GER)6 increased by 34
percentage points from 107% to 141% between 1996 and 2006. The author then posits that
this increase in GER was due to high grade repetition rate and late school entry, especially
after FPE introduction. These figures, however, cannot be given a causal interpretation.
2.3 Theoretical framework
I use the canonical model of household behaviour by Becker (1965) where a household is both
a consumer and a producer. I assume that a household combines time (for example, schooling
time, child care time, etc.) with market goods (for example, books, school materials, school
uniform, etc.) through a production function to produce basic commodities such as child
quality. Subject to the schooling production function, income, and time constraints, the
household then maximises its utility and chooses the best combination of these commodities,
including child quality (see Thomas et al., 1990; Schultz, 2004; Mani et al., 2013).
In the presence of non-market goods, such as parental time spent on child care, a condi-
tional demand function for schooling is one of the solutions to the household maximisation
problem explained above. Therefore, following Thomas et al. (1990), Schultz (2004), and
4A Lesotho loti is pegged 1-to-1 to a South African rand (ZAR). 1 USD equals 12.54 ZAR as of
29/07/2015.
5Data available at http://data.uis.unesco.org/. UNESCO Institute of Statistics.
6GER is the ratio of the total number of primary school students, regardless of their age, to the total
number of official primary school-age population.
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Mani et al. (2013), I model determinants of schooling using the conditional demand function
for schooling given as:




i , wi,Xi, zi, ηi, µi) , (2.1)
where Yi is enrolment by child i, P
s
i is the price of schooling faced by child i, P
c
i is a vector
of prices for all other commodities, wi is the price of leisure, zi is child i’s household wealth,
and Xi is a vector of household and individual characteristics (age, gender, and household
demographic composition). ηi is child i’s innate ability which influences parental allocation
of schooling inputs, while µi captures all child rearing and caring practices in student i’s
home which also affect schooling.
I think of child schooling as measured by a short term measure like enrolment as one
dimension of child quality. Child height and the child survival rate are other dimensions of
child quality which can also influence child schooling (see Thomas et al. 1990), but which I
do not consider in this study.
According to Becker (1965), the full price of schooling or investment in human capital is
the sum of direct costs (for example, school fees, transportation, school uniforms, textbooks
and materials) and indirect costs such as the forgone child wage. Therefore, a household will
invest in a child’s education if the marginal utility (or benefit) of an extra year of schooling
exceeds the marginal cost. The implementation of FPE reduced the price of schooling and
that of child feeding (due to free lunch meals at school) faced by households. Consequently,
to the extent that schooling is a normal consumption good, the introduction of FPE should
increase the household’s demand for schooling, ceteris paribus (Schultz, 2004).
2.4 Data sources and summary statistics
I use data from two cross-sectional household surveys conducted by the Lesotho Bureau of
Statistics. The first is the 1994/95 Household Budget Survey (HBS) which collected informa-
tion from a sample of 3,784 households (with 25,272 individuals and 4,654 primary school-age
children) interviewed roughly five years prior to the introduction of FPE policy (Bureau of
Statistics, 2006). The second is the Lesotho Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ)
survey conducted in 2002 – three years after FPE introduction – collecting information from
4,954 households totalling 20,031 individuals, 4,175 of whom are primary-school-age children
(Bureau of Statistics, 2002)7.
The main variable of interest from these data is enrolment of primary school-age children
7These are the only surveys that are close enough to the cut-off point, 2000, and have comparable
information on individuals’ current educational status and grade level. For instance, individuals are asked
about their highest level of education, which is the highest grade completed in both surveys.
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in 1995 and 2002. In line with conventional practice in the literature, I focus on net enrolment
rate (NER) rather than gross enrolment rate (GER) as the schooling access measure of
interest. The GER may exceed 100 percent due to high participation of over-age children
and/or under-age children. Therefore, Bold et al. (2015) argue that increases in GER are
not necessarily a positive development, and that using NER is more appropriate when one
is interested in measuring demand for schooling among comparable age-groups of children
across time periods.
To improve the precision of our estimate of the effect of FPE, I need to control for other
factors that potentially have an influence on enrolment. Therefore, student characteristics,
such as age and gender, and parental (or household head’s) education proxied by years of
schooling, are important. Controlling for age is important for two reasons. Firstly, there is
an official age of entering the school system, which means that older children are more likely
to enrol than younger ones. Secondly, the opportunity costs of sending children to school
increase with age as they become more primed for the child labour market. The prevalence
of specific-gender preferences (for example boys being preferred over girls in many societies)
when it comes to education makes it essential to control for gender in the schooling equation.
With regard to parental education, Behrman (2010) notes that it increases child’s education
through home teaching, especially during pre-school and school-age stages. Mani et al. (2013)
further posit that parental education affects child’s education via parental choice of schooling
inputs.
Following Mani et al. (2013), I also control for differences in households’ demographic
composition using the number of adult males and females (i.e. those aged 18 and above)
in the household, and for the household’s experience in child caring and life cycle position
using the age of the household’s head.
Lastly, I control for household size, and wealth proxied by the household’s socio-economic
status index, which measures the long-term position of the household8. This wealth index
is constructed using principal components analysis based on a number of household wealth-
indicator variables which include household amenities, such as type of house roofing and wall
materials, sources of drinking water and fuel, distance to public services (e.g. clinic, etc.)
and household ownership of assets like a TV, refrigerator, etc. To ensure comparability of
the index over time, I first pooled the data to ensure that the same weights on respective
wealth indicators are applied on both surveys. Moreover, I use only those wealth indicators
that are common to both surveys. I then normalised the index to have a minimum value of
zero for ease of interpretation.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for the outcome and control variables, and in the
notes, it mentions all wealth indicator variables. The reported statistics are for a sample of
8Note that parental education is also used to proxy household wealth, specifically that part of wealth
not captured by the wealth index.
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all primary school-age children. We can see from the the table that enrolment significantly
increased between 1995 and 2002. For example, in 1995, enrolment among primary school-
age children was 69 percent, and it increased by 15 percentage points in 2002 to stand at 84
percent. This increase in enrolment is both statistically and economically significant. The
table further shows that household wealth dropped, and that the number of adult males and
females in the household declined, in line with a one member decrease in household size over
the period. Next, I take a closer look at what drives much of the change in enrolment.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable
1995 2002 |t|-statistic
mean sd N mean sd N
Enrolment 0.707 0.463 4631 0.839 0.367 4149 14.948***
Wealth index 5.433 0.041 4415 5.115 0.039 4175 5.660***
Child Age 9.094 1.995 4654 9.038 2.061 4175 1.292
Child Sex (Male) 0.514 0.500 4654 0.503 0.500 4175 0.967
Household Head’s educ 4.333 3.911 4652 4.388 3.935 4175 -0.656
Household Head’s age 49.47 13.32 4557 49.01 14.09 4122 1.583
Adult males 1.501 1.043 4654 1.239 0.928 4175 12.400***
Adult females 1.754 1.006 4654 1.508 0.805 4175 12.603***
Household size 7.314 2.716 4654 6.380 2.321 4175 17.260***
Source: Own calculations using 1995 HBS and 2002 CWIQ surveys. Notes: The sample is all primary
school-age children. All the figures are unweighted because both surveys do not provide sampling weights. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The construction of the wealth index is based
on the following variables: roofing and wall materials; number of rooms in the house; source of drinking
water; source of fuel for cooking, heating, and lighting; distance to nearest water source, public transport,
health centre, primary school, and local shop or food market; refrigerator; radio, bicycle, wheel barrow, car,
land, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, donkeys, sewing machine, and motor vehicle.
2.5 Descriptive evidence on enrolment changes since
FPE
In this section, I provide suggestive evidence on the effect of FPE on school enrolment.
Figure 2.1 plots enrolment rates by primary school-appropriate age, from age 6 to age 12.
For age 6, for example, NER is defined as the proportion of six year old pupils to the total
number of 6 year olds in the population. The figure clearly shows that enrolment increases
with age, and this age gradient is high between ages 6 and 8. For instance, in 1995, NER
at age 6 was about 30 percent, then almost doubled to 58 percent at age 7, and further
increased to about 65 percent at age 8. Similarly, in 2002, NER for 6 year olds was about
60 percent, increased to about 80 percent by age 7, and then stabilised at 85 percent from
age 8.
Furthermore, the figure shows that NER increased significantly for all primary school
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ages, but evidently more so for the 6 to 8 year old group. For example, NER of the 6 year
olds more than doubled between 1995 and 2002, jumping from 30 percent to more than 60
percent. NER of the 7 year olds also increased by an impressive 22 percentage points from
58 percent to 80 percent in 2002. A similar increase is observed for the 8 year olds during
the same period. However, the increase in NER of the 9 to 12 year olds over the same period
was relatively small.
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Source: Own calculations based on 1995 HBS and 2002 CWIQ data. Notes: Enrolment is a dummy equal
to 1 if a child is aged between 6 and 12 years is enrolled in primary school.
I now turn to Table 2.2 which reports NERs by gender, age, grade and household wealth,
before and after FPE. To aid the discussion, it is necessary to outline some definitions. NER
is defined for all primary school-age children excluding those enrolled in secondary schools9.
In anticipation of the discussion later on in the chapter, I report net enrolment rates by age-
group (i.e. the 6-to-8 year old group versus the 9-to-12 year old group), and by grade-group
(i.e. primary school children with at most grade 2 versus those with grade 3 to 7). Thus,
I define the age-group NER as the total number of children in the age-group (say 6 to 8
years old group) enrolled in primary school divided by the total number of children in that
age group expressed as a percentage, and grade-group NER is the proportion of all primary
school-age pupils in the grade-group (say all 6-to-12 year olds in grade-group ‘Grade < 3 ’
and enrolled) to the total number of primary school-age children who have completed at
most grade 2 (i.e. those with Grade less than 3).
Table 2.2 shows that overall NER increased significantly by about 13 percentage points
after the introduction of FPE. This is consistent with our expectations and is similar to
9Some primary school-age children who enrolled before the entry age of 6 and/or those who were fast-
tracked are in secondary schools.
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results found in Kenya and Uganda (Deininger, 2003; Grogan, 2009; Bold et al., 2015). Male
children, who historically have lower enrolment rates compared to their female counterparts,
appear to have been the biggest beneficiaries of the FPE programme, even though their
enrolment rate is still low relative to that of females. For example, after FPE, net enrolment
for boys increased by 16 percentage points from 65.4 percent in 1995 to 81.3 percent in 2002,
while that of girls increased by 10.4 percentage points over the same period.
With regard to enrolment patterns by age-group, the table shows that the NER for all
age-groups increased over the period, but much more so for the 6-to-8 years old group. For
instance, while the NER of the 9-to-12 year olds increased by 10.8 percentage points, that
of the 6-to-8 year olds increased by about 17.8 percentage points after FPE.
In anticipation of the discussion later on the chapter, the table also presents changes in
NER by grade-groups; the grade-group ‘Grade < 3 ’ (i.e. the group whose highest grade
completed is less than 3), and grade-group ‘Grade 3 to 7 ’ (i.e. the group whose highest
grade completed is between 3 and 7). For the grade-group ‘Grade < 3 ’, NER is defined as
the total number of primary school-age pupils with less than grade 3 divided by the total
number of primary school-age children who have completed at most grade 2, expressed as a
percentage. Given that the FPE has no age restrictions, changes in grade-group NER are
a broad measure of FPE effects on enrolment. We can see from the table that the NER of
children with grades 3 to 7 remained almost constant at 96 percent over the period, while
that of children with less than grade 3 (i.e. those eligible for FPE in 2002 irrespective of
age) increased by an impressive 21.3 percentage points to stand at 79.3 percent after FPE.
From this perspective, irrespective of how the FPE target group is defined (either by grade-
appropriate age or by highest grade completed), there is a strong prima facie evidence that
FPE raised enrolment rates between 1995 and 2002.10
Furthermore, FPE appears to have benefited the poor the most relative to the rich (see
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). Firstly, Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 show a clear evidence of a wealth
gradient in enrolment in both periods. Table 2.2 shows that, in 1995, less than half of primary
school-age children in the bottom wealth quintile (i.e. 48.5 percent) were enrolled, whereas
almost three quarters (i.e. 74.4 percent) of those in the third quintile and 86.6 percent of
those in the wealthiest quintile were enrolled. Similarly, in 2002, about 16 percent of primary
school-age children in the bottom quintile were not enrolled, whereas only 6 percent of those
in the wealthiest quintile were not enrolled.
Figure 2.2 clearly shows that the wealth gradient in 1995 was much larger between the
bottom wealth quintile and the third wealth quintile than it was between the third quintile
and the fifth quintile. In 2002, the wealth gradient was almost constant through out the
10Note, however, that those with at least grade 3 have already enrolled in school at some point and are
potentially a select group. Later in the chapter, I empirically evaluate whether this group is a reasonably
good counterfactual for those with less than grade 3.
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Table 2.2: Pre- and Post-FPE Net Enrolment Rates by groups
Obs. NER
1995 2002 1995 2002
All children 4631 4149 70.7 83.9
By Gender
Female 2252 2058 76.2 86.6
Male 2379 2091 65.4 81.3
By Age group
6-8 years old 1880 1765 57.5 75.3
9-12 years old 2751 2384 79.6 90.4
By Highest Grade
Grade < 3 3042 2980 58.0 79.3
Grade 3 to 7 1428 1131 96.6 96.2
By Wealth
Quintile 1 893 876 48.5 74.1
Quintile 2 890 930 65.4 80.0
Quintile 3 883 951 74.4 85.8
Quintile 4 911 751 78.6 89.5
Quintile 5 815 641 86.6 93.9
Source: Own calculations based on 1995 HBS and 2002 CWIQ data. Notes: The sample is primary school-
age children, excluding those enrolled in secondary school. All statistics are unweighted. The age-group NER
is the proportion of pupils in the age-group (say 6-8 year old group) to the total number of children in that
age-group. Grade-group NER is the proportion of all primary school-age pupils in the grade-group (say all
6-to-12 year olds in grade-group ‘Grade < 3 ’ and enrolled) to the total number of primary school-age children
who have completed at most grade 2. NERs for all other categories are calculated using the conventional
definitions.
wealth quintiles, and less than it was in 1995. This suggests that FPE lessened the influence
of wealth on enrolment by benefiting the poor more than the rich.
Table 2.2 shows that NER of students from poor backgrounds (i.e. those at the bottom
wealth quintile) jumped by an impressive 25.6 percentage points from 48.5 percent in 1995
to 74.1 percent in 2002. Primary school-age children in the second wealth quintile were the
second greatest beneficiaries, their enrolment increased by 14.6 percentage points to stand
at 80 percent in 2002. The smallest increase in enrolment after FPE occurred in the fifth
quintile with only an 7.3 percentage points increase. Enrolment in the third and fourth
wealth quintiles increased by 11.4 and 10.9 percentage points, respectively. By and large,
even though the NER increased across all wealth quintiles, the increase was much higher for
those coming from poor households. As Figure 2.2 clearly shows, these enrolment gains are
statistically significant across wealth quintiles.
These näıve comparisons of enrolment rates before and after the programme do not reflect
the causal effect of FPE on enrolment because the observed changes in enrolment could have
entirely been driven by factors unrelated to FPE; for example, changes in tastes for education
over time. To attach a causal interpretation to these changes, it is necessary to address some
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Source: Own calculations based on 1995 HBS and 2002 CWIQ data. Notes: Net enrolment is calculated
for each wealth quintile. Wealth quintiles are for the household asset index constructed using the principal
components analysis.
of these identification problems. I turn to this issue in the next section.
2.6 Empirical strategy
2.6.1 The model
To tease out the treatment effect of the FPE programme on enrolment, I employ the
difference-in-differences (DID) identification strategy (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Blundell
and Dias, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The DID approach is appropriate in settings
where we observe outcomes for individuals in two groups (i.e. control and treatment groups)
for two or more periods (pre- and post-programme) as in panel data, and in settings where
we have repeated cross-sections from the same population, pre- and post-programme, for
individuals in the control and treatment groups.
I use data from repeated cross-sections. In this case, the DID strategy is as follows.
Suppose child i belongs to a group Gi ∈ {0, 1} (where Gi = 1 is the treatment group), and
is observed in period Ti ∈ {0, 1} (where Ti = 1 is post-programme period). Let Yi(0) and
Yi(1) be her potential outcomes (e.g. enrolment status) before and after the programme,
respectively. Therefore child i’s outcome is given as
Yi =
Yi(0) ≡ α + γTi + λGi + εi, if Ti = 0Yi(1) ≡ α + γTi + λGi + δDID + εi, if Ti = 1 (2.2)
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where γ is the year-specific effect common to both control and treatment groups; λ is a group-
specific, time-invariant coefficient; δDID is the DID effect parameter; and εi is an unobserved
individual error term.11 The DID estimand, δDID, is then given by
δDID = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)]
= (E[Yi|Gi = 1, Ti = 1]− E[Yi|Gi = 1, Ti = 0]) (2.3)
−(E[Yi|Gi = 0, Ti = 1]− E[Yi|Gi = 0, Ti = 0])
This double differencing procedure removes biases due to permanent pre-existing differ-
ences between the two groups, and biases resulting from common time trends unrelated to
the programme. Let Di be the treatment dummy equal to the interaction of the group and
time dummies, Di = Ti · Gi, which equals 1 if Ti = 1 and Gi = 1. Then equation 2.3 can
simply be estimated by least squares methods using the following regression DID12
Yi = α + γTi + λGi + δDIDDi + Xiβ + εi (2.4)
where Xi is a vector of controls.
The DID method requires that the control group not be influenced by the programme,
and be comparable to the treatment group. As mentioned earlier, the FPE programme was
progressively implemented from grade 1 in year 2000 such that by 2002, it was covering
grades 1 to 3. Given the school entry age of 6 years, the age-appropriate cohort for grades 1
to 3 is the 6-to-8 year olds (see Figure A.1). Thus, I define the treatment group in two ways:
(i) by age-group (i.e. the age-appropriate cohort for grades 1 to 3), and (ii) by grade-group
(i.e. whether a school-age child had completed at most grade 2 by year 2002).
Under the first definition (the age-group definition), the treatment group refers to all
children aged 6 to 8 years old. I use all those aged 9 to 12 years old as the control group.
These two groups are quite similar in terms of their characteristics as I show in Table 2.3.
Notice that since the FPE programme had no age restrictions, the control group in this case
inevitably includes some pupils who have received treatment because of delayed enrolment
and/or grade repetition13. Second, there could be intra-household spillover effects such that
eliminating fees a younger sibling in the household may free up household resources to be
used to pay fees for an older sibling. For these reasons, I call the treatment group defined
this way a narrowly-defined treatment group. The implication of this definition is that the
11A much stronger version about the individual error term for the DID strategy is that it is assumed to
be independent of the Gi, and to have the same distribution over time, εi ⊥ (Gi, Ti).
12This is the estimable counterpart of the conditional schooling demand function in equation 2.1.
13Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the age composition of each grade. For example, there were more
12 year olds with at most grade 2 in 2002 than in 1995. This clearly indicates that fee-elimination induced
many overage children who would have otherwise been left out of the schooling system to enrol.
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DID estimand will be biased downward, and hence identify the lower bound effect. The
advantage of this definition of the treatment group is that it is not possible for any child
to manipulate her age in order to fall in any particular age group. After controlling for
individual and household characteristics, any other allocation mechanism not explained by
age is largely random.
According to the second definition (the grade-group), the treatment group is all primary
school-age children who had completed at most grade 2 by year 2002 such that, if enrolled in
2002, their highest current grade should be grade 3. I call the treatment group defined this
way a broadly-defined treatment group. Under this treatment-group definition, the control
group is all primary school-age children who had completed at least grade 3 in 2002. By
definition, unless they intentionally decided to repeat lower grades, these children should
not have benefited from the policy in 2002. If they did repeat lower grades, this will bias
upwards the FPE effect. But if they instead decided to stay out of school waiting for fee
elimination in their new grades, this will bias downwards the FPE effect. Thus, one cannot
tell a priori the direction of the bias in this case. Nevertheless, I show in Section 2.6.3 that
there were no unusual spikes in the trends of repetition rates (and percentage of repeaters)
by grade over time, which, if evident, would suggest the presence of some bias. I also show
that there are no group compositional changes over time.
The second concern with the broadly-defined treatment group is that, the control group
(i.e. those with at least grade 3) may not be a good counterfactual. This is because children
with at least grade 3 have already enrolled in school at some point and are potentially a
select group of high-ability children and/or from wealthy families. However, I show in the
next section that the control group is a reasonably good counterfactual, and I control for
family wealth in all the regressions to address this concern.
There are at least three concerns about the internal validity of the DID strategy, with
respect to both group definitions. First, there may be intra-school spillover effects. For
example, schools may respond to rising enrolment in lower grades (that is, grades affected
by the policy) by diverting resources (e.g. teachers, classroom space, etc.) away from
higher grades (that is, grades not-yet-affected by the policy). These spillover effects would
lower enrolment in the control group and thus overstate the policy effect. However, the
concurrent occurring of school-building and teacher-recruitment programmes would likely
mitigate any intra-school spillover effects. As mentioned earlier in the introduction, the
number of schools and teachers increased considerably between 2002 and 2006, by 9 percent
and 21 percent, respectively. This suggests that, as demand for schooling was increasing
in lower grades, resources were made available to cater for such demands. Therefore, the
intra-school enrolment spillover effects, if any, should at least be very minimal. In fact, this
should have more bite on the policy effect under the broad definition of the treatment group
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where such resource-shifting would affect children of all ages in the control and treatment
grades.
Second, the school construction programme may have differentially affected the treat-
ment and control groups. By design of the FPE programme, younger children and children
who had not completed the treated grades have likely benefited the most from the school
expansion programme especially in cases where only additional classes were built to cater for
the increased demand in lower grades. In cases where new schools were built, this is likely
to have benefited the control and treatment groups equally. In either case, it is unlikely that
the school building programme negatively affected the enrolment in the control group.
Third, the school expansion and fee elimination could have interaction effects on enrol-
ment. Similarly, if this interaction effects affect the control and treatment groups differ-
entially, this will violate the DID strategy’s assumptions. But, if these effects are similar
for both control and treatment groups, then this will have no implication on the identified
average treatment effect of the FPE policy. It is hard to test and/or solve this possibility.
However, if the this interaction effects are positive, given that both the fee elimination and
school construction programmes have at least positive influence on enrolment, then the FPE
policy effect will be attenuated under either treatment group definition.
2.6.2 Assessing the plausibility of assumptions under the narrowly-
defined treatment group
Given that the treatment group is defined in two different ways, it is fitting to discuss the
plausibility of the identifying assumptions in relation to each treatment group definition
separately. In this sub-section I discuss the identifying assumptions and their plausibility in
relation to the narrowly-defined treatment-group, and relegate a similar discussion in respect
of the broadly-defined treatment group to sub-section 2.6.3.
To effectively wipe out the common time trend between the groups, the main identify-
ing assumption required is that, in the absence of the policy, the change in outcome (e.g.
enrolment) of the treatment group would have been equal to the change in enrolment of
the control group. In this two-period, two-group setting, however, this assumption cannot
be tested. Pre-programme enrolment data corresponding to the narrowly-defined treatment
group is not available for this study, otherwise it would have been possible to indirectly assess
the plausibility of the common trends assumption14.
The second most important assumption required by the DID strategy in cross-sections is
that there should be no significant compositional changes in the control and treatment groups
14But with respect to our broadly-defined treatment group, we are able to test the plausibility of this
assumption using enrolment-related data (i.e. repetition and drop-out rates, and percentage of repeaters by
grade over time).
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before and after the policy to ensure before-after comparability (Blundell and Dias, 2009). To
assess the plausibility of this assumption, I follow Foureaux Koppensteiner (2014) and Bet-
tendorf et al. (2012), and compare characteristics of the control and treatment groups before
and after FPE in Table 2.3. The table shows the descriptive statistics of the characteristics
of the control and treatment groups, and their differences in 1994/95 and 2002. Specifically,
the table shows the means and differences in means of the outcome variable (enrolment), and
individual and household characteristics (child age, child sex, household wealth, household
size, household head’s education and age, and number of adult males and females in the
household) of the control and treatment groups, before and after the programme.
Columns (4) and (9) of the table show that the differences in all characteristics are quite
small, the highest being 3.6 for child age. The large differences in child age are inevitable
given our definition of the treatment group. The most important result is that the differences
in most characteristics between the groups have remained stable over time. For example, the
group differences in child age, child sex, household head’s age, and number of adult males
are quite similar over time. Even though there appears to be a slightly faster decline in
household size and number of adult females in the household in the treatment group relative
to the control group, I note that changes in all these variables normally follow a gradual
process and are unlikely to have been caused by sudden jumps that could confound the
results. I therefore conclude that changes in the composition of the groups with respect to
their fixed effects (or unobservable characteristics) have remained unchanged over time, and
hence unlikely to bias the estimation results.
To drive home this argument, I check whether the control and treatment groups are
balanced in characteristics. Although this balancing property (or the unconfoundedness as-
sumption) is not fundamental in the DID strategy, it is generally reassuring when it is satisfied
(Foureaux Koppensteiner, 2014). Columns (3) and (8) of Table 2.3 show the p-values for the
t-test of differences in mean characteristics of the control and treatment groups. Looking
at these p-values, we can see that for all characteristics, except child age and household
head’s age, the hypothesis that they are balanced between groups cannot be rejected at the
5 percent level of significance.15
I further check the validity of this balancing property by looking at the normalized differ-
ences in characteristics following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). The normalized difference
between means is a scale-free measure of the difference in characteristics’ distributions by
treatment status, and is given as






15Differences in household head’s age are merely a function of differences in child age induced by the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where S2G is the sample variance of Xi in sub-sample with treatment Gi = {0, 1}. G = 1
if a child is aged between 6 and 8 years. According to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), if
the normalized difference is less than one quarter in absolute values, the unconfoundedness
assumption is likely satisfied, and hence estimating equation 2.4 by linear regression methods
is justified. The normalized differences reported in columns (5) and (10) of Table 2.3 are less
than this rule of thumb absolute value of 0.25 for all characteristics, except for child’s age,
This result suggests that control and treatment children are very similar in terms of their
characteristics.
Given this similarity in characteristics between the treatment and control groups, it is
plausible to consider the assignment of primary school-age children to control and treat-
ment groups, based on the grade-appropriate cohort criteria, to be conditionally random
(Foureaux Koppensteiner, 2014). This is further reassurance that the estimation results can
only be biased downwards, as explained earlier, and not due to compositional changes.
2.6.3 Assessing the plausibility of assumptions under the broadly-
defined treatment group
As pointed out earlier, the common trend assumption can not be tested directly. I do not
have pre-reform data on enrolment by grade, which would be ideal to indirectly test the
plausibility of this assumption. Fortunately, I have pre-reform national data on enrolment-
related measures of schooling (i.e. the percentage of repeaters by grade, repetition rates, and
drop-out rates) from UNESCO Institute of Statistics. Therefore, to assess the plausibility of
the common trend assumption, I look at pre-reform trends in these measures.16
In Figure 2.3, I plot the average percentage of repeaters for the treatment group (i.e.
grades 1 to 3 combined) and the control group (i.e. grades 4 to 7 combined) from 1990 to
2012. The long-dash vertical line in the figure marks the end of the fee-paying period, while
the solid vertical line marks the start of the FPE programme. Looking at Figure 2.3, we can
see that the graphs for the treated group and the control group are moving parallel to each
other. Between 1990 and 1994, the proportion of repeaters in each grade-group (treatment
and control) declined, then slightly increased between 1995 and 1996, and remained stable
until 1999. The slightly bigger drop in the percentage of repeaters in grades one to three
between 1999 and 2000 is due to the huge increase of new school entrants. The overall
percentage of repeaters throughout the period remained at around 20 percent before and
after FPE implementation (not shown in the figure).
A similar pattern prevails with respect to the trends in drop-out rates. Figure 2.4 presents
16The UNESCO Institute of Statistics data for each country comes from the annual education censuses.
We do not report trends in repetition rates because they are the same as trends in the percentage of repeaters
by grade.
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Grade 1 to 3 % of repeaters Grade 4 to 7 % of repeaters
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), Data Centre, 21 August 2014. Notes: Percentage of repeaters
is defined as the “total number of students who are enrolled in the same grade as the previous year, expressed
as a percentage of total enrolment in the given grade of education” (UIS glossary).









1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Grade 1 to 3 dropout rate Grade 4 to 7 dropout rate
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), Data Centre, 21 August 2014. Notes: Grade Drop-out rate
is defined as “the proportion of pupils from a cohort enrolled in a given grade at a given school year who are
no longer enrolled in the following year” (UIS glossary).
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the trends in drop-out rates for each grade-group, that is, the treatment grade-group and
the control grade-group. Similarly, the long-dash vertical line in the figure marks the end of
the fee-paying period, while the solid line shows the beginning of the FPE programme. The
figure indicates that, in 1991, the drop-out rate for the control group was about 12 percent,
and 7 percent for the treatment group. In 1997, the drop-out rate dropped to about 8 percent
for the control group, and 5.5 percent for the treatment group. It slightly increased in 1998
and then declined in 1999 for each group. Even though the gradient is slightly higher for the
control group between 1990 and 2000, it appears similar for both groups between 1995 and
2000.
Both the percentage of repeaters (or the repetition rate) and the drop-out rate are closely
related to enrolment in any given year. The fact that the control and treatment groups appear
to have a pre-reform common trend in each of these measures gives one confidence that pre-
reform enrolment rates for these groups also have a common trend. Thus, there should be
little concern for self-selection of children into the treatment group by either differentially
dropping out or repeating classes. This suggests that the control group, grade 4-to-7, is
potentially a valid control group.
I now turn to the discussion of the compositional changes assumption. Table 2.4 shows
the descriptive statistics of the control group (i.e. children in grades 4 to 7) and the treatment
group (i.e. children in grades 1 to 3) in 1994/95 and 2002. Essentially, Table 2.4 presents
similar information to that presented in Table 2.3, but for a broadly-defined treatment group.
I have highlighted earlier that, by design, the control group under the broadly-defined
treatment group includes all children who have enrolled for sometime and excludes all children
who have never enrolled. Therefore, the control group inevitably includes children from
wealthier families, relative to those in the treatment group. This is because, before FPE,
schools were still charging fees, and hence the group with at least grade 3 would have come
from relatively wealthier households. Indeed, we can see from columns (1) and (2), and
columns (6) and (7) of Table 2.4 that the wealth index for the control group is higher than
that of the treatment group. However, the main focus is on whether these wealth differences
between the control and treatment groups, for example, are stable over time.
Columns (4) and (9) show the mean differences between the control and treatment groups
for each characteristic in 1995 and 2002. We can see from these columns that the differences in
all the characteristics are small. As we have seen in Table 2.3, the largest difference between
the control and treatment groups is in age of the child (about 2.5 years), which is still small,
and should be expected given that children in lower grades are generally younger than those
in higher grades. What is particularly worth noting from Table 2.4 is that the differences in
all the characteristics are stable over time. For example, the difference between the control


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.1002 difference in 2002. Similarly, the difference in the wealth index between the control
and treatment group has remained stable over time at about 1.32 points.
Furthermore, the groups appear to be balanced in all characteristics, except for wealth,
household head’s age and age of the child17, as indicated by the small normalized differences
in columns (5) and (10) of the table (i.e. they are smaller than 0.25 in absolute values).
This evidence supports the assumption that the composition of groups, in terms of their un-
observable characteristics, has remained unchanged pre- and post-FPE. This taken together
with the common trends evidence is further evidence that the control group is potentially
valid.
The main concern with the analysis under this broad-group definition is that, prior to
FPE, the control group’s enrolment rate was 96.6 percent (see column 2 of Table 2.4), with a
very limited scope to increase over the period. When using the linear probability model, this
forces one to attribute almost the entire increase in enrolment over time in the treatment
group to FPE. To address this concern, I check the robustness of the results by running a
non-linear probability model (i.e. the probit model).
2.7 Results
In this section, I provide empirical evidence on the effect of FPE on primary school enrolment
in Lesotho. I first present the results when the treatment group is narrowly-defined, which
gives the lower bound effect of FPE on enrolment, and then results when the treatment
group is broadly-defined.
2.7.1 Lower bound Effect of FPE on Enrolment
This sub-section presents the lower bound effect of FPE on enrolment. Table 2.5 offers
results on the effect of FPE on access to primary schooling by children aged 6 to 8 years old.
It shows that, post-FPE, access to primary schooling increased, and this result is robust to
different specifications. The results are largely in line with the descriptive evidence seen in
the previous section (in Table 2.2).
Column 1 of the table presents FPE effect results with no controls. In columns 2 to 4,
I, respectively, control for wealth, child gender, and household head’s education, including
their interactions with group, time and FPE dummies. Column 5 presents the preferred
results where I control for all other individual and household characteristics thought to be
important to child schooling.
17This indicates potential violations of the linearity assumption. I check the robustness of the results by
running a probit model.
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Table 2.5: The Lower-bound Effect of FPE on Primary School Enrolment
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FPE (D=1) 0.0709*** 0.0497 0.0894*** 0.0704** 0.0934**
(0.0182) (0.0427) (0.0245) (0.0283) (0.0441)
Year (T=2002) 0.1071*** 0.2439*** 0.0689*** 0.1573*** 0.1918***
(0.0098) (0.0250) (0.0120) (0.0160) (0.0250)
Eligible (G=1) -0.2214*** -0.2941*** -0.2437*** -0.2673*** -0.0662*

























Constant 0.7964*** 0.5620*** 0.8621*** 0.7064*** -1.2882***
(0.0077) (0.0193) (0.0095) (0.0123) (0.1388)
Observations 8,780 8,541 8,780 8,779 8,397
R-squared 0.075 0.139 0.086 0.114 0.187
Notes: All regressions are unweighted. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significance at 10%;
**significance at 5%; ***significance at 1%. Enrolment is the dependent variable and equals 1 if a 6-12 year
old is enrolled in primary school. Eligible is a group indicator equals 1 if a child is in the treatment group
(i.e. if aged 6 to 8 years). FPE is the treatment indicator, the interaction of Eligible and Year dummies.
The regression in column (5) controls for Age, Age squared, Household head’s age, Number of adult males
and females in the household, and Household size. HHEduc is Household Head’s Education.
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Across all specifications, except for column 2, the FPE coefficient is statistically significant
and ranges between 0.070 and 0.093. Similarly, the coefficient on the year dummy is positive
and statistically significant throughout, indicating a positive time effect on enrolment. We
can also see that enrolment of the treatment group (i.e. the 6 to 8 year olds) is significantly
lower than that of the control group (i.e. the 9 to 12 year olds). Furthermore, we can see
in column 2 of the table that a unit increase in the wealth index increases enrolment by 4.3
percentage points. This positive wealth influence is also supported by the positive coefficient
on household head’s education in column 4 of the table. The enrolment rate of boys is
revealed to be significantly lower than that of girls in column 3.
The point estimates reported in columns 1 to 4 are potentially biased in ways that
we cannot tell a priori. This is because, as mentioned in section 2.6, the assignment of
primary school-age children to control and treatment groups is random, conditional on their
characteristics. Controlling for all child’s characteristics related to treatment status and
enrolment helps to net-out this potential bias. This leads us to the preferred results in
column 5 of the table, where all observed individual and household characteristics have been
controlled for. The estimates in column 5 reveal that FPE raised enrolment of the 6 to 8
year olds (the treated group) by about 9.3 percentage points relative to enrolment of the
9 to 12 year olds. This translates to about 13.2 percent (i.e. (9.3/70.7) × 100) increase in
enrolment attributable to FPE.
Consistent with the descriptive evidence in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2, results show a signif-
icant positive wealth gradient. The coefficients on the wealth index, gender, and household
head’s education have remained statistically significant and relatively stable, even after con-
trolling for all other variables. We can see in column 5 that a unit increase in the wealth
index increases primary-school enrolment by about 4 percentage points, and children of edu-
cated parents are more likely to enrol relative to their counterparts with uneducated parents.
There is also clear evidence of the gender gap in favour of girls. Boys’ enrolment is about 13
percentage points lower than that of girls.
Furthermore, the results in Table 2.5 indicate that FPE has not benefited children from
poor backgrounds more than those from rich families. For instance, we can see from column
5 of the table that the coefficient of the wealth-FPE interaction term is positive, generally
implying that school enrolment by the rich, not the poor, increased after FPE. However, this
coefficient is statistically insignificant, potentially due to the fact that the estimates here are
lower bound estimates given the restrictive nature of the treatment group. Similarly, the
coefficient for the interaction term Male–FPE is negative, contrary to what we saw in Table
2.2, but it is insignificant. This could be due to the fact that many boys and poor children
who have benefited from the policy are more likely to be older than 8 years given that these
groups (i.e. boys and the poor) are the one most likely to delay entry into the schooling
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system. I elaborate on this point further in the next section.
2.7.2 Upper bound Effect of FPE on Enrolment
Table 2.6 presents results of the effect of FPE on enrolment by primary school-age children
using the broadly defined treatment group (i.e. all primary school-age children who had
completed at most grade 2 in 2002). Column 5 of the table shows the upper bound FPE
effect, having controlled for all observed individual and household characteristics.
By and large, the qualitative conclusions remain the same, in spite of how the treatment
group is defined. The most important result from Table 2.6 is that enrolment of the primary
school-age population increased by about 28.8 percentage points due to the implementation of
the FPE programme18. Given the base enrolment rate of 70.7 percent in 1995, this translates
to about 41 percent increase in enrolment due to FPE. Even though this estimated FPE effect
is true for the sample at hand (because of not weighting), it is very much higher than the
33 percent increase in primary school net enrolment rate between 1999 and 2000, which is
calculated using the national enrolment statistics19, and much less than the widely cited 75
percent surge in enrolment of new entrants during the same period.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the bias on the effect parameter under the broad defini-
tion of the treatment group could go either way: it could be positive if children intentionally
repeated lower grades, or negative if those in higher grades stayed out of school waiting for
FPE. Given that those who continued schooling beyond grade 3 before FPE must have come
from relatively well-off households with high tastes for education, it is reasonable to believe
that the majority of them could have, at worst, repeated lower grades than stay out of school.
This makes it more probable that the effect could be biased upwards, and, hence, strongly
suggests that this result is the upper bound causal effect of FPE that can be generalised to
the population.
I speculated in Section 2.7.1 that using the narrowly-defined treatment group could ex-
plain the insignificance of the FPE effect on enrolment of children from poor households
seen in Table 2.5. The results in Table 2.6 confirm these speculations. The FPE programme
has clearly narrowed gender- and wealth-related schooling inequalities by significantly ben-
efiting boys and children from poor backgrounds. This is consistent with the descriptive
evidence. For instance, the negative coefficient of the Wealth-FPE interaction term implies
that, post-FPE introduction, a percentage fall in household wealth leads to a further 2 per-
centage points increase in the FPE enrolment effect to 30.8 percentage points. That is,
FPE increased enrolment of children at the lower tail of the wealth distribution the most.
18This result is robust to possible violations of the linearity assumption. Using the probit model, this
effect is estimated at 37.6 percentage points, and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. See Table
A.2.
19Data available at http://data.uis.unesco.org/. UNESCO Institute of Statistics.
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Table 2.6: The Upper-bound Effect of FPE on Primary School Enrolment
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FPE (D=1) 0.2168*** 0.3273*** 0.1745*** 0.2526*** 0.2877***
(0.0138) (0.0333) (0.0189) (0.0218) (0.0345)
Year (T=2002) -0.0037 -0.0035 0.0035 -0.0013 0.0037
(0.0075) (0.0209) (0.0090) (0.0132) (0.0206)
Eligible (G=1) -0.3855*** -0.6036*** -0.3279*** -0.4698*** -0.4922***

























Constant 0.9657*** 0.9385*** 0.9684*** 0.9513*** -0.7269***
(0.0048) (0.0150) (0.0062) (0.0089) (0.1043)
Observations 8,581 8,353 8,581 8,581 8,215
R-squared 0.136 0.176 0.143 0.161 0.231
Notes: All regressions are unweighted. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significance at 10%;
**significance at 5%; ***significance at 1%. Enrolment is the dependent variable and equals 1 if a 6-12
year old is enrolled in primary school. Eligible is a group indicator equals 1 if a child is in the treatment
group (i.e. if a primary school age child has completed at most grade 2). FPE is the treatment indicator,
the interaction of Eligible and Year dummies. The regression in column (5) controls for Age, Age squared,
Household head’s age, Number of adult males and females in the household, and Household size. HHEduc
is Household Head’s Education.
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Additionally, the positive coefficient of the male-FPE interaction term indicates that FPE
increased school enrolment of boys by as much as 36.2 percentage points relative to that of
girls.
On the whole, these results are consistent with the evidence provided by Deininger (2003)
in Uganda, and Lucas and Mbiti (2012) in Kenya who found that FPE increased access to
schooling. What is more, they show that in an environment where there is little scope
for schooling demand shifts from public schools (i.e. those covered by the FPE policy) to
private schools20. This suggests that FPE does indeed significantly raise access to schooling.
Furthermore, in line with the evidence by Deininger (2003) in Uganda and Al-Samarrai
and Zaman (2007) in Malawi, this chapter’s results show that the abolition of user fees
mostly benefited the poor, and bridged the gender-related inequalities in schooling, thereby
enhancing equity in access.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the effect of FPE programme on enrolment in Lesotho. I find
that this policy significantly increased the enrolment of the primary school-age population.
Using the narrow definition of the treatment group, I derive a lower-bound FPE effect of 9.3
percentage points (or about 13.2 percent) increase in enrolment of the 6 to 8 year olds. The
effect increases to 28.8 percentage points (or about 40.7 percent) increase in enrolment for
all of the primary school-age population when a broadly defined treatment group is used.
What is more, the results also show that FPE significantly increased enrolment of boys
(the historically disadvantaged group in Lesotho) relative to girls and of children from poor
backgrounds.
The main concern with this analysis is that the broadly defined control group’s enrolment
rate was already high (i.e. close to 100 percent) even before FPE, thereby making it difficult
to isolate the FPE effect from the time trend. Even though I have checked the robustness
of the results against this potential pitfall, it may still be considered a limitation. Another
potential limitation is that, under the broadly-defined treatment group, the control group
is a select group of children who have enrolled in school for at least three years and are
potentially from wealthier families. I have attempted to address this problem by controlling
for household wealth and household head’s education level.
By and large, however, the results in this chapter highlight that FPE in Lesotho has
largely achieved its objective of increasing enrolment and redressing inequalities in schooling
access. It is therefore possible that, if instituted in those sub-Saharan African countries still
20 In Lesotho, only one percent of all primary (non-religious) schools are private and FPE covers almost
all schools.
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lagging behind in education indicators, the ‘Education for All’ goal can be achieved. What
remains unknown is the effect of this policy on educational quality. Therefore, future research
should focus on this margin if we are to understand the full impact of FPE on education.
In the next chapter, I make a contribution towards this margin by looking at how education
quality has changed since the introduction of this policy.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Phasing-in of the FPE programme
Source: Own representation. Notes: On the left-hand side (i.e. y-axis) of the figure we have years from 2000
to 2006, the top horizontal axis shows grades 1 to 7, the bottom horizontal axis (i.e. x-axis) shows grade-
appropriate ages 6 to 12 years. The shaded regions of the figure indicate the grade(s) and grade-appropriate
age(s) covered by FPE in each year, starting from 2000.
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Source: Own calculations based on 1995 HBS and 2002 CWIQ data.
Table A.1: Primary School ownership in Lesotho
Proprietor
Share of ownership (%)
2000 2007 2011 (census)
African Methodist Episcopal Church 1.87 0.35 2
Anglican Church of Lesotho (A.C.L) 13.19 8.44 12
Lesotho Evangelical Church (Protestants) 38.86 38.66 33
Roman Catholic Church (R.C.C) 41.27 32 34
Community 1.39 5.31 3
Government 0.6 8.8 11
Private 0 0.59 1
Other Churches 2.82 5.85 4
Total 100 100 100
Source: Own calculations from the Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational
Quality (SACMEQ), SACMEQ II of 2000 and SACMEQ III of 2007, and MOET (2011).
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Table A.2: The Effect of FPE on Primary School Enrolment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Enrolment Marginal Effects (dy/dx)
FPE (D=1) 2.2246*** 0.3759***
(0.2744) (0.0459)































Notes: Probit regression results. Other controls are Age, Age squared, Household head’s age, Number of
adult males and females in the household, and Household size. HHEduc is Household Head’s Education.
Enrolment is the dependent variable and equals 1 if a 6-12 year old is enrolled in primary school. Eligible is a
group indicator equals 1 if a child is in the treatment group (i.e. if a primary school age child has completed
at most grade 2). FPE is the treatment indicator, the interaction of Eligible and Year dummies. Robust




Educational Inequality in Lesotho:
Changes and Determinants
3.1 Introduction
Education quality (or achievement)1 is low in much of the developing world, and is especially
so in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). A common presumption in the current literature is that the
dire state of educational quality in SSA has been exacerbated by the recent push to meet
the universal primary education Millennium Development Goal (MDG) by 2015 (see, for
example, Zuze and Leibbrandt, 2011; Colclough et al., 2008). Even though the FPE does
increase the educational quality of those children who would have otherwise not attended
school, it may reduce the educational quality of those who were already schooling. Therefore,
the average effect of the FPE may be negative if the latter effect dominates the former effect.
Theoretically, this access-quality hypothesis derives from Cunha et al. (2006)’s theory of
life cycle skill formation which predicts that exposing children to little and/or low quality
education early in their lives will negatively affect their future skill acquisition. According
to this theory, when young children are in a less stimulating environment, for example,
staying with parents who are less involved in their education and/or being in overcrowded
classrooms with little or no pupil-teacher contact, they are likely to acquire less education
from schooling2 which will be reflected by their poor performance in achievement tests.
This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence from some SSA countries, for example,
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda, which saw a decline in education quality after
1Educational achievement and educational quality are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.
2Schooling is different from education. Schooling is an input into the education production function
(Behrman, 2010).
42
the introduction of the free primary education (FPE) policy (Lee and Zuze, 2011; Lucas and
Mbiti, 2012).
However, the FPE policy is not always associated with a decline in education quality. For
example, Lesotho’s average reading and maths performance on SACMEQ tests increased3 by
4% and 7%, respectively, between 2000 (when FPE was first introduced) and 2007. Taylor
and Spaull (2013) also argue that a decline in a country’s average score does not always reflect
a falling education system. The authors show, using their “effective enrolment” measure
(that is, the proportion of an age-specific population achieving particular skill levels), that
increased education access in Southern and Eastern Africa was accompanied by an increase
in education quality.
Using changes in average test scores to infer changes in educational quality over time
is common in the education literature (Carnoy and Rothstein, 2013; Jopo et al., 2011b).
However, the use of this traditional summary statistic (that is, the mean) leaves much of the
information inherent in a test scores’ distribution untapped and thus fails to reveal much
of education quality dynamics. It is unclear, therefore, whether the increase in average
achievement in some countries, for example, is due to improved student performance levels
at the upper and/or lower tails of the distribution. On the one hand, if the increase in
average achievement is due to an increase in the performance of high-ability students, then
we are faced with a scenario of improved average education quality and a rise in education
inequality. If, on the other hand, the increase in average scores is a consequence of increased
performance of low-ability students, then we have a case of a reduction in education inequality
and improved education quality. Knowing which scenario prevails is essential for education
policy in order to ensure that no child is left behind, not only outside the schooling system
but also within the schooling system.
In fact, the Dakar Framework for Action by the World Education Forum does not only
call for quality FPE, but also the redress of educational inequalities (UNESCO, 2000). This is
because there is consensus in the literature that inequalities in educational achievement have
negative implications for other socially important dimensions, such as health and earnings
inequalities (Becker and Tomes, 1986b; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2014). Nonetheless, there is
little evidence on the extent, changes and determinants, of educational inequalities in many
developing countries, including Lesotho. Moreover, discussions on changes in educational
quality hardly ever mention educational inequalities. As Rodrigues et al. (2013) argue, an
increase in educational achievement should be interpreted as a positive change in education
quality only when all, and not just the high-ability, students have improved performance
levels.
This chapter seeks to fill this gap by going beyond the averages in analysing changes in
3Based on our calculations from the SACMEQ data described in the data section below.
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educational achievement in Lesotho. Lesotho is an appropriate setting on which to study
these changes in educational achievement and educational inequality for two reasons. Firstly,
following the implementation of the FPE programme in the year 2000, the enrolment of
new school entrants surged by 75% between 1999 and 2000, resulting in high pupil teacher
ratios, shortages in physical infrastructure, and an increased use of unqualified teachers,
especially in rural schools (Lekhetho, 2013; Urwick, 2011). But between 2000 and 2007, the
average achievement of grade 6 students increased, contrary to what would be expected and
what other SACMEQ countries with the same policy experienced. It is interesting to know
whether this increase in performance was driven by all or just a few gifted students, and also
the resulting implications of such an increase on educational inequality. Secondly, income
inequality in Lesotho is among the highest in SSA, with an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.52
(see Bureau of Statistics, 2006). The fact that part of income inequality is explained by
inequalities in educational achievement (see for example, Alves, 2012) points to the value of
also understanding the determinants of educational inequality.
Using the relative distribution method of Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999), I find that
the increase in educational achievement between 2000 and 2007 is driven by the improved
performance of students across the achievement quantiles, but mostly due to that of low-
ability students (that is, those below the median) and high-ability students (that is, those
above the 80th quantile). For students between the median and the 80th, their performance
appears to have remained constant. That is, although the inequality in educational achieve-
ment fell below the median, it increased above the median largely due to the increase in
performance of those at the very top of the achievement distribution. Therefore, this led to
an increase in both education quality and educational quality polarization (or educational in-
equality) over this period. Specifically, the results show that the increase in maths test scores
distribution is largely driven by the location (mean and median) shift, and that in reading
scores distribution is significantly driven by both location and shape (variance) changes.
These changes in educational achievement and educational inequality could be due to
changes in school resources and school characteristics, which are most likely to have been
affected by the implementation of the FPE policy. Glewwe et al. (2011) review the literature
that estimates the effects of school resources on students’ achievement. From a list of studies
they review, they find that there is little evidence that school resources have a positive impact
on students’ achievement. For example, Eide and Showalter (1998) find that the impact of
school inputs on achievement is nonlinear. They show that per pupil expenditures increase
maths test scores of low ability students and not that of an average student, and that pupil-
teacher ratio has no impact on achievement. Leuven et al. (2008) also find that class size
has no effect on student performance. However, Case and Deaton (1999) find that school
resources (proxied by district average pupil-teacher ratio) in South Africa have a positive
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effect on student achievement. Therefore, the results on the effects of schools resources on
achievement are, at best, mixed.
Consequently, I employ the unconditional quantile regressions to uncover determinants
of these distributional changes (Firpo et al., 2009). I find that much of the increase in
educational attainment is unexplained. However, two important educational policy variables,
pupil-teacher ratio and teacher effort, have a significant influence on the increase in reading
test scores. For example, a fall in pupil-teacher ratio and an increase in teacher effort,
respectively lead to a significant increase educational achievement. On the other hand, the
increase in maths performance was partly driven by pupil socio-economic background, grade
repetition, age, school wealth and school social capital (that is, whether the surrounding
community contributes to school activities such as school building and maintenance). Thus,
the results seem to support the earlier evidence that automatic grade promotion could be
harmful to educational quality (Foureaux Koppensteiner, 2014).
The results further indicate that the increase in educational inequality (i.e. the increase
in maths and reading variances) is strongly associated with a rise in grade repetition, and
a fall in teacher effort and school social capital. However, as is the case with changes in
educational achievement, much of the increase in educational inequality is left unexplained.
I, therefore, conjecture that there could be some family background factors (for instance,
parental sex preferences, a child’s order of birth, etc) and intangible school quality factors,
such as changes in management and leadership practices, that are associated with changes
in educational quality and inequality in Lesotho.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data while Section 3
discusses the empirical strategies. Section 4 presents and analyses the findings. Section 5
then concludes the chapter.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Data
I use data from SACMEQ, a consortium of education ministries from fourteen Anglophone
African countries4, policy makers, researchers, and the International Institute for Educational
Planning (IIEP), with the aim of improving research capacity and technical skills of edu-
cational planners to monitor and evaluate educational quality (Ross et al., 2005; Murimba,
2005). Thus far, SACMEQ has successfully carried out three survey projects: SACMEQ I
conducted in 1995-1998; SACMEQ II in 1998-2000; and SACMEQ III in 2005-2007. Lesotho
has only participated in the last two surveys.
4These are Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania (Mainland), Tanzania (Zanzibar), Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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The target population for these surveys is all grade (or standard) six students rather than
a specific age group as is the case with, for instance, PISA (Program for International Student
Assessment). They use a two-stage sampling method to collect information. Firstly, schools
are stratified by region (or district), and within each region, schools are sampled using the
probability proportional to size lottery method. The size of each school is determined from
the previous year’s administrative records. Secondly, a simple random sample of grade six
students within each selected school is chosen (Ross et al., 2005). SACMEQ II data is from
177 primary schools and 3155 students, while SACMEQ III data comes from 182 primary
schools and 4240 students. These surveys are nationally (but not regionally) representative.
These data have rich background information on students’, teachers’ and schools’ char-
acteristics, and standardised (English) reading and mathematics test scores for students and
teachers. To get these standardised test scores, reading (maths) test questions were clas-
sified into eight levels of increasing difficulty, from pre-reading (pre-numeracy) to critical
reading (abstract problem solving). Exploiting this test structure, the raw test scores were
then transformed using Rasch Item Response Theory (IRT) to reflect each student’s and
teacher’s competency level5. These scores were further transformed to have an international
mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. I use these transformed test scores as the
measure of educational achievement.
I use students’ family background information from the student questionnaire to construct
the pupil socio-economic status (SES) index. First, I selected the relevant variables (e.g.
parental education) based on Shanks and Robinson (2013) ‘framework for understanding
child and educational outcomes’. Second, I pooled data from both years, and then employed
the principal components analysis (PCA) method on a set of variables common to both years
to get the index.6 Pooling the data, and using common items in both years to construct the
index ensures comparability of the index over time.
Parental education is a categorical dummy of the highest level of education completed:
it is coded into seven categories from ‘no education’ to ‘completed university education’.
In 2000 and 2007, respectively, I have 39% and 20% missing father education, and 19%
and 11% missing mother education7. Therefore, I use this detailed categorisation of parental
education to convert it into completed years of education, assuming no grade repetition. The
main motive is to impute the missing values. I then apply the predictive mean matching
method to impute these missing values based on all other students’ covariates. Doing so,
5The IRT assumes that the distribution of latent ability is normally distributed and estimates the prob-
ability that an individual gives the correct response to an item (or question) conditional on his/her cognitive
ability and item difficulty using a logit model. Combining these probabilities with the observed raw test
scores distribution helps to back out the distribution of cognitive ability (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2014).
6A complete list of these covariates used to construct the SES index is shown in Table A.1. I use the
ordinary (or centered) PCA method to construct the index given that not all the variables are assets.
7All children without parents and/or knowledge of their parents’ education did not report parental
education.
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however, does not affect the distribution of the SES index (see Figure A.1), but helps to keep
all the students in the data.
Table 3.1 gives a complete list of the covariates, including the SES index, and their
summary statistics. There 3155 and 4240 students in 2000 and 2007, respectively. But there
are about 11 students and one student with missing maths scores in 2000 and 2007, in that
order. Between 2000 and 2007, the average class size slightly increased from 45 pupils to 46
pupils, but the average Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR) dropped from 54 pupils per teacher to
42 pupils per teacher. This is reflective of the increased number of teachers and schools built
under the free primary education (FPE) programme over the same period.
The average number of classrooms remained almost constant at about 1.5 (≈ 2 class-
rooms), while teacher years of experience dropped by about one quarter, which indicates
that there was an increase in the number of new and less experienced teachers. Nonetheless,
the average level of teacher qualification increased, which suggests that the new teachers
were relatively more educated.
Additionally, the number of students with textbooks increased between 2000 and 2007.
The percentage of students with own maths textbooks increased by 10 percentage points
from 46 percent to 56 percent, while that of students with reading textbooks increased by
about a percentage point from 55 percent to 56 percent.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable
2000 2007
Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N
|t|-value for
mean equality
Pupil, and subject-specific characteristics
Reading Score 451.2 57.94 3155 467 70.21 4240 7.754
Maths score 447.2 60.36 3144 476.9 67.27 4239 17.903
Gender (female) 0.556 0.497 3146 0.546 0.498 4240 0.2
Pupil age in months 169.63 22.15 3155 168.02 21.23 4240 3.147
Own reading textbook 0.553 0.497 3155 0.559 0.497 4240 1.572
Own maths textbook 0.456 0.498 3155 0.563 0.496 4240 10.445
Share reading textbook 0.326 0.469 3155 0.369 0.483 4240 2.708
Share maths textbook 0.431 0.495 3155 0.362 0.481 4240 6.987
Once repeated a class 0.608 0.488 3155 0.517 0.500 4240 8.381
SES index -0.350 0.034 3155 -0.098 0.035 4240 5.156
Speak English at home 0.707 0.455 3155 0.762 0.426 4240 3.846
Pupil Problem Index -0.146 1.545 3155 0.109 2.503 4240 5.390
School characteristics
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1: Continued from previous page
Variable
2000 2007
Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N
|t|-value for
mean equality
Class size 44.90 18.09 177 46.16 22.28 174 0.742
Pupil-teacher ratio 53.85 177 18.49 41.80 16.39 174 23.792
Grade enrolment 70.84 54.55 177 70.19 52.91 174 1.204
School enrollment 616.5 384.0 177 493.5 325.1 174 14.745
Number of grade 6 class rooms 1.531 0.963 177 1.516 0.974 174 0.456
School location (Urban) 0.351 0.477 177 0.336 0.472 174 2.467
School Building Condition (poor) 0.66 0.008 177 0.512 0.008 174 13.419
School asset index 6.31 0.039 177 5.58 0.032 174 14.544
School days lost per year 4.66 5.451 177 0.84 3.040 174 35.474
Sch. distance from services 28.54 36.337 177 26.54 29.778 174 2.526
Teacher Problem Index 0.091 1.497 177 -0.068 1.899 174 4.029
Maths teacher characteristics
Test score 739.4 70.67 177 738.8 68.59 174 1.675
Gender (female) 0.763 0.425 177 0.684 0.465 174 4.541
Age 40.96 9.136 177 38.04 9.595 174 11.945
Years of professional training 2.723 1.264 177 2.655 1.542 174 5.977
Years of experience 16.33 9.942 177 12.40 9.119 174 15.247
Teaching hours per week 23.10 6.839 177 19.71 8.954 174 17.475
Test frequency 1.393 0.775 177 1.391 0.703 174 5.736
Qualification (primary) 0.512 0.500 177 0.358 0.479 174 12.391
Qualification (junior secondary) 0.112 0.315 177 0.0319 0.179 174 13.351
Qualification (Senior secondary) 0.157 0.364 177 0.208 0.406 174 8.459
Qualification (A-level) 0.161 0.368 177 0.263 0.440 174 9.159
Qualification (Tertiary) 0.0582 0.234 177 0.139 0.346 174 9.325
Reading teacher characteristics
Test score 722.0 60.19 177 721.3 57.77 174 17.903
Gender (female) 0.751 0.433 177 0.722 0.448 174 4.541
Age 41.09 9.186 177 39.32 10.46 174 6.251
Years of professional training 2.736 1.260 177 2.821 1.478 174 1.096
Years of experience 16.58 9.954 177 12.87 9.247 174 13.328
Teaching hours per week 22.99 6.847 177 19.11 8.929 174 20.001
Test frequency 1.575 0.688 177 1.408 0.703 174 13.168
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1: Continued from previous page
Variable
2000 2007
Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N
|t|-value for
mean equality
Qualification (primary) 0.509 0.500 177 0.330 0.470 174 14.158
Qualification (junior secondary) 0.122 0.327 177 0.0419 0.200 174 12.886
Qualification (Senior secondary) 0.157 0.364 177 0.208 0.406 174 5.75
Qualification (A-level) 0.161 0.368 177 0.263 0.440 174 12.553
Qualification (Tertiary) 0.0582 0.234 177 0.139 0.346 174 10.839
Source: SACMEQ II and SACMEQ III data. Notes: The school asset index is a count index
provided with the data, and is calculated as the sum of assets such as school library, staff room,
electricity, radio, TV, VCR, computer, etc, that the school owns. The SES index is the pupil’s
socio-economic status index calculated using the PCA. I use the ordinary PCA index because
most household items used are not assets, and it is not clear whether having a wooden floor
is better that a cement floor, for example. Pupil- and Teacher-Problem indices are composite
indices made of pupil and teacher problem behaviours such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse, late
school arrivals, unjustified absenteeism, bullying of pupils and/or teachers, etc.
3.2.2 Descriptive analysis of test scores distributions
It is essential to have a clear picture of educational achievement dynamics before diving
into the more technical analysis. Table 3.2 gives a glimpse of the evolution of education
quality using traditional summary measures; the mean, median, standard deviation, and the
coefficient of variation. The first two columns show the summary statistics, respectively, for
reading and maths scores in 2000, while the last two columns present the same information
for 2007.
We can see from the table that there has been an upward shift in both the location
(mean and median) and the shape (variance or coefficient of variation) of maths and reading
test scores. On average, maths test scores increased by 30 points, while reading test scores
increased by 17 points between 2000 and 2007. The extent of inequality is higher in the
maths test scores’ distribution with a coefficient of variation of 13.50 compared to 12.84 for
reading scores in 2000. However, the increase in inequality is higher in reading than in maths
scores. For instance, the reading scores coefficient of variation increased by 2.2 points, while
that of maths scores increased by 0.5 points.
These changes are much clearer in Figure 3.1. This figure plots the distributions of
reading and maths scores for the full sample of schools (panels A and C) and the resampled
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Table 3.2: Grade 6 Reading and Maths Test Scores in Lesotho: 2000 - 2007
Summary measures
2000 Test scores 2007 Test scores
Reading Maths Reading Maths
Mean 451.226 447.178 467.869 476.907
Median 445.318 440.489 455.524 468.619
Standard deviation (Sd) 57.936 60.363 70.211 67.273
Coefficient of Variation (CV) 12.84 13.50 15.01 14.11
Sample size (N) 3155 3144 4240 4239
Source: Own calculations from SACMEQ data.
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(D) Pupil Math test scores
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SACMEQ III. Notes: Kernel densities of test scores for
a full sample of schools and resampled schools. Resampled schools is a panel of 42 schools included in both
surveys.
schools (panels B and D)8. Panels A and B show the reading scores’ distributions. They
clearly show a positive shift in the location of the reading distribution with a change in
shape. This, thus, shows that the increase in students’ reading performance between 2000
and 2007 was accompanied by an increase in educational inequality. Panels C and D of
Figure 3.1 show the distributions of maths scores. Looking at these panels (panels C and
D), we can see the positive location shift in the distribution of maths scores, with no obvious
change in distributional shape. Appendix Figure A.2 shows that the 2007 test scores first
order stochastically dominate the 2000 test scores, especially in maths scores.
I now analyse these test scores’ changes by socio-economic status (or wealth). Table
3.3a gives the changes in average reading achievement by wealth quintiles, while Table 3.3b
provides similar information for maths achievement. Column 8 in each table shows the
percentage change in average scores by quintile. It is evident from these tables that there






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































has been an increase in educational achievement across SES quintiles. But it seems that
wealthy students are the ones driving much of the changes in reading and maths test scores.
From both tables, the percentage change in achievement is increasing with student’s wealth
position. For example, while the reading performance of students in the first wealth quintile
(the poorest) increased by 1.59%, that of students in the fifth quintile (the richest) increased
by 6.38%.
Table 3.3a further shows that reading achievement is more unequal in 2007 compared to
2000, as revealed by the increased coefficient of variation over the period (see column 9 of
the table)9. Much of this increase in reading scores’ inequality is concentrated in the middle
of the wealth distribution. For example, the change in the coefficient of variation at the
third and fourth wealth quintiles is 1.70 and 2.09, respectively, compared to 1.62 at the first
quintile and 0.68 at the fifth quintile.
Table 3.3b shows that maths performance of students at first quintile increased by a
smaller percentage, 4.07%, compared to 10.60% increase in that of students at the fifth
quintile. However, the increase in educational inequality in maths is largely concentrated at
the second quintile, and it declined among students at the fourth quintile between 2000 and
2007. The gap in educational achievement between the first and the fifth quintile is highest
in reading performance, but it increased the most in maths performance. The reading test
score gap between the rich and the poor is 30 points and 53 points, in favour of the rich, in
2000 and 2007, respectively. On the other hand, the maths score gap between the rich and
poor is about 11 points and 41 points in 2000 and 2007, respectively. Thus the wealth gap
in performance increased by 30 points in maths, it increased by 23 points in reading.
These changes in performance by wealth suggest that pupils’ wealth is associated with the
change in performance over time. But what else could explain these changes in performance
over time? In the next section, I explore changes in the distribution of policy variables
that could potentially be associated with the observed changes in educational quality and
educational inequality10.
3.2.3 Changes in the distribution of educational policy variables
Table 3.4 presents the distributions of teacher test scores, student textbook ownership, and
pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) by wealth quintiles, school proprietor, and location, in 2000 and
2007.
Starting with teacher-subject scores by students’ wealth, we can see that there is a positive
9We use the coefficient of variation as a measure of educational inequality in comparing test scores
variances for distributions with different means and standard deviations.
10We consider pupil teacher ratio, teacher education and textbook access to be educational policy variables
because they are widely employed supply-side policies, and are often used in the literature and popular press

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relationship between wealth and teacher test scores. For instance, in 2000, the average teacher
reading score in the first wealth quintile is 723 points. It dips to 718 points in the second
quintile, and then steadily rises up to 731 points in the fifth quintile. We observe a similar
pattern in 2007. Teacher maths scores, on the other hand, very much oscillate across wealth
quintiles in 2000. In 2007, however, teacher maths scores steadily rise from 736 points in the
first quintile to 742 points in the fifth quintile. This positive relationship between teacher test
scores and wealth may explain the relatively high maths and reading achievement inequality
in 2007 seen in Table 3.3a.
Furthermore, the last two rows of Table 3.4 indicate that teacher-subject knowledge is
generally skewed towards urban areas. In 2000, an average urban teacher scored 5 points (in
reading) and 6 points (in maths) above his/her rural counterpart. In 2007, the gap widens
up to 13 points in reading performance, but remains almost constant at 5 points in maths
performance. This indicates that low quality teachers are largely serving students from rural
areas (with many poor households), while high quality teachers are teaching students from
urban areas (with many rich households).
The table further reveals that the proportion of students from poor backgrounds with
textbooks is higher than that of their affluent counterparts in 2007, which is the reverse of
the situation in 2000. For example, in 2007, about 60% of students in the first quintile have
textbooks, while only 52% and 49% in the fifth quintile have access to reading and maths
textbooks, respectively. Across wealth quintiles, there is an increase in the proportion of
students with maths textbooks over the period. Moreover, rural students generally have
better access to maths textbooks than their urban counterparts. For example, 58% of rural
students have maths textbooks in 2007 compared to 52% of urban students.
Even though pupil-teacher ratio has declined across socio-economic groups and locations
between 2000 and 2007, students from wealthy families generally attend less crowded schools
compared to those from disadvantaged families. In 2000, the pupil-teacher ratio in the first
quintile was 57 versus 52 in the fifth quintile. These ratios dropped, respectively, to 45
and 41 students per teacher in 2007. However, this was to be expected because the FPE
policy involved construction of more primary schools in rural (and largely hard-to-reach
mountainous) areas.
Another particularly interesting finding in this table is that pupil-teacher ratio fell in all
schools except government schools, where it increased by about 16 students per teacher. This
could be explained by the location of newly built government schools and where new teachers
are likely to work. As mentioned above, under the government school building programme,
more schools were built in previously underserved and hard-to-reach mountainous areas, in
addition to building additional classrooms to existing schools. In fact this is what Table
3.2 shows: the share of urban schools decreased from 35 percent to 33.6 percent. This,
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coupled with the fact that many children are from rural areas, imply that government schools
attracted more children. It is also possible that children changed to government schools
because of them being nearer to their homes. Attracting teachers to rural and hard-to-reach
schools is always a problem in Lesotho. Thus, the increase in the number of students in
rural (and mainly government schools) was not accompanied by an increase in the number
of teachers.
All in all, these average statistics appear to show some correlation between the changes in
the distribution of policy variables and changes in educational achievement. For instance, the
relatively high pupil teacher ratio and low teacher subject scores in the first wealth quintile
are possibly associated with the low student performance in the first wealth quintile. But, as
pointed out earlier, changes in averages obscure much of educational quality distributional
dynamics. Therefore, there is need to go beyond these simple, but informative, descriptives
to uncover the distributional changes. I do this in the next two sections.
3.3 Relative Distribution Analysis
3.3.1 The method
To further explore the distributional changes in educational achievement over the period,
I use the relative distribution method developed by Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999).
This method is a fully non-parametric statistical framework for analysing changes in the
distribution of an attribute (e.g. test scores) between groups (rural-urban) or periods (2000-
2007)11. Rodrigues et al. (2013) are the first to employ this method in education economics
to investigate distributional changes in educational achievement in Brazil between 1997 and
2005.
Let the continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) of test scores (Y ) for the refer-
ence year, 2000, be F0(y0), and that of the comparison year, 2007, be F1(y1). Again, assume
that both of these CDFs have a common support with their respective density functions
given as f0(y0) and f1(y1). The relative distribution of Y1 to Y0 is then defined as
R = F0(Y1) (3.1)
This produces a relative data r (i.e. the realization of R) interpreted as the percentile
rank that the 2007 test score y1 would have in the 2000 test scores distribution, and is
continuous in the interval [0, 1]. R is a random variable with a CDF given as
G(r) = F1(F
−1
0 (r)) ≡ F1(yr) r ∈ [0, 1] (3.2)
11This presentation draws heavily from Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) who pioneered the method.
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r ∈ [0, 1] (3.3)
where yr is the τ
th quantile test score in the 2000 test score distribution.
Thus, for each quantile of the 2000 test scores’ distribution, there are three possible
results: if g(r) > 1 (or g(r) < 1), there is an over-representation (or under-representation)
of year 2007 students relative to 2000 students; and if g(r) = 1, we have distributional
equivalence such that the performance levels of students in both years is the same across
quantiles.
If g(r) > 1 or g(r) < 1, it implies that the two PDFs are different. To decompose these
differences between PDFs into differences that are due to location (mean or median) shift and
shape (scale or skewness) effects, I further make the following assumptions. Let YA denote
a hypothetical random variable indicating the reference year test scores location-adjusted to
have the same median as the comparison year test scores. That is, YA has the same median
of the 2007 distribution, but the shape of the 2000 distribution. For an additive shift in
location, YA is the random variable defined as Y0 + ρ, where ρ = median(Y1)−median(Y0).
Thus, YA is equal to the educational achievement in 2000 plus the 2007 median score less
the 2000 median score. The CDF of YA is given as FA(Y1) = F0(Y1 − ρ).
From this transformation, I now have three distributions, Y0, YA, and Y1, with which I can
construct two relative distributions that isolate the effects of changes in location and shape
(or structure) of the distribution. Using the notation of equation 3.1, let R ≡ R10 = F0(Y1)
be the relative distribution of Y1 to Y0, R
A
0 = F0(YA) = F0(Y0+ρ) be the relative distribution
of YA to Y0, which isolates the location effect, and R
1
A = FA(Y1) = F0(Y1 − ρ) be the the
relative distribution of Y1 to YA isolating the shape effect. This is represented in terms of









The results of this decomposition are displayed graphically, and quantified using summary
measures such as the median relative polarization (MRP) index.
The MRP index helps to tease out whether changes in educational achievement over time
are associated with changes in educational inequality by measuring the relative density in the
center and/or tails of the distribution. It corresponds to the median absolute deviation of
the relative distribution. Because I am only concerned with shape effects, I use the median-
matched relative distribution of Y1 to Y0, which is defined as R
A
0 = F0(Y1 − ρ). Therefore,
the median of RA0 = 1/2 and the MRP of Y1 to Y0 is defined as
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MRP (F1;F0) = 4
1ˆ
0
| r − 1
2
| gA0 (r)dr − 1 (3.5)
where gA0 (r) is the relative distribution of the 2007 distribution, location-adjusted to
have the same median as the 2000 distribution. The MRP produces values between −1
and 1, where zero implies no shape differences, positive values mean more polarization (i.e.
increases in the tails of the distribution), and negative values show convergence towards
the center of the distribution (i.e. decreases in the tails of the distribution). The MRP
is further decomposed into lower tail polarization index (LRP), and upper tail polarization
index (URP), respectively, defined as




| r − 1
2
| gA0 (r)dr − 1 (3.6)




| r − 1
2
| gA0 (r)dr − 1 (3.7)
3.3.2 Changes in Educational Achievement
Figures 3.2 and 3.3, and Table 3.5 present the relative distribution analysis results12. Figure
3.2 shows relative distributions of maths scores between 2000 and 2007, and Figure 3.3
shows the relative distributions of reading scores. In each figure, panel A shows the overall
distributional change, panel B shows the location effect, and panel C shows the shape effect.
From panel A of each of these figures, we can see that there is an increase in the relative
densities of maths and reading scores along the quantiles of the distributions. This implies
a decline in the density of students with lower performance levels on both proficiency tests
(maths and reading), concurrent with an increase in the density of students with higher
performance levels above the 80th percentile.
Focusing on panel A of Figure 3.2, for example, we can see that the density of 2007 maths
scores relative to 2000 maths scores at the 20th percentile is about 0.5 (i.e. g(0.2) = 0.5).
This implies that the 2007 students are 50% less likely to be at the 20th percentile of the
2000 maths scores’ distribution. Similarly, panel A of Figure 3.3 shows that g(0.2) = 0.8
for reading scores, implying that the 2007 students are 20% less likely to be at the 20th
percentile of the 2000 reading scores’ distribution. At the other extreme, we can see that
the relative density is approximately 2.3, i.e. g(1.0) = 2.3, for maths, and g(1.0) = 1.8 for
12Ben Jann’s reldist Stata code is used for this analysis (see Jann, 2008).
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(C) Math scores: Shape Effect
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SACMEQ III data. Notes: The x-axis shows the
quantiles of the 2000 test scores while the top horizontal line shows actual scores corresponding to each
quantile. The solid horizontal line is the line of distributional equivalence. The dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals for the relative density.
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(C) Reading scores: Shape Effect
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SACMEQ III data. Notes: The x-axis shows the
quantiles of the 2000 test scores while the top horizontal line shows actual scores corresponding to each
quantile. The solid horizontal line is the line of distributional equivalence. The dashed lines are the 95%
confidence intervals for the relative density.
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reading. These results suggest that the proportion of students who, in 2007, scored between
550 and 800 points in maths and reading, respectively, is 130% and 80% more than that of
the 2000 student population that reached the same proficiency levels. All in all, these results
show a huge increase in maths performance relative to reading performance.
Turning to the location effects in panel B of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, I find that the results
are much in line with those seen in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2. That is, there is a strong (less
strong) location shift in the maths (reading) scores between 2000 and 2007, indicating that
the 2007 students’ test scores are far superior than the 2000 scores. This is largely driven
by students below the median and those above the 80th quantile for maths, and those below
the 20th quantile and those above the 80th quantile for reading.
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 have clearly shown that the 2007 test scores’ distributions are
more unequal than the 2000 ones. Panel C of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show us who is driving the
inequality between these distributions. These figures plot the relative density of Y1 to YA.
Focusing on panel C of Figure 3.2 for maths scores, we can see that the relative density is
oscillating around the line of distributional equivalence. Therefore, there is no clear evidence
of polarization in maths performance. Looking at the reading scores shape effect in panel
C of Figure 3.3, however, we can see clear evidence of an increase in polarization (i.e. an
increase in the tails of the relative distributions) between 2000 and 2007. The U shape in
panel C of Figure 3.3 shows an increase in reading scores polarization (or inequality).
Table 3.5 presents education quality polarization indices; the MRP, LRP, and URP in-
dices. The MRP index for reading scores indicates that, over the period, about 9% of the
student population has shifted away from the centre of the reading scores’ distribution, a per-
centage point higher than the 8% shift in the maths scores’ distribution, and these changes
are statistically significant at 5% level. This implies that there is relatively higher increase in
educational inequality in reading performance compared to that in maths performance. The
results further show that lower tail polarization (LRP) has contributed more to the overall
polarization index, MRP, than the upper tail polarization (URP). For example, the LRP
index for reading scores is 10.6%, almost 4 percentage points higher than the URP index,
and is statistically significant at 5% level. Thus, there is a high proportional representation
of the 2007 cohort at the lower and upper tails of the reading distribution, but largely at
the lower tail. As for the maths relative distribution, neither LRP index nor URP index is
statistically significant, even though LRP seems to be relatively higher in magnitude.
It is possible that the observed changes in educational achievement and educational in-
equality are a mix of “composition effects” from rising enrolment and “treatment effects”
from changes in teacher and school characteristics. In the next two sections, I attempt to
link these distributional changes in test scores to changes in the covariates (e.g. the policy
variables) seen in Section 3.2.
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Table 3.5: Grade 6 test scores’ distribution polarization between 2000 and 2007
Polarization index
Reading scores Maths scores
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Median (MRP) 0.088** 0.0162 0.079** 0.0160
Lower tail (LRP) 0.106** 0.0349 0.126 0.0942
Upper tail (URP) 0.069** 0.0288 0.032 0.0825
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SACMEQ III data. Notes: Bootstrapped standard
errors are reported. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
3.4 Decomposing changes in educational achievement
and educational inequality
When one is interested in comparing average test scores between two periods (or groups), it
is possible to apply the workhorse decomposition method proposed by Blinder (1973) and
Oaxaca (1973), the Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition method. The O-B method enables
one to decompose the mean change in an outcome variable into covariates-explained change
and ‘unexplained’ (or coefficients-explained) change, and further divide these components
into the contribution of each covariate. Suppose that student i’s test score in period t, yit,
is linearly dependent on a vector of characteristics, Xit, through the following education
production function
yit = Xitβt + εit, for t = 0, 1 (3.8)
where βt is a time-specific parameter vector, and εit is a mean-zero random error. The
mean difference in test scores between 2000 (t = 0) and 2007 (t = 1) is therefore given as:
4µT = y1 − y0
= X1β1 −X0β0
= X1β1 −X1β0 + X1β0 −X0β0










where 4µr is the unexplained (or coefficients) effect, and 4
µ
X is the explained (or char-
acteristics) effect.13 The detailed decompositions of these effects are written in terms of the
sums of the covariates’ contributions as:
13Note that the use of“effects”here does not refer to causal effects but rather the contribution of coefficients













where xk is the mean of the kth variable, and βt,k is the coefficient of the k
th variable.
One of the limitations of the O-B decomposition is that it cannot be used to decompose
other distributional statistics, such as the median and variance, other than the mean (Firpo
et al., 2007; Fortin et al., 2011). Since the primary interest is in learning about how pupils’
characteristics affect not only the mean test scores but also other distributional statistics, I
use the recentered influence function (RIF) regression decomposition method by Firpo et al.
(2007, 2009). The RIF-regression decomposition method is a generalization of the O-B that
allows for the decomposition of changes in any distributional statistic.
To see this, assume that the education production function in equation 3.8 is some un-
known flexible function,
yit = f (Xit, εit) , for t = 0, 1 (3.12)
where y, t, and X are jointly distributed. Let F1 be the distribution of test scores (y) at
time t = 1 (i.e. yt=1|t = 1
d∼ F1) and similarly, yt=0|t = 0
d∼ F0. Let FC be the distribution
of test scores that 2007 (i.e. t = 1) students would have got had their characteristics been
rewarded as in 2000 (t = 0). We denote such counterfactual scores as yt=0|t = 1
d∼ FC . The
corresponding distributional statistics (e.g. the median) for our three respective distributions
are denoted as ϕ(F1), ϕ(F0) and ϕ(FC). Therefore, the change in this distributional statistic
between t = 0 and t = 1 is given as:
4ϕT = ϕ(F1)− ϕ(F0)






In order to get the detailed decompositions of 4ϕr and 4
ϕ
X , I estimate the τ
th quantile
(qτ ) RIF regressions. First, I calculate the RIF for each observation as
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RIF (y; qτ ) = qτ + IF (y; qτ )
= qτ +
τ − 1{y ≤ qτ}
fY (qτ )
where qτ is the sample quantile, fY (qτ ) is the density of y at point qτ (estimated using
kernel methods) and 1{y ≤ qτ} is an indicator function taking the value of 1 when the value
of the test score (y) is less or equal to qτ . Second, I run the OLS regression of this new
dependent variable, RIF (y; qτ ), on the covariates, (X) as follows:
14
RIF (y; qτ ) = Xitβt + εit (3.14)
and then apply the O-B decomposition to get 4ϕr and 4
ϕ
X by quantile, and their detailed
decompositions as in equations 3.10 and 3.11. This decomposition gives the influence of
changes in covariates and coefficients over time on changes in achievement (Firpo et al.,
2007, 2009). Since the expected value of RIF (y;ϕ, Ft) equals ϕ, these are unconditional
quantile decompositions. Moreover, if ϕ = µ, then RIF (y;ϕ, Ft) equals y, so that the
decomposition of equation 3.14 becomes the traditional O-B decomposition.15
3.5 RIF regression results
The object of this section is to see whether changes in any of the education policy variables
(for example, PTR, access to textbooks and teacher education) and any other covariates are
associated with the observed changes in educational achievement and educational inequality
between 2000 and 2007. I first report the results of the RIF-regression decomposition of
changes in educational achievement, and then the results for changes in educational inequality
(i.e. changes in test scores’ variances).
Table 3.6 presents the RIF regression quantile decomposition of changes in reading per-
formance. It shows the total change in reading achievement by quantiles, and the contribution
of each covariate to the changes. Table 3.7, on the other hand, presents the RIF regression
quantile decomposition of changes in maths performance. Just like Table 3.6, it shows the
total change in maths scores by quantiles and the contribution of each covariate to these
changes.
The overall message from these tables is that educational achievement increased across all
quantiles between 2000 and 2007, with much of the increase being driven by the performance
14Equation 3.14 is called the Uconditional Quantile Regression (Firpo et al., 2007, 2009).
15To implement this decomposition method, I use the rifreg Stata code by Nicole Fortin, dowloadable
at http : //faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html.
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of students at the lower quantiles. These results are much in line with earlier results presented
in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. More importantly, we can see from both Tables 3.6 and 3.7 that the
coefficients effect (or unexplained effect) is statistically significant, and it is almost as large
as the total differential across quantiles, while the explained effect is relatively smaller and
statistically insignificant. This signifies that changes in observed students’ characteristics
have had very little influence on the observed changes in educational achievement.
Looking at individual tables, and starting with Table 3.6, I find that changes in pupil
teacher ratio (PTR), speaking English at home, grade repetition, and teacher effort (i.e.
teaching hours per week and testing frequency), all have a statistically significant relation-
ship with changes in reading achievement. Interestingly, all these covariates, except grade
repetition, only have a significant influence on test score changes at the lower quantiles. For
example, pupil-teacher ratio is negatively associated with changes in reading scores at the
10th and 50th quantiles. This implies that the fall in pupil teacher ratio between 2000 and
2007 is related to the increase in pupils’ reading achievement at these quantiles. Speaking
English at home is positively related to the increase in reading performance of pupils at the
10th quantile only. An increase in teacher effort, either by giving more tests and/or teaching
more hours per week, is positively related with the increased reading performance of pupils
at the 10th and 50th quantiles. Lastly, grade repetition has a strong positive influence on
maths scores at the top quantiles. Although it is not a policy variable, it is also interesting
to note that the socio-economic status (SES) index appears to have strong positive influence
on students’ reading performance at the upper tails of the distribution.
Turning to Table 3.7, I find that education policy variables have no significant relation-
ship with changes in maths performance. However, pupil maths performance is statistically
associated with the socio-economic status (SES) index, school wealth (i.e. school total assets
and school building condition), pupil age, and grade repetition. Specifically, I find that an
increase in pupil socio-economic status is significantly associated with an increase in maths
performance across all quantiles. But the influence of the SES index seems to be stronger at
all quantiles of the maths distribution.
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Table 3.6: Changes in reading scores, 2000-2007: RIF-Reg decomposition results
VARIABLES
Quantile 10 Quantile 50 Quantile 90
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Total Differential 156.8*** (7.957) 91.35*** (2.615) 86.08*** (6.014)
Pupil Teacher Ratio -3.306* -38.96* -3.167* 9.070 -3.948 17.49
(1.715) (22.56) (1.654) (7.332) (4.025) (17.29)
Teacher quality -1.174 -134.4 0.833 -56.50* 4.220 -64.26
(2.325) (99.48) (2.021) (29.27) (4.680) (63.92)
School Ownership -1.738 193.6*** -1.944 75.93*** -1.591 167.4***
(2.065) (71.00) (1.705) (10.13) (2.991) (20.27)
Teacher sex 0.172 16.59* -0.0216 -0.320 0.236 -5.596
(0.410) (9.330) (0.114) (3.682) (0.509) (8.121)
Pupil sex 0.194 11.09* 0.232 4.862*** 0.0232 -5.593
(0.418) (6.351) (0.194) (1.418) (0.126) (4.088)
Textbook access 0.0524 13.44* 0.134 5.446*** 0.320 10.00
(0.301) (7.282) (0.327) (2.072) (0.747) (6.087)
Teacher age 0.199 122.8** 0.188 2.037 -0.510 15.79
(0.622) (48.93) (0.517) (13.59) (1.569) (33.42)
Pupil repeated 0.853 6.477 1.690*** -5.936*** 6.423*** -34.47***
(0.554) (10.91) (0.509) (2.268) (1.536) (5.394)
Speak English home 1.694* 2.339 0.632 4.201* 0.999 13.05**
(0.878) (7.609) (0.390) (2.230) (0.708) (5.407)
Teacher effort 3.307** -16.30 3.570** -24.22*** -0.134 4.060
(1.412) (23.77) (1.426) (7.706) (2.444) (14.42)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
Quantile 10 Quantile 50 Quantile 90
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
SES index 1.019 -3.059 1.473** -1.541*** 4.028** -3.751***
(0.658) (2.281) (0.593) (0.505) (1.977) (1.434)
School location 1.323 0.235 0.924 4.533*** -0.642 7.912*
(1.011) (3.919) (1.033) (1.566) (1.331) (4.114)
Pupil age 0.575 98.73** 1.699*** -57.14*** 1.938** -125.7***
(0.454) (48.69) (0.507) (11.85) (0.836) (31.10)
Pupil Problem index -0.283 -0.142 -0.0265 -0.0218 -0.714 1.035
(0.493) (0.992) (0.138) (0.191) (1.430) (0.836)
Teacher Problem index -0.191 0.168 0.0273 -0.0368 -0.287 0.130
(0.326) (0.518) (0.176) (0.109) (0.817) (0.460)
Lost School days 3.552 -2.830 -0.474 0.844 -1.417 1.778
(3.384) (6.818) (2.666) (3.080) (9.288) (10.65)
School wealth 0.727 10.84 -1.116 28.30*** -2.742 38.48*
(1.323) (23.34) (1.617) (7.873) (3.321) (21.06)
School distance
from public services 1.746 -9.041 0.507 -2.692 0.880 -6.534
(1.720) (6.717) (0.641) (2.495) (1.245) (5.244)
Social Capital -1.231 21.71 0.621 6.976 -30.99** 34.69*
(4.155) (15.97) (3.810) (7.459) (11.98) (17.63)
Explained Effect \
Unexplained Effect 7.492 149.3*** 5.782 60.77*** -23.90 110.0***
(7.604) (9.253) (6.017) (5.547) (18.46) (19.12)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
Quantile 10 Quantile 50 Quantile 90
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Constant -143.9 (155.8) 66.98* (38.47) 44.09 (79.28)
Observations 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SCMEQ III. Notes: Teacher quality represents the combined coefficient of teacher
subject test score, qualification, years of professional training, and years of experience. School ownership represents the combined coefficient
of different school ownership dummies where the government ownership is a reference category. Teacher effort represents the combined
influence of teaching hours per week, and the frequency of subject tests. Pupil-Problem and Teacher-Problem indices are composite indices
made up of behaviours such as pupil/teacher drug abuse, alcohol abuse, late arrivals, unjustified absenteeism, bullying of pupils/teachers.
School wealth represents the combined influence of school asset index and school condition. School capital is a dummy that equals 1 if
a community contributes to school activities such as school building, maintenance, etc. Combined influence/coeficient is the total across
multiple indicator variables for teacher quality and teacher effort, for example.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.7: Changes in maths scores, 2000-2007: RIF-Reg decomposition results
VARIABLES
Quantile 10 Quantile 50 Quantile 90
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Total Differential 214.9*** (9.206) 91.35*** (2.615) 71.99*** (3.932)
Pupil Teacher Ratio -3.088 5.834 -0.911 0.330 -1.347 4.654
(2.368) (34.17) (1.067) (8.166) (1.929) (9.263)
Teacher quality 2.066 -551.8*** 0.861 -100.2*** 0.619 -147.8***
(3.184) (118.9) (2.087) (27.48) (4.199) (39.71)
School Ownership -1.086 61.31 0.739 124.7*** 1.494 77.47***
(2.995) (91.15) (1.376) (13.49) (1.608) (18.02)
Teacher sex 0.416 -4.700 0.172 -3.988 -0.404 3.567
(0.765) (16.02) (0.303) (3.724) (0.564) (5.049)
Pupil sex -0.00253 -0.800 0.0290 -1.048 0.0562 -3.683
(0.0809) (6.088) (0.0536) (1.654) (0.0945) (2.864)
Textbook access 0.522 4.782 0.426 1.997 0.696 2.831
(0.673) (7.822) (0.339) (1.712) (0.647) (2.616)
Teacher age 0.0249 51.62 0.188 -4.922 1.914 -35.75
(1.397) (70.90) (1.153) (22.04) (1.979) (29.17)
Pupil repeated 1.242 6.670 1.049*** -3.851* 3.164*** -17.83***
(0.911) (9.157) (0.397) (2.125) (0.883) (3.795)
Speak English home 1.709 -5.729 0.770 4.080 0.494 8.103*
(1.219) (8.990) (0.500) (2.698) (0.445) (4.714)
Teacher effort 0.833 11.48 0.358 -5.934 -1.968 14.02
(1.554) (38.20) (0.936) (8.485) (1.344) (10.57)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
Quantile 10 Quantile 50 Quantile 90
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
SES index 2.033* -3.738* 0.827** -0.915** 2.381** -1.914**
(1.098) (2.200) (0.410) (0.430) (1.113) (0.858)
School location 1.448 -3.771 0.562 2.226 -0.0604 0.400
(1.310) (5.024) (0.676) (1.589) (0.237) (2.277)
Pupil age 2.803** 19.59 1.420*** -45.66*** 0.596 -48.00**
(1.158) (55.98) (0.428) (13.00) (0.370) (21.56)
Pupil Problem index 0.129 2.201 -0.0124 0.399 -0.428 1.037
(0.516) (2.292) (0.166) (0.425) (1.004) (0.649)
Teacher Problem index 0.505 0.0235 -0.0955 0.0348 -0.249 0.188
(0.792) (0.379) (0.252) (0.153) (0.577) (0.322)
Lost School days 0.616 -20.97** -1.462 0.687 -7.739 8.086
(4.898) (9.866) (3.306) (3.880) (9.474) (10.89)
School wealth -1.431 11.81 -2.192 28.12*** -3.920* 36.92***
(2.265) (32.93) (1.680) (7.779) (2.107) (10.92)
School distance
from public services 2.063 -22.89** 0.221 -3.471 0.669 -5.069*
(1.931) (9.811) (0.470) (2.925) (0.801) (2.734)
Social Capital 1.581 374.6*** -0.425 159.0*** -15.25* 26.89**
(8.105) (38.63) (5.360) (9.403) (8.412) (11.81)
Explained Effect \
Unexplained Effect 12.38 202.5*** 2.524 88.82*** -19.28 91.27***
(13.70) (15.90) (7.404) (7.221) (14.69) (14.98)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
Quantile 10 Quantile 50 Quantile 90
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Constant 267.0 (180.6) -62.78 (41.24) 167.1*** (53.94)
Observations 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SCMEQ III. Notes: Teacher quality represents the combined coefficient of teacher
subject test score, qualification, years of professional training, and years of experience. School ownership represents the combined coefficient
of different school ownership dummies where the government ownership is a reference category. Teacher effort represents the combined
influence of teaching hours per week, and the frequency of subject tests. Pupil-Problem and Teacher-Problem indices are composite indices
made up of behaviours such as pupil/teacher drug abuse, alcohol abuse, late arrivals, unjustified absenteeism, bullying of pupils/teachers.
School wealth represents the combined influence of school asset index and school condition. School capital is a dummy that equals 1 if
a community contributes to school activities such as school building, maintenance, etc. Combined influence/coeficient is the total across
multiple indicator variables for teacher quality and teacher effort, for example.
Bootstrapped standard errors(100 replications) are in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Furthermore, I find that grade repetition is positively associated with changes in maths
performance at the 90th quantile. This implies that increased repetition leads to increased
performance. Thus, this result seems to support the evidence that automatic grade promo-
tion (i.e. relaxing the grade retention policy)16 has a negative effect on student performance
(see Foureaux Koppensteiner, 2014). Lastly, school wealth and school social capital (i.e.
whether the surrounding community contributes to school activities such as school build-
ing and maintenance) are negatively associated with pupil maths performance at the 90th
quantile.
These pupil-teacher ratio results are in line with the literature on class size and/or school
resources which shows that school resources do matter for students’ performance. Moreover,
that grade repetition leads to increased performance implies that by repeating grades, stu-
dents are able to acquire the grade-appropriate material which also enables them to perform
better in subsequent grades.
Given that a large portion of the increase in students’ performance is largely unexplained
by the covariates, this suggests that other family background factors and intangible school
quality factors, such as school management, autonomy, perceptions of staff and students, and
accountability, have possibly contributed to the observed changes in achievement (Lounkaew,
2013).
Finally, I turn to Table 3.8 which presents the decomposition of reading and maths test
scores’ variances. The first two columns present reading scores’ variance decomposition
results, while the last two columns present results for maths scores’ variance decomposition.
We can see from the table that the total differential (i.e. the increase) in reading scores’
variance is statistically significant and is much larger than the increase in maths scores’
variance. These results are much in line with those presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 and Table
3.5. The main contribution of this table is, however, that it shows the detailed decomposition
of the variance differential. Specifically, results from Table 3.8 show that the covariates
(teacher effort and school social capital) have negatively contributed to test scores inequality
in both subjects. This, however, is cancelled by the huge positive contribution of grade
repetition and the coefficients effects, mainly school ownership coefficients effects.
16Notice, however, that the drop in pupil repetition rate by 10 percentage points between 2000 and 2007
was most likely not due a deliberate policy, but rather forced on schools by the huge influx of students after
FPE, to such an extent that they had to relax their retention policies.
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Table 3.8: Variance RIF-Regression decomposition for Reading and Maths test scores
VARIABLES
Reading Variance Decomposition Maths Variance Decomposition
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Total Differential 1,339*** (366.2) 849.7*** (326.0)
Pupil Teacher Ratio -69.71 1,143 -11.66 -1,573
(140.6) (923.3) (123.0) (1,360)
Teacher quality 129.2 -3,384 -107.0 -6,889*
(194.0) (4,244) (266.4) (3,565)
School Ownership 3.271 25,529*** 136.5 22,804***
(111.2) (5,506) (117.1) (2,874)
Teacher sex 19.45 -679.6 -63.74 222.2
(31.19) (468.6) (50.43) (432.5)
Pupil sex 8.803 -273.3 2.813 42.74
(9.618) (191.0) (4.547) (206.5)
Textbook access 3.026 216.8 38.91 184.8
(12.41) (296.7) (40.79) (203.9)
Teacher age -47.58 4,358* 128.2 -1,314
(69.67) (2,564) (107.5) (2,102)
Pupil repeated 161.2*** -246.6 123.4*** -691.1**
(47.49) (274.1) (43.38) (276.4)
Speak English home -1.790 -86.78 25.33 1,191***
(12.29) (307.6) (23.62) (396.7)
Teacher effort -176.9* 2,166* -162.3* 1,646
(99.34) (1,150) (84.25) (1,024)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.8: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
Reading Variance Decomposition Maths Variance Decomposition
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
SES index 100.3 -8.349 63.57 -17.50
(67.99) (28.07) (41.42) (25.93)
School location 2.626 -85.87 6.979 -204.3
(21.35) (248.2) (21.03) (224.6)
Pupil age 33.61 -1,352 -13.28 2,401
(24.67) (1,651) (13.50) (1,571)
Pupil Problem index -20.56 26.37 -8.541 59.62
(43.77) (34.75) (39.12) (51.47)
Teacher Problem index -19.63 -22.59 -15.94 8.124
(31.57) (35.16) (36.10) (22.51)
Lost School days -162.0 -8.081 -509.3 519.6
(330.0) (428.7) (600.4) (701.8)
School wealth -115.2 -749.7 -155.9 1,471
(123.0) (1,402) (119.2) (994.0)
School distance
from public services -0.869 155.7 23.52 -332.3
(22.29) (258.1) (35.68) (202.9)
Social Capital -1,624*** 1,752 -1,245** -499.0
(570.9) (1,836) (611.1) (1,371)
Explained Effect \
Unexplained Effect -1,777** 3,115*** -1,744* 2,593**
(742.2) (774.2) (1,019) (1,088)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.8: Continued from previous page
VARIABLES
Reading Variance Decomposition Maths Variance Decomposition
Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Constant -25,335*** -16,436***
(5,944) (5,009)
Observations 7,370 7,370 7,370 7,370
Source: Own calculations based on SACMEQ II and SCMEQ III. Notes: Teacher quality represents the combined coefficient of teacher
subject test score, qualification, years of professional training, and years of experience. School ownership represents the combined coefficient
of different school ownership dummies where the government ownership is a reference category. Teacher effort represents the combined
influence of teaching hours per week, and the frequency of subject tests. Pupil-Problem and Teacher-Problem indices are composite indices
made up of behaviours such as pupil/teacher drug abuse, alcohol abuse, late arrivals, unjustified absenteeism, bullying of pupils/teachers.
School wealth represents the combined influence of school asset index and school condition. School capital is a dummy that equals 1 if
a community contributes to school activities such as school building, maintenance, etc. Combined influence/coeficient is the total across
multiple indicator variables for teacher quality and teacher effort, for example.
Bootstrapped standard errors(100 replications) are in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Changes in teacher effort (which is the combined effect of teacher’s frequency of giving
tests and teaching hours per week) are negatively correlated with the increase in reading
achievement inequality. Nevertheless, changes in grade retention appears to be the main
contributor to the increase in maths and reading achievement inequality, as indicated by the
statistically significant positive contribution of the students repetition variable to the increase
in performance and inequality. More importantly, I find that neither changes in school quality
(for example, PTR) nor changes in textbook access have significantly influenced the observed
changes in the variance. As such, the increase in educational inequality is largely unexplained
by the covariates.
3.6 Conclusion
Understanding changes in educational quality and educational inequality is essential for
education and social policies. This is particularly so for most developing countries which have
recently had a rapid expansion in access to primary education following the introduction of
FPE policies.
In this chapter, I use SACMEQ grade six standardised test scores to analyse the changes in
educational achievement and educational inequality, and their determinants. Using both the
relative distribution method and the RIF-regression decomposition method, several results
stand out from the analysis. I find that the increase in educational quality between 2000 and
2007 is largely driven by improved students’ performance across quantiles (or abilities), but
mainly due to the increase in the performance of those at the lower tails of the achievement
distribution. Some of the increase in reading performance is explained by changes in pupil
teacher ratio, speaking English at home, grade repetition, and teacher effort (that is, teaching
hours per week and testing frequency). The increase in maths performance is not explained
by any of the education policy variables, but partly by grade repetition, age, school wealth
and school social capital (that is, whether the surrounding community contributes to school
activities such as school building and maintenance). By and large, much of the increase in
educational performance remains unexplained.
With regard to the significant influence of grade repetition, the results seem to support
Rodrigues et al. (2013)’s conjecture, and later confirmed by Foureaux Koppensteiner (2014),
that relaxing the retention policy reduces students’ performance. These results thus suggest
that the automatic grade promotion policy that is now being implemented in Lesotho could
hurt educational quality.
I also find that educational quality polarization (or inequality) has increased during this
period, more so in reading performance, and this is largely driven by the increase in spread in
test scores below the median. This increase in educational inequality is strongly associated
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with changes in grade repetition, teacher effort and school social capital. Grade repetition
has a positive influence on educational inequality, while high teacher effort and school social
capital negatively influence educational inequality.
Finally, the results reveal that much of the observed changes in maths and reading scores
changes remain unexplained, as shown by the large and statistically significant unexplained
(coefficients) effects component. This suggests that there are potentially other intangible
school quality variables (for example, network effects) and student family background factors
(for example, parental child’s sex preferences, birth order effects, etc.) that could have
significantly influenced educational performance after the FPE programme. In order to
draw policy lessons from Lesotho’s successful FPE policy implementation, it is important to
try to uncover the factors that could have influenced educational achievement and inequality
during this period. The task is to unpack the influence of those factors that are currently
unobserved in our data. In the next chapter, I shift focus from FPE policy effects and
educational quality changes over time, and look at the impact of family factors on human
capital accumulation. Specifically, I examine the effect of a child’s order of birth on her
development outcomes. This is a topic which has recently received much attention in the
economics and psychology literatures.
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Table A.1: PCA Socio-economic Index Components
Variable
2000 2007
mean sd N mean sd N
Home items
mother years of education 7.993 3.714 3155 7.986 3.617 4240
father years of education 7.067 4.430 3155 7.284 4.215 4240
Daily newspaper 0.341 0.474 3155 0.227 0.419 4240
Magazine 0.282 0.450 3155 0.252 0.434 4240
Radio 0.932 0.251 3155 0.911 0.284 4240
TV 0.338 0.473 3155 0.367 0.482 4240
Video Tape Player (VCR) 0.137 0.344 3155 0.119 0.323 4240
Audio cassette player 0.413 0.492 3155 0.355 0.479 4240
Telephone / cellphone 0.132 0.339 3155 0.694 0.461 4240
Refrigerator/freezer 0.176 0.381 3155 0.204 0.403 4240
Car 0.179 0.383 3155 0.152 0.359 4240
Motorcycle 0.0672 0.250 3155 0.0480 0.214 4240
Bicycle 0.278 0.448 3155 0.221 0.415 4240
Piped water 0.267 0.442 3155 0.342 0.474 4240
Electricity 0.138 0.345 3155 0.232 0.422 4240
Table to write on 0.686 0.464 3155 0.744 0.436 4240
Number of books at home 16.35 41.95 3155 10.31 37.56 4240
Source of lighting
Fire 0.0193 0.138 3155 0.0126 0.112 4240
Candle 0.588 0.492 3155 0.520 0.500 4240
Paraffin or oil lamp 0.294 0.456 3155 0.297 0.457 4240
Gas lamp 0.0261 0.160 3155 0.0325 0.177 4240
Electric lighting 0.0700 0.255 3155 0.136 0.343 4240
No lighting 0.00307 0.0553 3155 0.00157 0.0395 4240
House Floor
Clay 0.219 0.413 3155 0.226 0.418 4240
Canvas 0.0745 0.263 3155 0.0240 0.153 4240
Wooden planks 0.0358 0.186 3155 0.0333 0.180 4240
Cement 0.442 0.497 3155 0.434 0.496 4240
Carpet/tiles (plastic, ceramic) 0.230 0.421 3155 0.283 0.451 4240
Wall material
Cardboard/plastic sheeting 0.0314 0.174 3155 0.0241 0.154 4240
Continued on next page
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Table A.1: Continued from previous page
Variable
2000 2007
mean sd N mean sd N
Reeds/Sticks/Grass thatch 0.0627 0.242 3155 0.0454 0.208 4240
Stones / Mud bricks 0.447 0.497 3155 0.484 0.500 4240
Metal sheets / Asbestos sheets 0.0654 0.247 3155 0.0498 0.217 4240
Wood (planks/timber) 0.0264 0.160 3155 0.0280 0.165 4240
Cut stone /concrete blocks 0.368 0.482 3155 0.369 0.482 4240
Roofing material
Cardboard/plastic sheeting 0.0319 0.176 3155 0.0274 0.163 4240
Grass thatch and mud 0.264 0.441 3155 0.273 0.445 4240
Metal sheets / Asbestos sheets 0.519 0.500 3155 0.483 0.500 4240
Cement 0.0771 0.267 3155 0.0624 0.242 4240
Tiles 0.108 0.310 3155 0.154 0.361 4240
Other
Pupil has regular meal 0.589 0.492 3155 0.716 0.451 4240
Family configuration 0.775 0.417 3155 0.506 0.500 4240
Pupil pays for extra classes 0.493 0.500 3155 0.0938 0.292 4240
Source: SACMEQ II and SACMEQ III data. Notes: Family configuration is a dummy equal
to one if a child lives with both parents.
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Chapter 4
Birth Order Effects on Educational
Attainment: Evidence from Lesotho
4.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, increasing education levels in the developing world, particularly
sub-Saharan Africa, has been of paramount importance. Morduch (2000) argues that an
effective policy for achieving this goal depends on a better understanding of the nature of
schooling decisions in these countries. According to Leibowitz (1974), Cunha et al. (2006),
and Cunha and Heckman (2009), differences in child outcomes emerge from an early age,
due in part to the amount of human capital (cognitive and non-cognitive skills) acquired
before age six. The different environments chosen and created by families help create these
differences in child outcomes. Moreover, much of schooling decisions, which affect later life
outcomes, take place within the family. Hence, it is important to understand specific family
factors responsible for these differences in child outcomes.
One of the family environment factors, birth order (that is, a child’s order of birth), is
a recurrent theme in the economics and psychology literatures. Even though any particular
child’s order of birth is biologically determined, parents can actively or passively choose to
create different home environments for children of different birth orders, which will then
affect their cognitive and non-cognitive skills’ development. The available evidence on birth
order effects on educational attainment shows a consistent divide between the developing
world and the developed world: there tend to be negative birth order effects in developed
countries, while there is evidence of positive birth order effects from developing countries
(De Haan et al., 2014). Therefore, birth order effects on child outcomes are context-specific,
as it relates to countries’ levels of development.
However, within less developed countries there are heterogeneities in terms of social norms
that shape parental preferences towards children of different birth orders, which may lead
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to different birth order effects (see Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011). Thus, the evidence
of positive birth order effects found in some developing countries may not be generalised to
other developing countries with different contexts. More importantly, the underlying causal
mechanisms through which birth order affects educational attainment are still unsettled, and
also appear to be context-specific.
In this chapter, I examine the effect of birth order on children’s educational attainment
in Lesotho. I use the 2006 census data for children aged six to twelve years to estimate
birth order effects on educational attainment. To deal with potential endogeneity of birth
order resulting from its correlation with family size and other unobserved family factors, I
use family fixed effects models.
Apart from this paper being the first to estimate birth order effects on human capital
development in Lesotho, it adds to the literature in three other ways. Firstly, I use different
measures of educational attainment, instead of one as is common in the literature. I estimate
birth order effects on a short-run measure of education (that is, enrolment), and two long-run
measures of education (that is, completed years of education, and schooling progression or
age-adjusted schooling). It is interesting to not only know the birth order effects on short-
term outcomes, but also its effects on long-term educational outcomes. Moreover, the fact
that these measures have different strengths and weaknesses, as detailed below, means that
estimating birth order effects on all of them will also allow one to check the robustness of
the birth order results. Secondly, I examine two possible sources of heterogeneity in birth
order effects: differences due to families of different sizes, and gender bias (that is, gender
of the first-born). Lastly, I investigate whether family wealth and child-spacing can explain
the observed birth order effects.
Different from the available evidence based on many developing countries data, I find
large and significant negative birth order effect on child educational attainment. I also find
strong evidence that this negative birth order effect is transmitted through birth-spacing, and
not family wealth, contrary to earlier evidence from other developing countries (for example,
Ecuador and some sub-Saharan countries) which shows that wealth is the underlying causal
mechanism behind the positive, not negative, birth order effect on attainment (Tenikue and
Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al., 2014). Surprisingly, my results affirm the negative birth
order effects found in developed countries (for example, Norway and the United States)
(Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010). The difference with the latter evidence is that, in the
United States, for example, De Haan (2010) finds that family wealth, and not birth-spacing,
explains the negative birth order effect. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that these findings
are consistent with the confluence model’s predictions, even though I cannot rule out the
hypothesis that first-borns do better because of being brought up under tougher parental
disciplinary rules than their younger siblings.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives the context of Lesotho. Section 3 details
the related literature. Section 4 describes the data and gives descriptive analysis. Section
5 discusses the empirical strategy: the fixed effects model of birth order effects. Section 6
presents the main birth order effect results, and the heterogeneities of birth order effect by
family size and family gender preferences. Section 7 examines the pathways through which
this birth order effect is transmitted. Section 8 concludes the chapter.
4.2 The context
Lesotho is a small landlocked, lower middle income sub-Saharan African country with an
estimated population of 2 million. Like many other developing countries, unemployment,
poverty and income inequality are major concerns. The proportion of people living below
the national poverty line is 56.6 percent, and there is a great divide between the rich and
the poor with an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.52 (Bureau of Statistics, 2006).
During the South African apartheid era, Lesotho served as a labour reserve for the South
African mining sector. This situation helped create a culture of labour migration, particularly
among prime-age men. Although the number of Basotho men currently working in the South
African mines has drastically declined over the last twenty years, being a migrant miner is still
regarded as the best employment avenue by many prime-age men. For example, according
to the 2008 Labour Force Survey (2008 LFS), about 14 percent of individuals in the prime-
age (25-54 years old) group were living outside the country (Bureau of Statistics, 2008),
compared to about 0.7 percent, 1.1 percent, and 3.5 percent for those aged 5-9 years, 10-14
years, and 15-19 years, in that order. In the absence of adult males, young boys (mainly in
rural areas) have to look after their families’ livestock. According to the 2008 LFS, of all
children aged 6-14 years, 2.9 percent are working, with girls making up only 0.3 percentage
points of child labour force participation. Many of these children work as herd boys and do
not attend school.
The FPE programme has been introduced to encourage these children to enrol and acquire
basic education, which comprises seven years of primary education and three years of sec-
ondary education. Even though secondary education is still not free, there are programmes,
which include scholarships for orphaned children and book rental schemes to reduce costs of
textbooks, that are meant to assist disadvantaged children. Nonetheless, enrolment drops
drastically when children transition from primary to secondary school.
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4.3 Birth Order: Theory and Evidence
In this section, I review the literature on birth order effects on child outcomes. There are
several theories that attempt to explain the birth order effects on human capital development
of children: some theories predict negative birth order effects, while others predict positive
birth order effects. I first review the theories that predict the negative birth order effects and
the evidence consistent with this prediction. I then review the theories that predict positive
birth order effects, and discuss the evidence consistent with this prediction.
Birth order has been an active research theme in the psychology literature where re-
searchers are interested in its effects on individuals’ intelligence. The confluence model,
which predicts negative birth order effects on a child’s intelligence level, is the operating
theory in the psychology literature (Zajonc, 1976). According to this model, the intellectual
performance of a child depends on his/her intellectual environment, which is a function of
the average of the absolute intellectual levels (or age levels) of the child and his/her family
members. For example, the first-born child enters a high intellectual environment with two
adult parents. The second-born child enters a relatively lower intellectual environment be-
cause of the presence of her first-born sibling in the family, and the intellectual environment
for the third-born is much lower. The model, therefore, predicts a negative relation between
birth order and educational attainment.
Child-spacing (or birth spacing) can either perpetuate or attenuate the negative birth
order effects. Parents can stimulate their offspring’s intellectual ability through talking and
playing with them. Thus, a large gap between siblings increases parent-child interaction, all
else equal, and this can translate into better outcomes for the earlier-born sibling. Using
American data, Baydar et al. (1997) find that the birth of a sibling results in changes in
the family environment (e.g. changes in maternal labour participation and family income),
a decline in maternal interactions with the older child, especially when the birth-space is
short, and that mothers adopt controlling parenting styles toward the older sibling. They
discover that these changes result in negative verbal development of the older child. So, a
short birth interval between siblings is harmful to cognitive and non-cognitive development
of the earlier-born child.
The longer birth interval can further perpetuate the negative birth order effects through
the tutoring effect (Sulloway, 2007). According to this tutoring hypothesis, first-borns de-
velop more intellectual abilities, through organisation and expression of thoughts, as they
teach their younger siblings, while the last-borns have no one to teach. However, another
implication of the confluence model is that a larger birth space between siblings increases
the younger sibling’s intellectual environment. This can attenuate the negative birth order
effects. Therefore, the mediating effects of birth-spacing are ambiguous a priori. That is, the
larger gap is better for both first- and second-borns, leading to ambiguous effects on birth
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order effects.
There is also the hypothesis that birth order effects have biological or prenatal origins.
According to this hypothesis, later-borns face higher prenatal environmental risks because
levels of maternal antibody increase with birth order (Gualtieri and Hicks, 1985). It, there-
fore, predicts a negative relation between birth order and child development. The evidence,
however, seems to refute this hypothesis. Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) use Norwegian
data to show that the negative birth order effect on intelligence depends on the child’s social
rank within the family, and not her birth order per se. For instance, second-born children
who have deceased first-born siblings, and hence brought up as ‘first-borns’, have equally
high levels of intelligence as biological first-borns.
Most economic theories of intra-household resource allocation emphasise the resource
dilution hypothesis as the mechanism behind negative birth order effects on human capital
development. The first-born child becomes the only-child of the family, hence she enjoys a
higher stock of parental resources (including time and financial resources) than the later-born
siblings who have to share parental resources with all other earlier born siblings. According
to Cunha et al. (2006), early child investments are the most productive, and they increase the
productivity of later investments. Therefore, the theory predicts that first-borns will have
higher intellectual ability than their later-born siblings because of high investment enjoyed
during the sensitive formative years. This first-born advantage gets larger the longer the
birth space.
Hao et al. (2008), however, posit that the negative birth order effects arise endogenously
due to the strategic interaction between parents and their offspring. Parents impose more
stringent disciplinary measures on their first-born children in response to their bad behaviour
and/or poor school performance in order to establish a reputation of toughness and deter
similar behaviour amongst their later-born children. This increased attention on the first-
born leads to better outcomes for the first-born relative to the later-borns. Using data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Hotz and Pantano (2013) find robust evidence
that children’s school performance declines with birth order, as does the toughness of their
parents’ disciplinary actions.
Black et al. (2005) use family fixed-effects models to tease out birth order effects on child
outcomes from a large administrative dataset of Norwegians aged 16-74. They find large and
statistically significant negative birth order effects on children’s education and their later life
outcomes, such as earnings and teenage childbearing. They then posit that their findings
are consistent with the optimal fertility stopping model where parents stop having children
if the last one has low endowments. It is, however, hard to divorce these findings from the
predictions of models by Zajonc (1976), Cunha et al. (2006), and Hao et al. (2008).
De Haan (2010) uses the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study data to estimate birth order
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effects. To purge any potential endogeneity of birth order due to its correlation with family
size and/or any other family size related factors, she estimates birth order effects separately
for families with different number of children. Like Black et al. (2005), she finds strong
negative birth order effects on completed years of education, evidently due to high parental
financial transfers to earlier-borns, and not due to the average age gap between successive
children posited by the confluence model. Härkönen (2014) also finds similar evidence in
West Germany using family fixed-effects models, and propounds that the dilution of parental
time is a plausible mechanism behind these effects. Likewise, Price (2008) finds evidence
supporting the parental time dilution hypothesis using the American Time Use Survey data.
He finds that parents spent significantly more quality time with their first-born children than
with later-born children.
The evidence on birth order effects discussed thus far is consistent with the negative
birth order effects on human capital development predicted by the confluence model, the
resource-dilution, and strategic parenting hypotheses. This evidence is exclusively from the
developed world. The evidence from developing countries, in contrast, reveals positive birth
order effects.
How could birth order positively affect human capital development? The resource dilu-
tion hypothesis provides a different mechanism through which this could happen. Horowitz
and Wang (2004) develop a model of intra-household allocation of resources (that is, time
of children) across labour market and education activities when children are different in
their human capital accumulation abilities.1 As the sibship size increases, per capita familial
resources decline. Therefore, according to this model, poor families supply too much la-
bour of (that is, provide too little education to) the child with human capital accumulation
comparative advantage (that is, the first-born) resulting in ‘reverse specialisation’. That is,
increased pressure on familial resources may force a poor family to send the first-born child
out to work to compensate familial resources and finance education of her younger siblings.
This will have a negative impact on human capital accumulation of the first-born child and a
positive effect on attainment of the younger siblings. Tenikue and Verheyden (2010)’s model,
which explicitly models child heterogeneity in terms of birth order, gives similar predictions
to those of Horowitz and Wang’s model.
Relatedly, Lafortune and Lee (2014) examine birth order and gender bias effects on human
capital accumulation within a model that combines convex returns to education and credit
constraints. In this model, higher birth order children are favoured for schooling in credit-
constrained families. Additionally, the model predicts that if there are higher opportunity
costs of educating boys compared to girls, for instance, having male siblings will lead to
higher education for girls. An implicit prediction of this model is that a first-born male will
1Children are different either due to their innate abilities, gender, birth order or environmental factors.
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have lower schooling relative to his later-born siblings, and much more so if he is the only
son in the family. Lafortune and Lee (2014) use data from the United States, South Korea
and Mexico to test the theory’s predictions. They find that birth order is positively related
with a child’s schooling in low income families, but in high income families, the first-born
gets more education. Moreover, they find that in South Korea, where boys are preferred over
girls, having more younger female siblings benefits the boys.
Much of the evidence from developing countries consistently supports the theoretical
prediction that birth order positively affects schooling. Applying the family fixed-effects
estimation strategy on data from the Philippines, Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2004) find positive
birth order effects on completed years of schooling, and that these effects are more pronounced
in low-educated (or low-income) families. Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) also use family
fixed effects strategy on data from 12 sub-Saharan African countries2. They find positive
(negative) birth order effects on educational attainment, measured by completed years of
education during the survey period, of children aged six to 18 years in poor (rich) families.
Tenikue and Verheyden (2010)’s results, however, are potentially confounded by meas-
urement error in birth order. As the authors rightly acknowledged, there is a high likelihood
that the observed 18 year-old child in the household is not the first-born but actually a
second-born, if the first-born has moved out of the household and hence not observed. I
show in the data analysis section below that this is a real threat in this study. In addition,
Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) estimate family fixed effects models, but do not deal with the
problem of increased correlation between child age and birth order within the family, which
may also bias their results. I later on deal with this problem by including age fixed effects
following Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) and De Haan et al. (2014). Finally, as pointed
out by De Haan et al. (2014), Tenikue and Verheyden’s finding that birth order effects are
transmitted by wealth may be confounded with age effects, for example, because they do not
estimate a fully interacted model.
De Haan et al. (2014) use Ecuadorian survey data on infants (the less than six year old
children) and adolescents (the 12-18 year olds) to estimate long term effects of birth order
on human capital development. They find positive and persistent birth order effects on
achievement; that is, first-born children lag behind in educational achievement from infancy
to adolescence, evidently due to mothers spending less quality time with first-borns, and
breastfeeding them for a shorter period than later-born children. They also find that first-
born adolescents are more likely be involved in child labour than their younger siblings.
Furthermore, they find that the positive birth order effects on human capital development
are larger in poor and low-educated families, but are negative in rich and high-educated
families. This is consistent with Tenikue and Verheyden (2010)’s and Lafortune and Lee
2These countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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(2014)’s findings.
To sum up, the confluence model, the resource dilution hypothesis, and the strategic-
parenting hypothesis predict negative birth order effects on child outcomes. According to
the confluence model, these birth order effects are wholly mediated by birth spacing, which
may intensify or reverse them owing to the tutoring effect that kicks-in as sibship size in-
creases. Empirical evidence from developed countries, namely the United States, Norway,
and Germany, is largely consistent with the negative birth order effects predicted by these
theories. On the contrary, available evidence from developing countries, namely the Philip-
pines and Ecuador, reveals positive birth order effects on human capital development. This
latter evidence is largely consistent with a different resource dilution hypothesis mechanism;
in resource-poor families, an increase in sibship size reduces per capita resources, and may
force the family to sacrifice schooling of the first-born child by sending the child to work to
compensate familial resources.
Even though the evidence from developing countries largely supports the positive birth
order effects and the family resource dilution hypothesis, it may not be generalised to other
developing countries with different contexts. For instance, the context in all the countries
included in Tenikue and Verheyden’s study is different from that in Lesotho in two important
ways. First, anecdotally, Lesotho has female (not male) bias in education. Second, the
fertility rate (that is, average family size as used here) in Lesotho is about 3.3 births per
woman, much lower than any of the countries in Tenikue and Verheyden (2010). Therefore,
to the extent that birth order effects differ by family size, and that birth-spacing transmits
birth order effects, we might expect to find different birth order effects in Lesotho.
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use data from the Lesotho Population and Housing Census (the Census, hereafter) which
was collected on the 19th April 2006. This data contains information on household (or
family)3 socio-economic background, employment status, school enrolment, highest level of
education completed, family relations, and demographic characteristics of all family mem-
bers. For each family, information is collected about all members, those present during the
census and those temporarily absent, including their relation to the household head. As per
the Census, the population of Lesotho is 1,868,526.
For purposes of this chapter, I assume that all children identified as the household head’s
children are his biological children. The majority of household heads are men, about 76
percent. I use information on family members’ relations with the household head, irrespective
of the gender of the household head, and age (in years at last birthday) to construct the
3In this chapter, I use family and household interchangeably.
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absolute birth order measure: Birth order equals 1 for the first born, 2 for the second-born,
et cetera. If there are polygamous families, then there will be measurement error in the
birth order measure. However, the extent of polygyny in the 2006 Census data is only 0.74
percent. This is unlikely to cause any significant bias on the estimated birth order effects.
To get to the working sample, I sequentially impose the following restrictions. Firstly, I
restrict the sample to all children of the household head aged between 6 and 18 years. This
is to ensure that all primary and secondary school-going children are included. Following
Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) and De Haan (2010), I further reduce the sample to households
where the eldest child is at most 18 years old, and where there are a minimum of two and
a maximum of five children. The second restriction, that families should have at least
two children, is a technical requirement for studying birth order effects. Because the total
fertility rate in Lesotho is 3.3 children per woman, limiting the sample size to households
with a maximum of five children increases the chances that all children observed within the
household are the biological children of the household head. In addition, by including families
with up to five children increases chances that households with completed family sizes are
included4. It also ensures that we have enough observations in each family size cell. This
restriction, however, does not have implications for the estimations later on given that the
fertility rate is exactly 3.3 in the final sample. Finally, I drop all families with multiple births5
(for instance, twins) because of the ambiguities of assigning birth order in such instances.
This restriction shrinks the sample size by 6.6 percent (and 5.5 percent decline in the number
of families).
If there are some household head’s biological children who have moved out of the house-
hold, this will introduce measurement error in the birth order measure. The incidence of this
happening for those aged below 18 appears to be low. For instance, I find that only about
0.08 percent and 0.15 percent of children aged 6-18 years old are listed as household heads or
spouses and household head’s sons/daughters-in-law, respectively. These are children that
must have moved out of their biological families. However, there is a real concern that many
of those aged above 18 years may have moved out of their biological families. Figure A.1
shows that the proportion of those living outside their biological families (that is, young
household heads and young sons- or daughters-in-law) increases just after age 18. Therefore,
to deal with this problem, I restrict the analytical sample to include only children of primary-
school-going age; that is, all 6-12 year olds. The advantages of this sample restriction are
that (1) it is less likely that a 12-year old has an elder sibling who is outside the family, hence
making the 12-year old a ‘social first-born’, and (2) all 6-12 year-old children are potential
4According to the 2009 Demographic Health Survey data, 95 percent of all women of productive age,
15-49, with five living children do not want to have any more children (SIF, 2011).
5The Census data does not come with birth date information, but only age in years at last birthday, even
though the questionnaire also has a birth date question. Therefore, within each household, all household
head’s children with the same reported age are considered to be twins, triplets, etc.
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beneficiaries of the FPE programme, making it easy to isolate birth order effects from FPE
effects. The down-side, however, is that one cannot look at birth order effects on child labour
participation on human capital development. These restrictions together reduce the working
sample by 73 percent to 77,730 children living in 46,973 (or 9.6 percent fewer) families.
In sum, the working sample includes 6 to 12 year olds, coming from households with
between 2 and five children, where the eldest child is aged at most 18 years.
Educational attainment is measured in three ways. The first measure is enrolment where
a child aged between 6 and 12 years is considered enrolled if her parent reports that the child
is enrolled. This is a short-run measure of education, but it has the advantage of being easy
to calculate and interpret. The second measure is the number of completed years of education
at the time of the census. The strength of this measure is that it is a long-term measure
of education that is easy to read and interpret. Its limitation, however, lies in the fact that
it is right-censored because many children are still in school and their final attainment will
most likely differ from the currently reported. The third measure is schooling progression
(or relative grade attainment or age-adjusted schooling), which is a long-term measure of
education that is good in an environment where there is high grade repetition and high
school entry delays. Schooling progression is defined as completed years of schooling divided
by potential years of schooling, which are the total number of schooling years a child would
have accumulated had she completed a year of schooling by age 7 and continued to add one
more in each subsequent year (Mani et al., 2013).6 The downside of schooling progression is
that for any two children of different ages (say, 7 and 10 years old) with zero completed years
of education, one cannot tell which one of the two is more disadvantaged than the other as
they will both have zero schooling progression. Additionally, it is only defined for children
aged 7 and older.
To get the completed years of education variable from the data, I use the highest level
of education completed as is reported for the first seven grades, and then add one year for
each of the three years of secondary, and two years of high school grades completed. There-
fore, individuals who have completed high school must have 12 years of education, while
those with graduate and post-graduate degrees have 16 and 18 years of education, respect-
ively.7 I then convert other qualifications into completed years of schooling as follows. Non
formal education is converted to two years of schooling, Diploma/Vocational training after
primary to 8 years, Diploma/Vocational training after secondary to 11 years of schooling,
and Diploma/Vocational training after high school to 14 years of schooling.
One of the key control variables of interest is household wealth. The Census does not
have household income or expenditure but does have information on household ownership of
6In this study, schooling progression equals education/(age − 6), where education is completed years of
education.
7This information is only relevant for the older siblings in the household.
89













Enrolment 77730 0.911 0.285 0.231 0.172
Education 77471 2.512 1.720 1.403 1.144
Schooling progression 67124 0.807 0.406 0.357 0.206
Child characteristics
First-Born 77730 0.204 0.403 0.228 0.326
Second-Born 77730 0.481 0.500 0.350 0.403
Third-Born 77730 0.249 0.433 0.350 0.306
Fourth-Born 77730 0.061 0.239 0.165 0.173
Fifth-Born 77730 0.005 0.073 0.041 0.056
Male 77730 0.506 0.500 0.418 0.314
Age 77730 9.110 1.992 1.443 1.515
Family characteristics
Household head education 73996 5.168 3.920 3.969 0
Rural 77730 0.764 0.425 0.434 0
Children 77730 3.287 0.973 0.951 0
Wealth Index 77730 0.964 29.977 30.686 0
Number of families 46973
Source: Own calculations from 2006 Census. Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-12 from families
with 2-5 children, and where the oldest observed child is at most 18 years. Education is completed years of
education during the census period, Schooling progression equals education/(age−6), and Enrolment equals
1 if a child is reported to be enrolled by the parent. The sample size is smaller for schooling progression
because, for children aged 6, the measure is unidentified. I use the uncentered PCA (see Banerjee, 2010 and
Wittenberg and Leibbrandt, 2015) to calculate the wealth index from household ownership of durable goods
(e.g. TV, radio, etc.), land (i.e. number of fields), and livestock (e.g. number of cattle, sheep, horses, etc.).
I use Martin Wittenberg’s Stata code to calculate this index.
durable goods8, land (that is, the number of fields), and livestock (for instance, number of
cattle, sheep, horses, chicken, et cetera.). In such situations, the best available option widely
applied in the literature is the use of wealth or asset indices constructed using the principal
components analysis (PCA). Under the PCA, the variables are first standardised (that is,
they are demeaned and divided by their standard deviations), and then the asset/wealth
index is constructed as the first principal component of the correlation matrix. The main
problem with this centered PCA index is that it tends to give negative scores to assets that
are owned only in rural areas, such as having cattle, and hence exaggerates the rural-urban
divide (Wittenberg and Leibbrandt, 2015). As Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2015) argue, it
gives us information about wealth and the degree of ‘urbanness’ in the data.
Given this, Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2015) advocate for the use of the procedure
proposed by Banerjee (2010) to construct an uncentered PCA asset index. Under this pro-
8These are radio, TV, telephone, cellular phone, refrigerator, bed/mattress, car, scotch cart, computer,
and internet.
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Figure 4.1: Educational Attainment, Age and Gender
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Source: Own calculations from 2006 Census. Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-15 from families with
2-5 children, and where the oldest observed child is at most 18 years.
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cedure, we first divide the variables (assets) by their respective means to form a matrix A,
and then create the asset index as the first principal component of the non-negative square
matrix A′A (see Banerjee, 2010 and Wittenberg and Leibbrandt, 2015). Unlike the wealth
index constructed using the ordinary PCA procedure, the uncentered PCA index is not only
externally consistent in that it is a good proxy for household income and expenditure, but it
is also internally consistent (Wittenberg and Leibbrandt, 2015)9. It, however, has the limit-
ation that it pays more attention (that is, it gives large scores) to rare assets in the binary
variable cases. Despite the differences, these indices (the centered PCA and uncentered PCA
indices) are highly correlated in practice. I, therefore, construct the wealth index using the
uncentered PCA procedure, and also create wealth quintiles from this index.
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the outcome and control variables. We can
see that about 91 percent of 6-12 year old children are enrolled, and their average completed
years of education is 2.5. The average schooling progression (or relative grade attainment) is
0.81, which implies that children accumulate an average of 0.81 grades per year of schooling.
The table also shows that there is more between-family variation than within-family variation
in educational attainment. For example, the between- and within-family standard deviations
in enrolment are 0.231 and 0.172, respectively.
Consistent with the 3.3 average children per family, there are more second-born children,
about 48 percent, and relatively fewer first- and third-borns who, respectively, make up 20
percent and 25 percent. The share of fourth-borns is 6 percent, and the fifth-borns are
least represented, making up only about 0.5 percent. The sample is equally split between
males and females, and the average age is 9.1. In all these variables, unlike in educational
attainment outcomes, there is almost as much within-family variation as there is between-
family variation. The average household head’s education is 5.3, and about 76 percent of
children live in rural areas.
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between educational outcomes and age. Figure 4.1a
presents the overall picture, while Figure 4.1b shows the relationship by gender. We can
see from Figure 4.1a that enrolment has an inverted U-shape relationship with age: it first
increases with age up to 90 percent at age 10, and then starts to decline. Schooling progres-
sion first drops from about 1 grade per year of schooling at age 7 to a low of 0.75 at age 10.
It then steadies just below 0.8 grades per year of schooling. On the other hand, completed
years of education have a strong positive relationship with age; they strongly increase with
age from age 6. Figure 4.1b reveals that, across all three measures of educational attainment,
girls outperform boys. Therefore, in order to tease out the association between birth order
and educational outcomes, one needs to control for age, among other potential confounding
9An internally consistent asset index ranks individuals with more of anything good (in this case assets)
higher than individuals with less. Therefore, by satisfying these criteria, the uncentered PCA wealth index
ranges from zero upwards, i.e. it is never negative, and can be used to calculate asset inequality.
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factors. I turn to this next.
4.5 Empirical Model
To estimate the effect of birth order on educational attainment, I follow De Haan et al.
(2014) and estimate a family fixed effects model to address the endogeneity between birth
order and observed and unobserved family specific fixed effects, including family size. The
model is specified as
yif = α+ β2 · Secondif + β3 · Thirdif + β4 · Fourthif + β5 · Fifthif +Xifθ+ λf + εif (4.1)
where yif is the outcome of child i in family f ; Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth are
dummies for second, third, fourth, and fifth-born children, respectively; Xif is a vector of
controls, including dummies for age and gender of the child, family wealth and birth order
interaction dummies, and λf are family fixed effects. I add age dummies (that is, age fixed
effects or birth cohort effects) to address the fact that the correlation between age and birth
order within a family is high, which could bias the results. Controlling for birth cohort
effects also addresses the fact that later-borns may face different educational opportunities
compared to first-borns, either due to changes in parental tastes for education or otherwise.
In the OLS specification, Xif also includes location, household head’s education, number
of children in the family (or family size) as dummies. The estimation results allow for any
arbitrary correlation within the family.
4.6 Results
In this section, I first present the chapter’s main results on birth order effects on educational
attainment. Thereafter, I discuss the heterogeneities in birth order effects by family size and
gender, and then discuss some sensitivity checks to the main results.
4.6.1 Birth order effects on educational attainment
Table 4.2 presents the estimated effects of birth order on educational attainment (that is,
enrolment, completed years of education, and schooling progression) of 6-12 year old children.
For each outcome, the table reports estimates for two different estimation strategies: the OLS
estimates are reported in columns 1, 3, and 5; and the family fixed effects model estimates
are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6. All specifications include dummies for child age, to
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control for cohort effects and sample selection bias10, child gender, location, and location
interacted with gender. In the OLS regressions, I also include household head’s years of
education, and a full set of dummies for the number of children in the family (four in all),
which control for the correlation between birth order and family size.
Looking at the OLS estimates in columns 1, 3, and 5 of the table, they reveal a significant
positive relation between birth order and educational attainment. For example, relative to
the first-born, an average second-born child has 0.05 more years of education, and accu-
mulates 0.01 more years of education per year of schooling. We also see that educational
attainment is negatively associated with family size, and this is consistent with previous
findings by Black et al. (2005), De Haan (2010), De Haan et al. (2014), and Ponczek and
Souza (2012).
However, these results cannot be given any causal interpretation because of the possible
bias due to omitted unobserved family factors. In fact, we have seen in Table 4.1 that there
is more between-family variation than within-family variation in all educational attainment
measures. Therefore, the positive OLS birth order coefficients could be due to differences
in educational attainment across families, not necessarily due to differential investments on
children of different orders of birth within families. This is particularly so because households
with only one child aged between 6 and 12 years old are only included in OLS regressions,
and not in the family fixed effects estimations. So much of the variation comes from between
rather than within families. Table A.1 reports the OLS results from a restricted sample of
households with at least 2 children between the ages of 6 and 12. These results turn negative,
although not always significant, clearly indicating this potential bias. Nonetheless, I follow
the literature (see for example De Haan et al., 2014) and report the OLS results based on
the working sample described above.
In order to isolate the effect of birth order on educational attainment, I turn to family fixed
effects specifications presented in columns 2, 4, and 6, respectively, for enrolment, completed
years of education, and schooling progression. We immediately see that the estimates for
educational attainment show a reverse birth order pattern from that produced by the OLS
regression estimates, and that the fixed effects estimates are much larger, in absolute values,
than the OLS estimates. This suggests that OLS estimates are potentially upward biased.
Looking at enrolment results in column 2 of the table, I find that higher birth order
children are less likely to be enrolled compared to their first-born sibling, and this effect
increases, in absolute values, with birth order. For example, relative to the first-born, a
second-born has 6 percentage points less probability of enrolment, while the fifth-born is
10Since educational attainment is only observed for children from families with at least two children
aged between 6 and 12 years old, sample selection bias could arise. Controlling for age dummies makes
the estimates consistent because, conditional on family fixed effects, whether or not we observe the child’s























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30 percentage points less likely to be enrolled. This effect is sizeable. Relative to the
average enrolment rate of 91 percent in the sample, this means that being a fifth-born
reduces the enrolment probability by 33 percent (= 30/90) or 0.77 standard deviations
(= 0.30× (0.073/0.285)).
Column 4 of Table 4.2 shows that a second-born completes 0.11 less years of education
compared to her elder sibling. The later-born’s disadvantage increases to 0.33 fewer years
of education for the fifth-born. Similarly, there is a strong negative birth order effect on
schooling progression (or relative grade attainment) in column 6, and the absolute effect
is increasing with birth order. For example, relative to the first-born, a second-born child
accumulates 0.13 less years of education (or grades) per year of schooling, while the fifth-
born accumulates 0.63 fewer years of education for each year of schooling. This implies that
first-borns progress much faster in school than their younger siblings, either due to early
school entry or less grade repetition.
Overall, these results are in stark contrast with the previous evidence from other devel-
oping countries, including sub-Saharan Africa, showing strong positive birth order effects
(Ejrnæs and Pörtner, 2004; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al., 2014). The pos-
itive birth order effects have been interpreted as partial evidence for the financial resource
dilution hypothesis. In other words, it implies that liquidity constraints force families to
invest less on earlier born children in spite of their comparative advantage in human capital
accumulation (Horowitz and Wang, 2004; Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al.,
2014). These results surprisingly affirm evidence from the developed world, and this is the
first indication that they are less likely to be explained by the liquidity effect hypothesis
(Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010).
One difference between these results and those of Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) and
De Haan et al. (2014), for instance, is that they attach greater weight to households with
more young children and fewer teenage children. I later on show that these results are robust
to the 6-12 year olds sample restriction.
The evidence presented here is consistent with the predictions of the confluence and ‘stra-
tegic’ parenting models of Zajonc (1976) and Hao et al. (2008). The first-borns not only have
higher enrolment rates, but they also progress faster in school than their younger siblings,
potentially due to the high quality investments they must have enjoyed while young (Cunha
et al., 2006; Heckman and Mosso, 2014). These childhood investments could have come in
the form of high family intellectual environment, teaching younger siblings, breastfeeding
longer than the younger siblings, and/or stricter parenting that instils much better discip-
line. It is important, therefore, to investigate some of these possible mechanisms through
which these birth order effects are being propagated. But, before doing that, I first look at
the differential effects of birth order according to family size and child gender.
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4.6.2 Heterogeneities in birth order effects: family size and gender
Birth order effects may be different due to different family environments, for instance, differ-
ent family sizes and differences in family gender preferences (Zajonc, 1976; Jayachandran and
Kuziemko, 2011; Lafortune and Lee, 2014). Here I specifically test two hypotheses. First,
if the confluence model is a good candidate model for explaining the observed birth order
effects, then we should expect to see more pronounced birth order effects in large families
because, all else equal, younger children are born in a low intellectual environment, and have
to compete for limited parental time with their elder siblings. Second, the first-borns develop
more skills as they teach their younger siblings. However, as families grow larger, birth order
effects might get smaller (in absolute terms) or even dissipate for the middle-born children
as the tutoring effect kicks in. That is, middle-born children may develop skills through
teaching their younger siblings, thereby reducing the knowledge gap between them and the
first-born.
According to Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011), if parents prefer sons to daughters,
girls will be weaned faster than boys so that parents can try again for a son, and once a boy
is born, they nurse him for a longer time to reduce their fecundity (see also Zajonc, 1976).
To wit, parents may passively invest differently in children of different birth orders based on
their gender preferences. It follows then that the second hypothesis I test is that, if parents
prefer girls’ education over that of boys, then the negative birth order effects will be stronger
for first-born girls than first-born boys. That is, these negative effects will be attenuated
(or even reverse signs) in first-born boy families. I follow De Haan et al. (2014) in studying
these two possible sources of heterogeneity in birth order effects.
Birth order effects by family size
I first explore the birth order effects by family size. Table 4.3 presents family fixed effects
estimation results for families with two, three, four, and five children, in that order. The three
columns present results for educational attainment outcomes: enrolment, years of education,
and schooling progression, in that order. By and large, these results are consistent with the
main findings: birth order negatively affects educational attainment, and the absolute effect
intensifies with birth order.
In line with De Haan et al. (2014), I find that birth order effects are different for different
family sizes. Looking at schooling progression results in column 3, for example, we can see
that a second-born child in a two-child family accumulates 0.09 fewer years of education
for each year of schooling relative to her first-born sibling, while a second-born in a four-
child family accumulates twice as much less years of education per year of schooling as her
counterpart in a two-child family: she accumulates 0.17 fewer years of education for each year
of schooling than her first-born sibling. The second-born disadvantage relative the first-born
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Second-Born -0.0411*** -0.102** -0.0912***
(0.0125) (0.0446) (0.0244)
Observations 17,812 17,771 15,507
Three-child families
Second-Born -0.0467*** -0.111*** -0.109***
(0.00985) (0.0340) (0.0175)
Third-Born -0.101*** -0.312*** -0.220***
(0.0198) (0.0671) (0.0349)
Observations 26,882 26,803 23,237
Four-child families
Second-Born -0.0869*** -0.0900** -0.170***
(0.0118) (0.0378) (0.0191)
Third-Born -0.162*** -0.285*** -0.326***
(0.0221) (0.0708) (0.0367)
Fourth-Born -0.243*** -0.577*** -0.516***
(0.0332) (0.106) (0.0551)
Observations 19,570 19,494 16,799
Five-child families
Second-Born -0.0493** -0.0733 -0.142***
(0.0194) (0.0641) (0.0267)
Third-Born -0.132*** -0.221** -0.293***
(0.0329) (0.102) (0.0485)
Fourth-Born -0.224*** -0.461*** -0.445***
(0.0478) (0.147) (0.0713)
Fifth-Born -0.286*** -0.734*** -0.633***
(0.0643) (0.194) (0.0992)
Observations 9,732 9,690 8,374
Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-12 from families with 2-5 children, and where the oldest observed
child is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
and gender of the child, and location, location interacted with gender, and household head’s education.
Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child is reported as enrolled. Education is completed years of
schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age− 6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
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drops to 0.14 grades per year of schooling in a five-child family. A similar pattern is observed
for enrolment. The second-born in a two-child family is 4 percentage points less likely to
enrol compared to the first-born, while her counterparts in four- and five-child families are,
respectively, 9 and 5 percentage points less likely to enrol relative to the first-born. There is
no such clear birth order effects pattern in the case of completed years of education.
To formally test for the equality of the coefficients, I estimate three fully interacted fixed
effects models where every variable, not just birth order, is interacted with family size. This
is equivalent to jointly estimating panels 1-4 of Table 4.3 for each outcome variable. The
results are reported in Table A.2. The interactions between birth order and family size are
statistically significant for enrolment and schooling progression, which implies that birth
order effects on enrolment and schooling progression get larger (in absolute values) as the
sibship size increases, but not on completed years of education. The pattern is more robust
for schooling progression where all birth order interactions with family size are negative and
statistically significant at 5 percent level. Furthermore, these effects seem not to dissipate
as the family size increases.
Birth order effects by gender
I now turn to the heterogeneity in birth order effects by gender of the child. To disentangle
birth order effects purely driven by gender biases from those due to sibling sex composition, I
compare birth order effects for families of first-born sons versus those for families of first-born
daughters (De Haan et al., 2014). This is a relevant margin to examine because, if parents
do have strong preferences for girls, a favourable treatment for girls should give us stronger
birth order effects among families with first-born girls. Put differently, the first-born boys
will have less or no advantage over their younger siblings.
Table 4.4 presents family fixed effects birth order estimates for two separate samples of,
respectively, families with first-born boys (in columns 1 to 3), and families with first-born
girls (in columns 4 to 6).11 There are huge differences in birth order effects across these
families, and these results are largely consistent with the girl-bias hypothesis. While birth
order effects on completed years of education for families with first-born girls are strongly
negative, and consistent with the main results, there are no significant birth order effects on
completed years of education in families with first-born boys. We can further see that birth
order effects on enrolment and schooling progression in first-born-girl families are slightly
larger, in absolute values, than in first-born-boy families, especially for fifth-borns relative to
the first-born. Taking the fifth-borns in first-born-boy families, for example, we can see that,
compared to the first-born, they are 28 percentage points less likely to be enrolled, and they
11These families (that is, first-born boy and those of first-girl families) are identical in terms of the average
years of education. The mean years of education for first-born boy families is 9.59 versus 9.57 for first-born




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































accumulate 0.6 fewer grades per year of schooling, while their counterparts in first-born-girl
families are 33 percentage less likely to enrol, and accumulate 0.7 fewer grades for each year
of schooling.
I formally test for the equality of birth order effects between first-born-boy and first-born-
girl families by estimating fully interacted models, where every variable is interacted with
a dummy for first-born-girl families. The results are presented in Table A.3. The results
show that there are statistically significant differences in birth order effects on completed
years of education between first-born-boy and first-born-girl families, but not on enrolment
and schooling progression. For example, a second-born in a first-born-girl family has 0.193
less years of education than his/her elder sister, which is 0.18 years lower than what his/her
counterpart in a first-born-boy family gets. This implies that later-borns are more disad-
vantaged, in terms of completed years of education, if they have a first-born sister than when
they have a first-born brother.
To sum up, the evidence presented in this subsection shows that birth order effects on
educational attainment are larger, in absolute terms, in larger families, and they appear
not to evaporate with the increase in family size. Moreover, birth order effects are larger
in first-born-girl families, and this is consistent with the hypothesis that parents prefer to
educate girls more than boys. The fact that first-borns’ advantage increases with sibship size
could possibly be due to: (1) the dilution of familial resources as the family size increases,
(2) the lower intellectual environment, relative to the first-born, that later-borns are born
into, or (3) the strict disciplinary environment that the first-born are brought up with. In
the following section, I narrow down the potential transmission mechanisms of these birth
order effects. I begin with checking the sensitivity of the main results.
4.6.3 Sensitivity checks
In this subsection, I present sensitivity checks of the main birth order results to different
sample restrictions made to reduce measurement error in the birth order measure. The
sample restrictions imposed in Section 4.4 are: (1) that families should have at least two
children, with the eldest aged at most 18 years old, and (2) that families should have a
maximum of five children. I further restricted the analytical sample to children aged 6-12
years, which could introduce sample selection bias because educational attainment is only
observed for some but not all children in families with 6-18 year old children. I first relax
these restrictions and compare the results with the main results which are based on stricter
sample selection criteria. Relaxing these restrictions increases the sample size as well as the
measurement error.
Table 4.5 presents fixed-effects model results based on a much bigger sample of 6-18 year-
old children from families where the eldest child is at most 18 years old. Since the oldest child
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Table 4.5: The Effect of Birth Order on Educational Attainment: 6-18 year-old children
sample
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enrolment Education Schooling progression
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Second-Born 0.00420** -0.0106*** 0.0275*** -0.0408** 0.0111*** -0.0464***
(0.00194) (0.00365) (0.0103) (0.0173) (0.00182) (0.00390)
Third-Born 0.00883*** -0.0219*** 0.107*** -0.0184 0.0183*** -0.0939***
(0.00303) (0.00687) (0.0138) (0.0323) (0.00377) (0.00719)
Fourth-Born -0.00131 -0.0455*** 0.199*** 0.0579 -0.00705 -0.163***
(0.00609) (0.0107) (0.0203) (0.0484) (0.00943) (0.0122)
Fifth-Born -0.00983 -0.0749*** 0.301*** 0.118 -0.0578 -0.245***
(0.0201) (0.0234) (0.0468) (0.0889) (0.0404) (0.0394)
Three children -0.00516** -0.0347*** -0.00895***
(0.00247) (0.0129) (0.00262)
Four children -0.0146*** -0.119*** -0.0289***
(0.00298) (0.0152) (0.00301)
Five children -0.0413*** -0.311*** -0.0564***
(0.00414) (0.0212) (0.00389)
Constant 0.858*** 0.907*** 0.623*** 1.007*** 0.992*** 1.148***
(0.00506) (0.0149) (0.0208) (0.0737) (0.00799) (0.0166)
Observations 123,603 123,603 123,304 123,304 113,463 113,463
R2 0.153 0.170 0.740 0.768 0.147 0.113
Number of Families 49,484 49,460 49,458
Notes: The sample is all children aged 6 to 18 years old from families with 2-5 children, and where the oldest
observed is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
correcting for cohort effects, and gender of the child, and dummies for location, and location interacted with
child’s gender. Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child reported as enrolled. Education is completed
years of schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age − 6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
observed in the family may not necessarily be the eldest child, there is high measurement
error in the birth order measure. As we can see from the table, the birth order effects on
educational attainment are still negative, and are very similar to the results reported in Table
4.2, in spite of the increased measurement error in the birth order measure. However, the
birth order effects in this sample appear to be underestimated (that is, biased towards zero).
The possibility that the observed oldest child in the household might not be the eldest
living child of the household forced one to restrict the analytical sample to 6-12 year old
children. Thus, the results may suffer from sample selection bias, even though controlling
for age fixed effects is an attempt to address this problem, as mentioned in footnote 10.
To formally check the robustness of the results against this potential sample selection
bias, I estimate birth order effects using a sample of families of ‘young mothers’. I define
‘young mothers’ as all women aged 35 years and below, and are either household heads or
household head spouses. These are mothers who are less likely to have children older than
18 years, which allows one to estimate birth order effects on a sample of 6-18 year olds with
little measurement error.
According to the 2009 Lesotho Demographic Health Survey report (SIF, 2011), Lesotho’s
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Table 4.6: Birth Order Effects on Educational Achievement: Young Mothers Families
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
Enrolment Education Schooling progression
Second-Born -0.0241*** -0.0475** -0.0667***
(0.00524) (0.0239) (0.00652)
Third-Born -0.0599*** -0.0444 -0.141***
(0.0102) (0.0451) (0.0125)
Fourth-Born -0.112*** 0.0351 -0.225***
(0.0173) (0.0702) (0.0241)
Fifth-Born -0.118*** 0.167 -0.265***
(0.0443) (0.156) (0.0781)
Constant 0.922*** 1.001*** 1.158***
(0.0177) (0.0843) (0.0219)
Observations 56,750 56,586 50,311
R2 0.113 0.789 0.113
Notes: Fixed-effects regression results. The sample is all children aged 6 to 18 years old from families of
young mothers (i.e. women aged 35 years or less and are household heads or household head spouses) with
2-5 children, and where the oldest observed is at most 18 years old. All regressions include household head’s
education, dummies for age (in years), correcting for cohort effects, and gender of the child, and dummies
for location, and location interacted with child’s gender. Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child
reported as enrolled. Estimates are from fully interacted fixed effects models where all birth order dummies
and controls variables are interacted with the wealth index. Education is completed years of schooling.
Schooling progression equals education/(age − 6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
overall fertility rate has been on the decline since the 1970s, but that of women aged 15-19
years has been on the rise over the same period. Between 2004 and 2009, the proportion
of 15-19 year old women who have ever given birth to more than one child increased from
0.8 percent to 1.5 percent. This implies that in the 1980s, when most of our young mothers
were teenagers, giving birth to at least two children as a teenager was a rarity. If we assume
that a woman gave birth for the first time at age 17, her eldest child, if alive, must be 18
years old in 2006. Therefore, restricting the sample to families of mothers aged at most
35 years essentially ensures that there are no over-eighteen year old siblings omitted in the
sample, and hence provides the most accurate birth order measure among the 6-18 year olds,
although at a cost of a relatively small sample size.
Table 4.6 presents fixed effects model results using a sample of young mothers’ families
with at least two children aged between 6 and 18 years old, where the eldest is at most
aged 18. We can see from the table that birth order effects on educational attainment and
child labour participation are negative. However, it appears that the birth order effects on
educational attainment in this table are almost half, in absolute values, the main effects
reported in Table 4.2, but larger than those reported in Table 4.5. Notwithstanding these
differences, it appears that, by and large, the results presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are
qualitatively the same as the main birth order effects findings. Therefore, I conclude that
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the main results are not very sensitive to the imposed sample selection criteria.
4.7 Potential pathways of negative birth order effects
In this section I investigate two mechanisms through which birth order effects can be propag-
ated: the liquidity effect (or wealth) channel, and the birth-spacing (or child-spacing) chan-
nel. The decision to look at these two potential transmission mechanisms is purely based on
data availability. I begin with the wealth channel and then turn to the child-spacing channel.
4.7.1 Family wealth
According to the liquidity effect hypothesis, as the household gets larger, per capita household
resources get depleted, and this may force the household to send the first born to the labour
market to relax the household’s budget constraint (Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010). This
hypothesis predicts positive birth order results, contrary to the evidence presented in this
chapter thus far.
In order to test whether family wealth drives the observed birth order effects, I use the
family wealth index discussed earlier. The wealth index reflects the accumulated pattern of
household income and expenditure to date, including education investments. For example,
there might be a positive effect of unobserved permanent income on observed assets and
observed education investment. However, households may invest more (less) in children’s
education and less (more) in asset accumulation, conditional on permanent income. This
will attenuate any relationship between education and “wealth” when using the wealth index.
In spite of this potential attenuation bias, Tenikue and Verheyden (2010) use a similar wealth
index from the Demographic Health Surveys and find significant negative wealth effects in
a number of sub-Saharan Africa. The consistency of their results across different countries,
therefore, allays fears that the results reported in this chapter are an artefact of the wealth
index used.
Table 4.7 discloses the fixed effects birth order results, with wealth index interactions.
Following De Haan et al. (2014), I estimate fully interacted fixed effects models where birth
order dummies and included control variables are interacted with the wealth index. We can
see from the table that birth order effects are largely consistent with the earlier findings:
birth order negatively affects educational attainment. More importantly, these results do
not support the hypothesis that the observed birth order effects are transmitted through
wealth. All the wealth-index–birth-order interactions are insignificant, and the coefficients
are approximately equal to zero. Moreover, comparing the birth order results from this table
with the main birth order results reported in Table 4.2, we can see that the magnitudes
104
Table 4.7: Fixed Effects Estimates of Birth Order, Interacted with Wealth Index
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
Enrolment Education Schooling progression
Second-Born -0.0578*** -0.114*** -0.130***
(0.00620) (0.0207) (0.0105)
Third-Born -0.130*** -0.181*** -0.263***
(0.0121) (0.0398) (0.0205)
Fourth-Born -0.220*** -0.255*** -0.423***
(0.0184) (0.0595) (0.0312)
Fifth-Born -0.304*** -0.334*** -0.628***
(0.0312) (0.0921) (0.0559)
Second-Born×wealth index 4.57e-05 -0.000282 0.000638
(0.000411) (0.00119) (0.000886)
Third-Born×wealth index 0.000287 -0.000774 0.00109
(0.000874) (0.00227) (0.00207)
Fourth-Born×wealth index -9.11e-05 -0.000671 0.00148
(0.00129) (0.00330) (0.00286)
Fifth-Born×wealth index 0.00109 -6.28e-05 0.00284
(0.00180) (0.00470) (0.00440)
Constant 0.962*** 1.121*** 1.237***
(0.0273) (0.114) (0.0449)
Observations 73,996 73,758 63,917
R-squared 0.099 0.776 0.118
Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-12 from families with 2-5 children, and where the oldest observed
child is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
and gender of the child, and location, location interacted with gender, and household head’s education.
Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child is reported as enrolled. Education is completed years of
schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age− 6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
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are almost the same. Therefore, based on these results, there is no evidence to support the
hypothesis that the observed birth order effects are propagated by wealth.
4.7.2 Child-spacing
I now turn my attention to the birth- or child-spacing channel. According to the confluence
model, birth order effects on human capital development are wholly transmitted by the birth
interval between successive siblings (Zajonc, 1976).
For the analysis that follows, I define birth-spacing as the actual age gap between two
successive siblings within a family. For example, the age between the first- and second-born
is given by the difference between their respective ages. Because the first-born follows no
one, the age gap for this child is undefined.
The regression results for birth order, child-spacing, and their interaction (with family
fixed effects) are presented in Table 4.8. As in the case of wealth effects above, these results
are from fully interacted models where all variables, not just birth order, are interacted
with birth-space. Looking at these results, we can see that birth order effects on enrolment,
completed years of education, and schooling progression are still negative, as in the main
results. In addition, the magnitudes of the coefficients are slightly larger than those reported
in the main results, Table 4.2, particularly the fifth-borns’ disadvantage in completed years
of education relative to first-born where the difference is largest, about 0.1 years.
More interestingly, birth order interactions with child-spacing are negative and statist-
ically significant in the completed years of education regression. This indicates that child-
spacing amplifies the negative birth order effects on completed years of education. For
example, increasing the age gap between the third- and fourth-born by one year reduces the
fourth-born’s completed years of education by 0.24 (that is, −0.230− 0.00848) years relative
to the first born.
These results could be an artefact of infant and child mortality rates that change the
actual birth spacing pattern. Nonetheless, according to the Ministry of Health et al. (2005),
the difference between the mean number of children ever-born (i.e. 1.80) and the mean num-
ber of living children (i.e. 1.62) of women aged 15 to 49 years is 0.18. This is a numerically
small difference. Therefore, infant and child mortality rates are likely to have a minimal
influence, if any, on the observed birth spacing effects.
These results are consistent with models that emphasise the importance of early qual-
ity investments (in the form of high intellectual enrolment and/or strict parenting which
instils discipline) enjoyed by the first-born children as the driving force behind birth order
effects. Without better data, however, it is difficult to pin down which mechanism, whether
the intellectual environment or the strict parenting, birth-spacing actually captures in this
context.
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Table 4.8: Effect of the child-spacing, birth order and their interaction on educational de-
velopment and child labour, with Fixed Effects
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
Enrolment Education Schooling progression
Second-Born -0.0596*** -0.116*** -0.132***
(0.00623) (0.0209) (0.0105)
Third-Born -0.126*** -0.177*** -0.263***
(0.0121) (0.0397) (0.0204)
Fourth-Born -0.214*** -0.230*** -0.423***
(0.0187) (0.0601) (0.0314)
Fifth-Born -0.311*** -0.405*** -0.654***
(0.0350) (0.104) (0.0619)
Second-Born×Birth-Space -0.000792 -0.00649 -0.00285
(0.00144) (0.00412) (0.00308)
Third-Born×Birth-Space -0.00118 -0.00716* -0.00305
(0.00145) (0.00412) (0.00308)
Fourth-Born×Birth-Space -0.00104 -0.00848** -0.00299
(0.00150) (0.00421) (0.00314)
Fifth-Born–Birth-Space
(omitted) 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
Constant 0.994*** 1.183*** 1.298***
(0.0220) (0.0842) (0.0380)
Observations 77,730 77,471 67,124
R-squared 0.098 0.776 0.121
Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-12 from families with 2-5 children, and where the oldest observed
child is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
and gender of the child, and location, location interacted with gender, and household head’s education.
Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child is reported as enrolled. Education is completed years of
schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age − 6). Birth-space is the actual age gap between
successive siblings. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the family level. ***significant at 1
percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine the effect of birth order on educational attainment in Lesotho
using the 2006 Census data for children aged 6 to 12 years. Applying family fixed effects
models, I find robust negative birth order effects on all measures of educational attainment
(enrolment, completed years of education, and schooling progression). These results are in
stark contrast with previous evidence from developing countries, but much in line with that
from the developed world, and hence strongly challenge the idea that birth order effects in
developing countries are largely due to wealth constraints.
I also investigate heterogeneities in birth order effects due to family size and family gender
bias, and find that birth order effects are more pronounced in large families. I take this as
part evidence for the confluence model predictions. Furthermore, there is strong evidence
that girls’ education is favoured over that of boys.
Turning to the potential pathways through which these birth order effects operate, there
is evidence that they are mainly transmitted through the average age gap between two
close siblings. I find no support for the hypothesis that birth order effects are propagated
through family wealth as previously found in other developing countries. Taken together,
the evidence presented here largely supports the notion that it is early quality investments
enjoyed by earlier-born children that gives them a comparative advantage over their siblings
in human capital accumulation. More research is, however, needed to test many other
potential pathways that could strengthen this explanation. For example, do pre- and post-
natal parental investments on children vary with birth order?, If so, how? Answering these
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Source: Own calculations from 2006 Census. Notes: The left panel of the figure shows the proportion of
6-25 year olds who are household heads or spouses by age, while the right panel shows the proportion of 6-25
year olds who are sons/daughters-in-law in a household by age.
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Table A.1: The Effect of Birth Order on Educational Attainment
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
Enrolment Education Schooling progression
Second-Born 0.00198 -0.0354*** -0.000591
(0.00251) (0.0122) (0.00243)
Third-Born -0.00371 -0.0247 -0.00106
(0.00368) (0.0151) (0.00370)
Fourth-Born -0.0250*** -0.0494*** -0.0268***
(0.00655) (0.0191) (0.00662)
Fifth-Born -0.0378* -0.0543 -0.0502**
(0.0204) (0.0402) (0.0212)
Three children -0.0196*** -0.0855*** -0.0251***
(0.00396) (0.0138) (0.00395)
Four children -0.0358* -0.101 -0.0359*
(0.0201) (0.0645) (0.0184)
Five children -0.0696 -0.0280 0.0590
(0.0758) (0.526) (0.102)
Constant 0.856*** 0.707*** 0.689***
(0.00601) (0.0211) (0.00729)
Observations 55,137 54,947 54,947
R2 0.077 0.661 0.111
Notes: The sample is all children from families with 2-5 children aged 6-12 , and where the oldest observed
child is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
and gender of the child, and location, location interacted with gender, and household head’s education.
Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child is reported as enrolled. Education is completed years of
schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age− 6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
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Second-Born -0.0296 -0.157** -0.0464
(0.0219) (0.0743) (0.0377)
Third-Born -0.0505 -0.355** -0.0654
(0.0442) (0.147) (0.0768)
Fourth-Born -0.00475 -0.639** -0.149
(0.0824) (0.260) (0.142)
Fifth-Born (omitted) - - -
Second-Born×Family Size -0.00839 0.0194 -0.0238**
(0.00650) (0.0216) (0.0106)
Third-Born×Family Size -0.0202 0.0249 -0.0538**
(0.0126) (0.0408) (0.0210)
Fourth-Born×Family Size -0.0482** 0.0291 -0.0731**
(0.0214) (0.0673) (0.0360)
Fifth-Born×Family Size -0.0628*** -0.159*** -0.145***
(0.00963) (0.0293) (0.0160)
Constant 0.996*** 1.191*** 1.301***
(0.0214) (0.0850) (0.0383)
Observations 77,730 77,471 67,124
R2 0.099 0.778 0.121
Number of Families 46,973 46,905 45,500
Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-12 from families with 2-5 children, and where the oldest observed
child is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
and gender of the child, and location, location interacted with gender, and household head’s education.
Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child is reported as enrolled. Education is completed years of
schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age− 6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.
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Table A.3: The Effect of Birth Order on Educational Attainment, Fixed Effects by Gender
of the First-Born: Fully Interacted model
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3)
Enrolment Education Schooling progression
Second-Born -0.0602*** -0.0130 -0.138***
(0.00923) (0.0306) (0.0153)
Third-Born -0.122*** -0.0522 -0.257***
(0.0176) (0.0580) (0.0294)
Fourth-Born -0.206*** -0.0995 -0.403***
(0.0267) (0.0864) (0.0451)
Fifth-Born -0.285*** -0.137 -0.584***
(0.0445) (0.134) (0.0815)
Second-Born ×FirstBorn Girl -0.00156 -0.180*** 0.0179
(0.0126) (0.0415) (0.0211)
Third-Born×FirstBorn Girl -0.0193 -0.239*** -0.00575
(0.0239) (0.0780) (0.0405)
Fourth-Born×FirstBorn Girl -0.0248 -0.283** -0.0303
(0.0361) (0.116) (0.0614)
Fifth-Born×FirstBorn Girl -0.0326 -0.367** -0.0657
(0.0606) (0.179) (0.109)
Constant 1.001*** 1.056*** 1.295***
(0.0216) (0.0819) (0.0373)
Observations 77,730 77,471 67,124
R-squared 0.098 0.776 0.122
Number of num id 46,973 46,905 45,500
Notes: The sample is all children aged 6-12 from families with 2-5 children, and where the oldest observed
child is at most 18 years. All regressions include household head’s education, dummies for age (in years),
and gender of the child, and location, location interacted with gender, and household head’s education.
Enrolment is a dummy which equals 1 if a child is reported as enrolled. Education is completed years of
schooling. Schooling progression equals education/(age−6). Estimates are from fully interacted fixed effects
models where all birth order dummies and controls variables are interacted with First-Born-Girl dummy.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the family level. ***significant at 1 percent, **significant




This thesis investigates how a large public education programme, the Free Primary Education
(FPE) programme, promotes human capital accumulation of primary school-age children,
and how a child’s specific characteristic, the order of birth, might influence intra-household
allocation of resources and hence differences in education outcomes of siblings. These ques-
tions are addressed in three self-contained chapters, each making a contribution towards our
understanding of how public policy and family environment matter for human capital devel-
opment. The data used in this thesis is from Lesotho, a less developed country characterised
by high levels of unemployment, poverty, and inequality.
In 2000, Lesotho instituted the FPE programme, with the goal of improving the level
of education by encouraging primary school-age children to enrol and stay in school until
they have at least completed the seven years of primary schooling. The FPE programme,
therefore, involved abolition of school fees, provision of free textbooks and stationery, and
building and/or refurbishment of new primary schools. It was implemented sequentially,
grade-by-grade, starting with the abolition of school fees in grade one, such that, by 2006,
all primary school grades were covered by the programme. Chapter 2 of the thesis examines
the effect of this programme on human capital development; specifically, its impact on school
enrolment and gender– and wealth–related schooling inequalities.
Owing to the implementation strategy of the FPE programme, there were variations
in enrolment rates over time and across grade-groups (that is, grades covered versus those
not-yet covered), and age-groups (that is, age-appropriate cohorts for covered grades versus
age-appropriate cohorts for the not-yet-covered grades). Thus, the control and treatment
groups are defined in two ways; by grade-group and by age-group. I employ a difference-
in-differences strategy that exploits these variations to tease out the treatment effect of the
policy on enrolment. I use data from the 1995 Household Budget Survey (HBS) and the
2002 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey.
The results of this chapter show that the FPE programme had a significant positive effect
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on school enrolment of primary school-age children between 1995 and 2002. Most import-
antly, the results indicate that the programme raised enrolment of boys (the historically
disadvantaged group in Lesotho) and children from poor backgrounds the most, thereby en-
hancing equity in access. When the treatment is defined by age-group I find a lower-bound
FPE effect of 9.3 percentage points (or 13.2 percent) increase in enrolment. The FPE effect
rises to 28.8 percentage points (or 40.7 percent) increase in enrolment when the treatment
group is defined by grade-group.
On the whole, the results presented in chapter 2 are consistent with the evidence found
in Uganda (Deininger, 2003), and in Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). More importantly,
they show that in an environment where, unlike in Kenya, there is little scope for schooling
demand shifts from public schools (that is, those covered by the FPE policy) to private
schools, FPE does indeed significantly raise access to schooling. From this perspective, FPE
has value for money in that the resources spent have resulted in the desired goals of increasing
enrolment and bridging gender-related inequalities in schooling.
However, the results in chapter 2 tell us nothing about the possible influence of the FPE
programme on changes in educational achievement and educational inequality. Chapter
3 of the thesis attempts to bridge this knowledge gap. Specifically, the chapter uses the
Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ)
grade six pupils’ standardised maths and reading test scores to analyse changes in educational
achievement and educational inequality, and the determinants of such changes. Thus far,
SACMEQ has successfully carried out three survey projects: SACMEQ I conducted in 1995-
1998; SACMEQ II in 1998-2000; and SACMEQ III in 2005-2007. Lesotho only has data for
the last two surveys (SACMEQ II collected in 2000, and SACMEQ III collected in 2007).
Thus, the educational achievement (or educational quality) data used in chapter 3 is for a
cohort that did not go through the FPE programme (the 2000 cohort) and one that went
through the FPE programme (the 2007 cohort).
I use the relative distribution method to analyse the changes in educational achieve-
ment and their implications for educational inequality since the introduction of the FPE
programme. In addition, I employ the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression de-
composition method to analyse the determinants of changes in educational achievement and
changes in educational inequality. Several results stand out from the analysis. I find that
educational quality increased between 2000 and 2007, and this increase was driven by an
improved performance of both low- and high-ability students, but mainly that of low-ability
students. However, during the same period, the results reveal that educational quality polar-
ization (or inequality) increased, particularly so in reading performance, and this was largely
driven by the increase in the spread of test scores below the median.
Turning to results on determinants of changes in educational achievement, they show
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that some of the increase in reading performance is explained by changes in pupil teacher
ratio (PTR), the proportion of children speaking English at home, grade repetition, and
teacher effort (that is, teaching hours per week and testing frequency). The increase in
maths performance is not explained by any of the education policy variables (for example,
PTR), but partly by grade repetition, age, school wealth and school social capital (that is,
whether the surrounding community contributes to school activities such as school building
and maintenance). Nonetheless, much of the increase in educational performance remains
unexplained.
With regard to the determinants of educational inequality, I find that the increase in
educational inequality is strongly associated with changes in grade repetition, teacher effort
and school social capital. Grade repetition has a positive influence on educational inequality,
while high teacher effort and school social capital negatively influence educational inequality.
Furthermore, the results show that much of the observed changes in maths and reading scores’
inequality remain unexplained.
In chapter 4 , I shift focus from the FPE programme effects to analysing how a child’s
specific characteristic, the order of birth, impacts on human capital accumulation through its
influence on parents’ decisions to invest in their children’s education. Specifically, the chapter
evaluates the effect of birth order on school enrolment, completed years of education, and
schooling progression (or relative grade attainment) of primary school-age children (that is,
the 6 to 12 year olds). Schooling progression is defined as completed years of education (or
completed school grades) divided by potential years of education, which is the total number
of years of education that an individual would have completed had she started schooling at
age 6 and successfully completed a grade each year. The empirical analysis uses data from
the 2006 Lesotho Population and Housing Census (the Census). In order to isolate the effect
of birth order on human capital accumulation, I use the within family fixed effects model.
This model enables one to purge any potential endogeneity of birth order that is due to
its correlation with family size and/or any other omitted factors that are common among
siblings. In addition, I control for age fixed effects (or birth cohort effects).
In contrast to the available evidence from many other developing countries data, I find
large and significant negative birth order effects on a child’s educational attainment. On
potential transmission mechanisms, the evidence shows that this negative birth order effect
is propagated through birth-spacing, and not family wealth. These results are contrary to
earlier evidence from other developing countries (for example, Ecuador, Ghana, and Kenya)
which shows that wealth is the underlying causal mechanism behind the positive, not negat-
ive, birth order effect on attainment (Tenikue and Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al., 2014).
Surprisingly, chapter 4’s results affirm the negative birth order effects found in developed
countries (for example, Norway and the United States) (Black et al., 2005; De Haan, 2010).
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The difference with the latter evidence is that, in the United States, for example, De Haan
(2010) finds that family wealth, and not birth-spacing, explains the negative birth order ef-
fect. The findings are consistent with the confluence model’s hypothesis that the high family
intellectual environment that first-borns are born in gives them an advantage over their later
born siblings in human capital accumulation. However, I cannot rule out the hypothesis that
first-borns do better because of being brought up under tougher parental disciplinary rules
than their younger siblings.
Implications of the findings : The results of this thesis have a number of implications for
policy and the literature. The first and most important implication of the results in this
thesis is that it is possible that, if the FPE policy can be instituted in those sub-Saharan
African countries still lagging behind in education indicators, the ‘Education for All’ goal
can be achieved.
Second, Lesotho is one of the first countries to have sequentially implemented the FPE
programme in sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that educational achievement increased since
the policy was introduced, and that this increase is positively associated with educational
policy variables (for instance, PTR and instructional time) suggests that the sequential
implementation strategy potentially helps to minimise the disruptions in the system and
reduce potential negative quality effects of the programme on quality. This is possibly a
good policy lesson to those countries that are yet to institute FPE programmes.
Third, the increase in educational achievement inequality will have negative implications
on health and earnings inequalities (Becker and Tomes, 1986a; Alves, 2012; Ferreira and
Gignoux, 2014). The Lesotho government thus should implement policies to address edu-
cational inequality in order to reduce the high level of income inequality. More generally,
the evidence suggests that for countries to effectively address the income inequality problem,
distributional changes in educational quality have to be closely monitored, such that any
emerging inequalities can be bridged in time.
Fourth, the result that grade repetition has a significant influence on achievement seems to
support the evidence found by Foureaux Koppensteiner (2014) in Brazil (see also Rodrigues
et al., 2013) which indicates that relaxing the retention policy reduces students’ performance.
Therefore, the finding suggests that the automatic grade promotion policy that is now being
implemented in Lesotho could hurt educational quality.
Fifth, the fact that much of the changes in both educational achievement and inequality
are unexplained by the observed characteristics indicates that there could be other intan-
gible school quality variables and student family background factors that potentially have a
significant influence on educational performance.
The implications of the negative birth order results are twofold. One is that, the theories
that try to explain birth order effects in developing country contexts cannot be generalised
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as yet. We still have to identify those conditions or contexts that fit the negative birth order
effects and those that fit the positive birth order effects because it is evident that the level
of development cannot be the only factor. Lastly, for policy direction, the results suggest
that, in order to attenuate these birth order effects and increase educational attainment
of later-borns, it is essential that the government designs policies that will improve school
participation of later-borns, especially for boys and those from larger families. Without
speculating on the general equilibrium effects, one such policy intervention could be the
introduction of conditional cash transfers to larger families, particularly those with first-
born boys.
Directions for future research: This thesis has shown that FPE does increase school
enrolment of primary school-aged children. However, schooling is not education. It is just an
input into education production. The critical question of whether the programme increased
educational achievement still remains open. In addition, we have seen that most of the
increase in educational achievement and educational inequality is not related to changes in
any of the observed variables. That is, the increase in educational achievement is potentially
explained by unobserved school and family factors. This then calls for more research work
focusing on the effects of intangible family and school factors on educational achievement.
The results in chapter 3 seem to support the confluence model’s hypothesis (Zajonc, 1976).
However, the fact that the results cannot be divorced from the predictions of the strategic
parenting hypothesis implies that more research is needed to test many other potential
pathways through which birth order affects educational achievement to either support or
discount the explanation given in this thesis.
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